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Abstract
This dissertation is a rewriting of Dubai's urbanity as global history.  Drawing on 
documentary and ethnographic evidence, it revisits both popular and academic 
notions of the global city in Dubai as a novel entity, highlighting the ways in which 
such notions remain tethered to analyses of the city's superlative urban forms and 
iconic architecture in the 21st century.  While unpacking the politics of capital and 
dynasty in denying Dubai a history prior to globalization as well as silencing the 
city's other pasts and histories of global connections, I present a city that is a material 
embodiment of social, cultural, spatial and political processes.  Tied to pre-existing 
structures and rather long periods of economic, social and political change within the 
canvas of global history, I argue that these are processes that constitute the subject of 
history and therefore ought to be studied as such.  My study of Dubai documents 
these processes as connections and entanglements between particular spaces and 
times, illustrating how such connections and entanglements facilitated, staged and 
legitimized by the city, have essentially been global in their effects and have had 
consequences not just for Dubai but for other spaces as well.  In doing so, I offer a 
picture of the global city in Dubai as social reality rendered through processes and 
practices addressed from below rather than as a standalone political, cultural and 
financial symbol of 21st century capital.  
My narrative of Dubai takes recourse to an Indian Ocean history of trade, migration 
and capital flows as key forces shaping processes of urbanization in the city-state for 
close to two centuries.  It further explores the ways in which the Indian Ocean as a 
distinctive social, political, financial and most importantly, monetary geography 
interlocked with a post-war international system of nation-states and their monetary 
geographies to create particular trajectories and social constituencies of capital and 
commodity flows defining Dubai.  It is these trajectories and social constituencies of 
capital, commodity and monetary exchange, mapped by and at the helm of which are 
v
Indian migrants, traders and entrepreneurs who have traversed  it in imperial and 
post-imperial times, that have fed into Dubai's diverse pathways of globalization in 
the 21st century.  
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Chapter One
Geographies of Commerce: Globalizing Dubai in History
Dubai, in the early years of 21st century, began to feature on an almost daily basis in 
the popular travel, destination and lifestyle columns of many international dailies.  
Drawing the reader's attention in The New York Times, for instance, are tips on how 
to spend a rewarding 36 hour break in Dubai, which for the writer is a city that has it 
all, or if it doesn't, is building it, or “if it's not building it, it's dredging up an island to 
put it on.”1  A British expatriate who had lived in the city for some time and writes a 
travel column in The Telegraph, offers a list of attractions in this “playground of the 
Middle East,” ranging from jet and sand to snow skiing on the one hand to golf, 
safari, fine dining and shopping on the other.2  The euphoria and aura around Dubai 
as the global urban future however, was short-lived. With the financial meltdown of 
2008 bringing the city's many extravagant projects to a grinding halt, negative 
criticism of the city's pace, style and promise of growth began to outweigh all its 
hype in what have been referred to as acts of "Dubai bashing" by bloggers in the 
city.3  Prognoses of the city as a "giant gamble," a "bellwether of the global credit 
crunch," "the foreclosure of a dream,"4 and with a future which "looks like nothing so 
much as a nightmare of the past,"5 all seemed to make sense in the climate of acute 
1 Danielle Pergament, “36 Hours in Dubai,” The New York Times, April 6, 2008, 
http://travel.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/travel/06hours.html?ref=36hours. (accessed May 10, 2010).
2 Tiffany Hancock, “Dubai: What to See and Do,” The Telegraph, February 7, 2004, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/middleeast/dubai/729620/Dubai-what-to-see-and-
do.html (accessed May 10, 2010). Also see Andrew Flintoff, “Andrew Flintoff's Dubai,” 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/celebritytravel/7221016/Andrew-Flintoffs-Dubai.html (June 2, 
2010).
3 Govind Dhar, comment on “Diaspora Diaries: Dubai,” Mumbai Boss, comment posted  on February 
16, 2010, http://mumbaiboss.com/2010/02/16/sand-spit-and-ink (accessed August 12, 2010) and 
Grace, comment on “Dubai Bashing: a New Sport,” Sandier Pastures, comment posted on April 18, 
2009, http://sandierpastures.com/personal/personal-thoughts/dubai-bashing-a-new-sport.html 
(accessed August 25, 2010). 
4 Christopher Davidson, “Dubai: Foreclosure of a Dream,” Middle East Report 251 (Summer 2009): 
9-13. 
5 Mike Davis, “Fear and Money in Dubai,” New Left Review 41 (September-October 2006): 68. 
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economic recession in the emirate.  An article in The Independent offers us the 
perfect snapshot of Dubai as having been nothing but a betrayal of its urban 
promises, 
Short of oil, Dubai attempted to create an artificial economy from reclaimed land and 
borrowed capital; but it was unnatural both economically and in an environmental sense.  
Grand as Palm Island and those imperious tower blocks appear, they are badly damaged 
collateral, a financial mirage.  As our banks are discovering, Dubai is simply sub-prime in 
the desert.6
Not only is Dubai seen by some as a failed model in economic development, it also 
remains an anomaly in the popular and scholarly imagination, by and large, given its 
rather truncated course of urbanization and short-circuited approach to capitalist 
modernity.  Dubai has been variously described as “a wild ride,”7 a legend, and as 
having “fast forwarded from the 18th to the 21st century in a single generation.”8 It has 
become after Los Angeles in the 20th century, the one city inspiring ruthlessly critical 
epistemologies and dystopic visions of the urban, the social and the economic as its 
hallmark.  Interestingly, all that Dubai is accused of now, was once pertinent to Los 
Angeles—real estate capitalism, low property taxes, speculation, non-unionized 
migrant labour, ecological deterioration, oil bonanza, obsession with architecture and 
the culture of myth making around the city through the media, being the most 
striking commonalities.9  Criticism of Dubai, however, does not stop with these.  It is 
not a city that spells counterfeit urbanity like Los Angeles.  It carries, on the other 
hand, as manifest in the writings of Mike Davis, not just the charge of an aberration 
of the normative urban, but an aberration of the very aberration itself.  Dubai is 
doubly fake, a city twice removed from the real and therefore worthy of pointed 
censure: 
[T]he coastal desert has become a huge circuit board upon which the elite of transnational 
engineering firms and retail developers are invited to plug in high-tech clusters, 
6 Sean O'Grady, “Is Dubai the New Lehmans?,” The Independent, November 26, 2009, 
http://independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/sean-ogrady-is-dubai-the-new-lehmans-
1828328.html (accessed January 12, 2011). 
7 Jim Krane, foreword to Dubai: The Story of the World's Fastest City (New York: Atlantic Books, 
2010), viii. 
8 Johann Hari, “The Dark Side of Dubai,” The Independent, April 7, 2009, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johan-hari/the-dark-side-of-dubai-1664368.html
(accessed January 5, 2011). 
9 Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (London: Vintage, 1990). 
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entertainment zones, artificial islands, glass-domed 'snow mountains,' Truman Show 
suburbs, cities within cities—whatever is big enough to be seen from space and bursting 
with architectural steroids. The result is not a hybrid but an eerie chimera: a promiscuous 
coupling of all the cyclopean fantasies of Barnum, Eiffel, Disney, Spielberg, Jon Jerde, 
Steve Wynn and Skidmore, Owings & Merrill. Although compared variously to Las Vegas, 
Manhattan, Orlando, Monaco and Singapore, the sheikhdom is more like their collective 
summation and mythologization: a hallucinatory pastiche of the big, the bad and the ugly.10
The trajectory to such a fantasy of city could only be traced to a political anomaly, 
the Maktoum monarchy and its strategic cover up, even willful tolerance of many of 
the dark and fearful secrets underlying Dubai.  Political commentaries and financial 
analyses, although sparing the Sheikh himself in their fierce criticism of the legion of 
Dubai's evil pursuits of wealth, made no efforts to conceal the city as situated at the 
centre of a global network of money laundering, terrorism,  prostitution and drug 
trafficking.11  A set of discourses around fear, drawing on Dubai's connections with 
the Al Qaeda and culminating in the Dubai Ports World incident of 2006 (in which 
the US government's decision to hand over the management of six ports in the 
country to Dubai Ports World had to be revoked), suddenly came to align itself with 
the discourses of the city as a debacle in urbanity.12  In what Benjamin Smith calls a 
“racist geographic sleight of hand,” Dubai had gone overnight “from the darling of 
the world business elite to a pariah in Middle America.”13
For all the fantasies, perceptions, fears and suspicions rallied by politicians and 
media wizards in the 'West,' Dubai exists, even thrives, and remains far from what 
apocalyptic visions of the city envisaged it would be.  It continues to inspire other 
cities and spaces in the developing world as a model of economic growth, 
particularly in the property and real estate sectors.  As I write this dissertation, 
Emaar, Al Ghurair and Al Futtaim some of the biggest parastatal property developers 
and real estate conglomerates are importing Dubai's city centers, business parks and 
integrated urban communities and recreating them in aspiring cities in the Middle 
10 Davis, “Fear and Money,” 49. 
11 John Sfakianakis, “Gray Money, Corruption and the Post-September 11 Middle East,” Middle East 
Report 222 (Spring 2002): 32-39. 
12 Paul Krugman, “Osama, Saddam and the Ports,” The New York Times, February 24, 2006, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B07E3DF1F3EF937A15751C0A9609C8B63 
(accessed January 31, 2014).  Also see Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. “Peril in Port,” New York Sun, February 
15, 2006, http://www.nysun.com/opinion/peril-in-port/27663/ (accessed January 31, 2014).  
13 Benjamin Smith, “The Great Ports Panic of 2006,” Middle East Report 248 (Fall 2008): 40-44. 
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East, North Africa and South Asia.14  The pace at which Dubai has diversified into 
new economic ventures and projects including the world's largest airport15 and gold 
refinery as well as a bullion bank16 puts the crisis story behind a new phase of history 
in the city. When I went to do my fieldwork in November 2011, I found Dubai much 
the same as I had in 2005, visiting my parents who had lived there for close to thirty 
years and who were leaving it forever to settle in India.  Migrants from India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka as well as Iran, parts of Central Asia and the Persian 
Gulf continued to throng to the city in search of better prospects, whether as blue or 
white collar workers, labourers, entrepreneurs or established business people.  Dubai 
was far from an urban fantasy in the desert or the site of a potential ghost town, but a 
city like it has always been, grounded in and negotiating its own specific processes 
and practices of urbanization.  The airport, duty free shops, streets, shopping malls, 
offices and other public spaces were crowded as they always were, in my memories 
of the city as a child, an adolescent and later as a young adult.  The newly opened 
Dubai Metro had no dearth of commuters, the Gold Souk, buyers; offices, staff; 
restaurants, customers; and construction sites, laborers.  If anything, the monumental 
office buildings and apartments on Dubai's Sheikh Zayed Road evacuated by 
westerners during the crisis, were according to cab drivers, cafeteria boys, real estate 
agents and financial brokers, finding new occupants from among the richer Indians 
and other South Asians.  Dubai, indeed was becoming more 'stable,' 'secure' and 
'sober,' in the views of many of these men I was in conversation with while in the 
city in 2011 and 2012.  It was a city that worked, a city that could maneuver global 
flows of commodities, people, capital, discourses, images and cultures in its own 
14 For a list of real estate and urban community projects in Dubai, the Emirates and overseas, go to 
the websites of the Al Futtaim group http://www.afrealestate.com/content/residential.aspx, the Emaar 
group http://www.emaar.com/en/index.aspx, and the Al Ghurair group 
http://www.alghurair.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35&Itemid=213. 
15 “Dubai's appetite for construction continues with multi-billion dollar boost to build world's largest 
airport,” CNN Travel, September 10, 2014 http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/09/travel/dubai-al-
maktoum-airport-expanasion/ (accessed September 15, 2014). 
16 Andrew Torchia, “Gold industry shifts east as Dubai plans huge refinery, spot contract,” Reuters 
May 5, 2014 http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/05/05/emirates-dubai-gold-idINKBN0DL0LJ20140505
(accessed September 15, 2014) and Simon Bowers, “Billion dollar gold market in Dubai where not all 
was as it seemed,” The Guardian, February 25, 2014 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/feb/25/billion-dollar-gold-market-dubai-kaloti (accessed 
September 9, 2014). 
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terms and to its advantage as well as to that of other spaces bound intimately and 
tangentially to it.  My enquiry on Dubai was precisely along these lines, in other 
words, it was to see how the city worked in and through its global connections in 
history as well as in the present.  
Figure 1.1: The United Arab Emirates (Courtesy: Google Maps)
Dubai is the second largest of the seven emirates that collectively constitute the 
federation of the United Arab Emirates or the UAE, otherwise referred to as the 
Emirates.  The United Arab Emirates was formed with Abu Dhabi as its capital in 
December 1971 when the British withdrew from the Persian Gulf after more than a 
century of treaty relationships with its different principalities.17 It is a member of the 
Gulf Co-operation Council or the GCC which is a political and economic alliance of 
six oil producing states in the Persian Gulf.18  Each of the individual emirates of the 
17 For details see James Onley, “Britain's Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820-1971,” Journal of Social 
Affairs 22, no.87 (2005): 29-43. 
18 The other members are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. 
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federation is headed by a sheikh or a ruler, owing to which their principalities also 
take the name 'sheikhdoms.'  Ruled by the sheikhly family of the Maktoums for close 
to two centuries now, Dubai is also the seat of the Vice-President and Prime Minster 
of the Emirates.  Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum who holds both these 
titles like his brother and father did, is the current ruler and the political architect of 
the city-state that Dubai is associated with in the popular imagination today. 
In this dissertation, I propose a Dubai beyond popular fantasies and fears and 
continuing to mark its presence as a place and a city in its own right.  My narrative of 
Dubai is grounded in an Indian Ocean history of trade, migration and capital flows 
and the development of a global economy spanning a century and a half.  In the 
study, the Indian Ocean is redeemed as an alternate frame within which the 
connected histories of Dubai, India and other regions in Central and Southeast Asia 
as well as Eastern Europe in their imperial, post-imperial and global contexts make 
sense. This frame, therefore, is spatial, historical and political as well as generative of 
newer epistemic and methodological possibilities.  “Geographies of commerce” is 
the key conceptual category I propose to study some of the ways, practices and 
processes in which the Indian Ocean continues to define Dubai's urbanization.  It is 
through the idea of “geographies of commerce” that I recover concepts, discourses 
and narratives that produce, define and are produced in the everyday lives of 
communities implicated in the course of these histories.  As a step in this direction, 
this dissertation aims to recoup this world of mobilities, transactions and exchanges 
of an economic, social, cultural and political nature.  In the process I hope to restore 
to Dubai its urban history and present as against a present that looks only towards an 
imagined global future. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the contexts of globalization and 
urbanization within which literature on Dubai began to surface and the attitudes to 
the city's history espoused in them.  While pointing to the inadequacies of their 
project of the global city in Dubai, which I illustrate is at odds with its history of 
global relations of trade, migration and capital, the chapter foregrounds the city as a 
concept in the writing of Dubai's history.  The section on Indian Ocean Dubai both 
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presents the contemporary tradition of research on the the city in this direction as 
well as adds to it as an evolving complex of conjoining and contesting structures and 
practices of monetary transactions.  The penultimate section discusses the key 
conceptual foundation for the thesis, namely "geographies of commerce", while the 
concluding section sets out the methods and sources as well as a brief outline of 
chapters. 
Global Dubai, an Urban Network, an Image or a City in the Desert? 
Much of the scholarship like popular journalism, literature and film on Dubai 
emerged in the early years of the millennium and forms part of the larger academic 
discourse on cities in the epoch of globalization.  Cities have constituted the most 
perceptible material forms and vibrant experiences of the social, political and spatial 
relations of global capital.  It is not surprising therefore that theories of the latter 
have, in turn, shaped the way we both conceptually understand the city and perceive 
and engage with actual cities in the world.  The city has fascinated urban theorists, 
sociologists, historians, political economists and anthropologists for well over a 
century now, and they have contributed to our knowledge of individual cities as sites 
of manufacturing, political and social movements, art, aesthetics, culture, film and 
music as well as crime, conflict and riots.  With globalization taking over as the 
larger frame however, two significant aspects defining cities have taken precedence 
over other social, political and cultural constellations within cities—these include 
urban networks and iconic urban forms.  
Cities figure no longer as bounded territory, but as extensive networks hinged on 
particular regimes of flows, including those of commodities, labour, capital, images 
and signs in particular directions.19  Entrenched within a system and operating as 
nodes linked through virtual channels of communication, advanced technologies of 
transfer and logistics, the actual geographical referents of cities have become 
marginal to our interests as scholars and critics, much in contrast to earlier 
19 For details on this argument see Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, Cities: Reimagining the Urban 
(Malden, MA: Polity, 2002); Saskia Sassen, introduction to Global Networks: Linked Cities, ed. 
Saskia Sassen (New York: Routledge, 2002), 1-36. 
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approaches to the city as bounded space.20  Alongside this is perhaps a more 
dominant feature of current thinking on the city in terms of its existence as images, 
icons and discourses of actual spatial forms and urban morphologies and the 
engineered experiences offered by these.  Thus, the city in the 21st century 
imagination is both part of a networked system on the one hand and an image, a 
discourse and an urban language on the other.  These dual aspects of the city are not 
segregated elements, rather, they complement, even intersect, each other, to 
transform an existing or a newly evolving urban space into the global city that it 
strives to become. 
Urban networks consist of cities “that can be evaluated across multiple scales for 
both their relational characteristics and their positional implications.”21  Saskia 
Sassen's argument that the territorial dispersal of contemporary economic activity 
and the subsequent centralization of control and management of such activity in 
particular sites have given rise to a new global order, is crucial to understanding the 
hierarchical organization of these urban networks.22  In other words, what we find 
within the networked urban system are cities situated vertically at different 
geographical scales ranging from the local and the national to the regional and the 
global.23  To qualify for global city status, cities had to have certain features.  They 
had to be the command and control centres of banking, finance and management as 
well as offer specialized services, say for instance, stock exchange, corporate law, 
accounting etc., and serve as transnational marketplaces for global economic 
operations.  They had to be sites where the headquarters of multinational 
corporations, international financial institutions and their support services were 
concentrated.  Investing in the urban form and morphology of their territory and the 
symbolic aspects of their history and culture, engineered to suit the interests of 
capital were all part of the strategy towards becoming a global city. 
20 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and 
Culture, vol.1, 2nd ed. (London: Wiley Blackwell, 2011); The Informational City: Information 
Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). 
21 Bruce Stanley, “Middle East City Networks and the 'New Urbanism,'” Cities 22, no.3 (2005): 190. 
22 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1991).  
23 John Friedmann, The Prospect of Cities (Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 2002). 
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The early series of writing on Dubai soon after the turn of the millennium and 
emerging from the fields of architecture and urban planning was obsessed with 
claiming for Dubai the global city status it supposedly deserved.  A work 
representative of the genre is Yasser Elsheshtawy's edited volume, Planning Middle 
Eastern Cities: An Urban Kaleidoscope in a Globalizing World (2004).24  Setting 
themselves the critical task of rethinking Arab/Islamic cities in the Middle East as 
contemporary urban spaces, the contributors evaluate the specific ways in which 
these responded to political, economic and cultural trends identified as the signature 
aspects of globalization.  The editor's case study at the end of the volume, elaborating 
on the spatial characteristics of Dubai, including its premium infrastructure (worthy 
of catering to the standards of transnational corporations) and the state's investment 
in the production of symbols exclusive of the city, hoist Dubai as an exemplar of a 
global city in the Middle East.  Although Elsheshtawy laments that spatial expansion 
towards "New Dubai" may jeopardize the urban fate of its "traditional city," the essay 
concludes on an optimistic note affirming that Dubai could serve as a model for 
"more traditional cities" in the Middle East looking to recreate themselves through 
the popular gaze of 21st century capitalism.  The argument of the volume with its 
disciplinary location in architecture, and its cultural and political location in the 
Arab/Islamic Middle East, rests on the theoretical notion that space works both as the 
cause and effect of capitalism in a post-industrial global economy.  To this spatial 
logic of capitalism not even the supposedly exceptional Middle East, and less so 
Dubai, were exceptions.  Elsheshtawy in vouching for Dubai, a city in the Middle 
East, as entrenched essentially within the structural framework of western capitalism 
strikes at the very orientalist notions of the Middle-eastern city as existing at odds 
with the latter. 
Attempts to understand the ways in which Dubai projected itself as a global city also 
focused on its ability to tap into the vocabularies of "symbolic power"25 or what 
Michele Acuto defines as the “technique of 'worldmaking' that confers influence by 
24 Yasser Elsheshtawy, Planning Middle Eastern Cities: An Urban Kaleidoscope in a Globalizing 
World (London:Routledge, 2004). 
25 For a discussion of symbolic power, refer Pierre Bordieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” 
Sociological Theory 7, no.1 (1989): 14-25. 
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mediating people's understanding of the world.”26  In other words, Dubai was 
portrayed as a city that could represent itself in terms of the already existing semantic 
codes of contemporary cities and even so, alter modes, categories and structures of 
perceiving, classifying and conceptualizing them.  He identifies architecture and 
architectural icons, skyscrapers, ultra-modern airports and international trade centres 
among others as the principal sites that display and negotiate the degree of symbolic 
power accruing to urban Dubai today.  Scholars looking at urban development in the 
city through its "spectacular projects" and an "artificial and themed urbanity," say for 
instance, resort hotels, shopping malls, theme parks, island empires and landfills of 
waterfronts on its coastline, point to Dubai's symbolic capital as having graduated to 
an "economy of fascination."27  Dubai thus joins the rank of cities like Las Vegas and 
Orlando in contemporary times and is symptomatic of a development “increasingly 
reducing everyday 'reality' and replacing it with a 'culture of simulation.'”28  It is this 
urban capacity to alter everyday experiences through programmed spatial and 
emotional interventions and render them, as Anthony Giddens observes, more 
realistic than their unaltered forms, that in many ways exemplifies it as a global 
city.29
Investment in symbolic power, however, in the case of Dubai does not limit itself to 
spatial and architectural expressions or the commercialization of emotion and 
experience.  The emirate's stakes in and exploitation of the dominant discourses, 
descriptions and categories informing popular perceptions of its urbanity are some of 
the other significant pathways to symbolic capital that critics have addressed in some 
detail.  A particularly valuable concept in this regard has been Benjamin Smith's 
"market orientalism."30  Smith argues that Orientalism and the market are not in the 
26 Michele Acuto, “High-rise Dubai Urban Entrepreneurialism and the Technology of Symbolic 
Power,” Cities 27, no.4 (2010): 272-284. 
27 Heiko Schmid, “Economy of Fascination: Dubai and Las Vegas as Themed Urban Landscapes,” 
Erdkunde 60, no.4 (2006): 346-361. 
28 Schmid, “Economy of Fascination,” 347.  For a discussion of simulation, its conceptual meanings, 
its origins in art and its aestheticization of banal realities and everyday lives, see Jean Baudrillard, 
Simulations, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman (Semiotext [e], Inc., 1983), 
https://archive.org/stream/Simulations1983/Baudrillard_Simulations#page/n0/mode/2up. 
29 Anthony Giddens. Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford 
University Press, 1991). 
30 For details see, Benjamin Smith, “Dubai, Landscape and the Production of Attractive Markets” 
10
case of Dubai mutually exclusive categories as current epistemologies of the city 
would have us believe.  Orientalism, a circuit of textual and discursive practices 
validating the imaginative geography of the Middle East as the other of the modern, 
progressive and civilized West, sets Dubai back in time and confines it to the domain 
of culture, essentially Islamic and Arab.31  The discourse of the market on the 
contrary, situates it within the realm of capital and modernity, equating it in principle, 
with urban spaces and cities in the west.  The intersection of these discursive fields 
points to the utility of the concept in the analyses of commercial rivalries between 
the West and its other as well as the complex and often contradictory political 
articulations of these rivalries.  Smith discusses market orientalism in relation to the 
question of doing transnational business within the Middle East highlighting how 
notions of religious and cultural orthodoxy are raked up to prevent firms and 
corporations from migrating into the Middle East.  However, Dubai in its global 
urban ambitions, he argues, uses the very same discourse that alienates other cities 
and spaces in the Middle East to mark its exceptionality within it and draw in 
investors, tourists and shoppers who come to the city to experience such 
exceptionality.  At the heart of the project of market orientalism in the otherwise 
"desert emirate," observes Smith, is landscape.32  Landscape in Dubai, like 
elsewhere, is an optical illusion of reality, even history that the state and the elite 
have created.  This illusion we buy into, oblivious of the social relations that it both 
contests and abstracts history from. 
The mythical use of landscape in Dubai clearly manifest in the city drawing on its 
oriental desert past to trumpet its novelty, exoticism and the superlative scale of its 
successes considered impossible to achieve elsewhere, and in terms intelligible to a 
global audience, has formed the theme of many significant works.  An interesting 
cultural metaphor used to describe this particular discursive strategy of competitive 
urban marketing premised on the image of the desert in Dubai and its transformation 
into a world class city is "Scheherazading," or in literal terms, storytelling.33  
(PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 2008), 70-78. 
31 Edward. W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (Toronto: Vinatge, 1979). 
32 For the discussion on landscape and its conceptual underpinnings, see Smith, Dubai, 37-65. 
33 Alamira Reem Bani Hashim, Clara Irazabal and Greta Byrum, “The Scheherazade Syndrome,” 
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Storytelling in and about Dubai seems to have an element of orientalist magic to it 
and has created a cult of urban fantasy around the city.  More significantly, its 
magical transformation, articulated as a monumental leap from a small, sleepy 
fishing village in the 19th century to the futuristic urban space of the 21st century in a 
preposterous Arab/Muslim Middle East, began to be an oft-quoted trope of Dubai's 
history.  The narrative genre of the city's urban history rendered much like a tale from
The Arabian Nights and premised on landscape, architecture and the built 
environment as sites of history writing had become quite popular by the latter years 
of the previous decade.34  While not structurally different to the existing tradition of 
scholarship referred to earlier, this genre of writing personalizes history in Dubai 
within the infrastructural modernity and urban morphology argument and condenses 
it to the laissez faire economic policies of the ruling Maktoums.35  Largely episodic 
and anecdotal, this criticism of Dubai does not exceed popular comments on the 
excessively ambitious and unrealistic projects of Sheikh Mohammed, the illegal and 
morally corrupt foundations of terrorism, criminal networks, money laundering and 
prostitution and the human costs and effects of the Dubai model of development.36  
The tone of these works attempting to give the new global city candidate a past and a 
history may vary from scathing criticism as in Syed Ali's "gilded cage" of a city to 
apologetic undercurrents in Davidson's vulnerability paradigm.37  Nonetheless, that 
these authors could not evoke a picture of Dubai other than as a paradoxical, plastic 
and a hyper-iconic urban entity38 only betrays their inability to override the given 
categories of discourse delineating the city and the problematic frame of space at the 
core of their analysis.
Architectural Theory Review 15, no.2 (2010): 210-231. 
34 The most well known of works in this genre are by Christopher Davidson, Dubai: The 
Vulnerability of Success (London: Hurst, 2008), Jim Krane, Dubai: The Story of the World's Fastest 
City (New York: Atlantic, 2009) and City of Gold: Dubai and the Dream of Capitalism (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 2009), Syed Ali, Dubai: The Gilded Cage (London: Yale University Press, 2010) and 
Pranay Gupte, Dubai: The Making of a Megapolis (New Delhi: Viking, 2011). 
35 The earlier tradition too offers the contemporary city in Dubai an (infra)structural continuity in the 
past, but the monarchic politics of the Maktoums in all of these infrastructural projects is taken for 
granted rather than explicitly stated. 
36 Ali, Dubai, 16-19.
37 Davidson, Dubai, 6-7. 
38 Ali, Dubai, 38. 
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Ahmed Kanna in Dubai: The City as Corporation (2011) which is one of the most 
significant scholarly contributions on the city to date, addresses the politics of a 
historiography conjectured on space and the kind of urbanization to which it remains 
tied.39  Drawing on the writings of Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey and others, he 
foregrounds the political dimensions of space in Dubai and situates it at the centre of 
what he calls the "family-state" of the Maktoums and their project of appropriation of 
its urban history.  The consciousness that urban space must form the site of 
inscription of state power and that urbanization through the symbolic rendition and 
use of space must remain the exclusive prerogative of the state, he reminds us, has 
been the dominant ideology of the Maktoums since the 1950s.  The project of the 
state revolved around the symbolic, spatial and political management of social and 
cultural difference in Dubai and the hierarchization of cultures, classes and 
ethnicities in terms of their utility to the spatial base of its power.  It was the spatial 
thinking of the Maktoums that created distinct regimes of citizenship and patterns of 
urban inclusion in the emirate, run and managed as a city-corporation.  In other 
words, the ethnic and neoliberal categories of the citizen as well as the consumer 
clientele, all made sense in a context where the state could, given the lack of political 
resistance, transform architectural space into social space in almost absolute terms.  
The politics of the Maktoums also involved what Kanna calls the “spatialization of 
Dubai as a blank slate,”40 or the capacity to restore its sovereign territory as what 
Harvey calls "absolute space."41  For the regime to work on space and the concept of 
space so as to amend these to suit its ideology, it (space) had to be rendered empty, 
abstract, devoid of history and erased of the signs of political struggle.  It was only 
on de-historicized and de-politicized space that the regime could build the world's 
tallest tower, only seven star hotel, biggest malls and the most exquisite private 
beaches, and also exude a sense of greater political and territorial security for 
particular classes of the elite, including wealthy foreigners and tourists. The idea of 
Dubai as having been built from the desert and therefore from nothingness makes 
39 Ahmed Kanna, Dubai: The City as Corporation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2011). 
40 Kanna, Dubai, 209-217. 
41 David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical 
Development (London: Verso, 2006), 121-122.
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better sense when looked at from this perspective.  The desert in this perspectival 
scheme is only a geographical signifier for a conceptual signified, the absence of 
history.  To put it differently, the void that the desert stands for is a metaphor for the 
historical vacuum inscribed on Dubai by the ruling regime.
Scholars have traced the pathways to Dubai's global urbanity—the diverse spatial, 
symbolic and political aspects which have been set out in the preceding pages—to 
the economic policies of the state, its property regime and its absolute control over 
urban planning.  That the three work in concert with each other as part of the 
framework of an urban development hinged on the spatial logic of capitalism is 
something we begin to see with Michael Pacione's profile of Dubai.  He writes of the 
city as “a hybrid model between state control and economic liberalism in which 
urban development is determined largely by the planning vision of the ruling family 
within an environment of market capitalism that seeks to attract foreign investment 
and reduce restrictions to free enterprise.”42  Waleed Hazbun adds to this strand of 
thinking on the city's development with his account of the state's practices of land 
allocation and rights distribution, as well as his critical gestures towards the 
partnership between state and private capital engendered by these.  He observes that 
Dubai's current land regime goes back to the 1960s when there were very few 
clusters of settlements in town.43  While some of the long inhabited settlements were 
spared, the remaining territory in the desert and along the coast of the emirate was 
taken over by the Maktoums, giving them 'total territorial control' and the privilege to 
transform such territory into enclaves of tourism, leisure and entertainment with little 
resistance from the citizenry.  The ruler was entitled to “sell the land, lease it, put it to 
special uses over a set period, or allocate it to the municipality for public utilities.”44  
However, what was interesting about the regime was that although property rights 
over land were transferred to private individuals and commercial establishments, the 
latter could only claim ownership of capital and profits, with no "prerogative over the 
42 Michael Pacione, “City Profile: Dubai,” Pacione, Michael. “City Profile: Dubai.”  Cities 22. no. 3 
(2005): 257; and Jeffrey Sampler and Saeb Eigner, ed. Sand to Silicon: Achieving Rapid Growth, 
Lessons from Dubai, ed. (London: Profile Books, 2003), 16-17.  
43 Waleed Hazbun, Beaches, Ruins, Resorts: The Politics of Tourism in the Arab World (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 217. 
44 Pacione, “City profile,” 260. 
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disposition of territory" which essentially remained the state's.45
Is there a Past to Dubai's Global Capital? 
The urban history of towns and cities is more than a history of concrete objects.  It is
constantly transformed into an entire system of signification. The image of the city 
extends beyond the city itself to its articulation, in precise and distinctive ways, to 
the abstract concept of the state, government, society and economic activities.  
K.N.Chaudhuri46 
What interestingly is lacking in the vast majority of scholarly writing on Dubai is a 
sustained engagement with questions of economy or capital, as it were, and the 
practices that have constituted its urbanity.  This might seem like a contradiction of 
sorts given the ample attention paid to its 21st century leisure, shopping and tourism 
economies in contemporary literature and the financial conduits marking them.47  For 
all the speculations on its contemporary economy, touted as “a pioneering model for 
post-oil development,”48 Dubai's pre-globalization economy has evoked very little 
academic interest; if anything, it has been quickly glossed over as based on oil, 
smuggling etc.49  This negligence, I argue, has to do primarily with imagining Dubai 
as territorially entrenched within the multiple geographical scales of an oil-rich 
Middle East; the Arabian Peninsula, its topography corresponding to the political 
geography of the Gulf Co-operation Council or the GCC; and finally the oil 
federation of the United Arab Emirates.50  The Middle East remains a geographical 
construct that does not have a past beyond the early 20th century when it was used to 
designate an arena of strategic operations in west Asia.51  As a popular usage, a 
cultural construct and “a geographical label with a tendency to slide about the map, 
whether following socio-cultural groupings, political boundaries or simple 
45 Hazbun, Beaches, Ruins, Resorts, 217. 
46 K.N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise 
of Islam to 1750 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 338. 
47 Davidson, Dubai, 121-135. 
48 Davidson, Dubai, 1. 
49 Yasser Elsheshtawy, “The Great Divide: Struggling and Emerging Cities in the Arab World,” in 
The Evolving Arab City: Tradition, Modernity and Urban Development ed. Yasser Elsheshtawy 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 2. 
50 The federation of the UAE is financed by the oil revenues accruing to Abu Dhabi.
51 Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 64-65.  
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prejudice,” the Middle East has been all about framing a people, a culture and a 
history as texts, objects and commodities.52  These texts, objects and commodities 
have no existence outside of our intervention as subjects that read, gaze and consume 
them.53  Placing oil as central to both the economy and the state in Dubai is only an 
extended reading in textual fashion, literally and metaphorically, of what happens 
elsewhere in the Middle East, including Abu Dhabi, and hardly takes into account 
any empirical reality as it defines Dubai.
Viewed from the geographical frame of reference in question, the city, quite 
problematically, is only the material form of the abstract entities of state and 
economy and not a socio-spatial form in its own right.  This was partly since modern 
urbanization in the larger part of the Gulf coincided with the establishment of 
independent nation states whose “capital cities became increasingly identified with 
the modern state as they began to extend over large parts of their national territory.”54
Dubai, the city thus became eponymous with Dubai, the emirate, the latter created as 
a constituency of the modern oil federation of the United Arab Emirates and ruled by 
the sheikh or the emir as it were.  Migration from parts of the Indian subcontinent as 
well as Iran was a dominant feature of this phase of urbanization in the Persian Gulf.  
Migrants were required to build, maintain and renovate infrastructure as well as 
provide services to a native population that had to be modernized as subjects of 
welfare regimes in these states.  The increasing demand for labour and services 
including transportation, communication, technology, education and health reflected 
in migrant numbers swelling to alarming proportions with Indians alone estimated to 
have constituted about 24. 5 percent of UAE's migrant workforce in 1982.55 By 2013,   
the number of Indian migrants was estimated at 2. 2 million in the UAE which had a 
migrant stock of 7. 8 million foreign workers out of a total population of 9.2 
million.56 Of the 2. 2 million, 40 percent are from Kerala in South India which also 
52 Lewis and Wigen, The Myth of Continents, 64-65. 
53 For the discussion on imaginative geographies as texts, see Derek Gregory, “Power, Knowledge 
and Geography: The Hettner Lecture in Human Geography,” Geographische Zeitschrift 86, no.2 
(1998): 70-93. 
54 Nelida Fuccaro, “Visions of the City: Urban Studies on the Gulf,” Middle East Studies Association 
Bulletin 35, no.2 (2001): 176. 
55 See “Migrant Workers in the Arab Middle East,” Third World Quarterly 4, no. 3 (1982): 530. 
56 “UAE has 2. 2 m Indians: 40% from Kerala,” Emirates 24/7, May 13, 2013, 
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has the greatest advantage from remittances of Indians working overseas.  Pakistanis 
come a close second to Indians at 1. 2 million, Bangladeshis at 700,000, Filipinos at 
680,000 and Iranians at 400,000.57 That state, economy and culture were deliberately 
constituted as mutually exclusive categories in Gulf societies where migrant 
populations far exceed the demographic category of citizens is an observation Neha 
Vohra makes in her recently published monograph on Dubai's Indian diaspora.58  The 
politics implicit in such a strategy, she elaborates, was to relegate the 'foreigner,' or 
the migrant as it were, to the realm exclusively of the economy59 and define his/her 
existence as subservient to the interests of the citizenry and the logic of a state at the 
helm of the two in Dubai.
Dubai as an emirate, or the seat of the ruling Maktoums, does share certain structural 
and functional features with other oil cities in the Arabian Gulf.  Oil revenues 
construed as primary drivers of urban development in Gulf monarchies, may have in 
more ways than one, consolidated the power of the Maktoums and defended the 
legitimacy of their right to reign over Dubai.  They may also have contributed quite 
significantly to the "ruling bargain" as the key characteristic of economic and 
political subject-hood in the emirate,60 shaped state-society relations and 
institutionalized its bureaucracy and rentier systems of governance.61  However, to 
say that oil created a city and forged an economy on its own terms is to practically 
deny the existence of both prior to oil in the emirate, even erase their imperial and 
post-imperial foundations in trade, mobility and financial exchange.  It is also in 
http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-has-2-2m-indians-40-from-kerala-2013-05-13-
1.506273 (accessed October 10, 2013). 
57 For details see Froilan T. Malit Jr., and Ali Al Youha, “Labour Migration in the United Arab 
Emirates: Challenges and Responses,” http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/labor-migration-united-
arab-emirates-challenges-and-responses (accessed March 21, 2014).
58 Neha Vohra, Impossible Citizens: Dubai's Indian Diaspora (London: Duke University Press, 
2013).   
59 Neha Vohra, “Participatory Exclusion: The Emirati State, Forms of Belonging and Dubai's Indian 
Middle Class,” (PhD diss., University of California, Irvine, 2008), 12.  
60 The ruling bargain is a term coined by Christopher Davidson to explain the project of pursuing 
economic reform without meaningful political reform, not just in Dubai but in the federation as a 
whole.  The components of the ruling bargain, he identifies as “the development of a patrimonial and 
technocratic network, the provision of a veneer of modern, "neo-patrimonial" government institutions, 
and the careful exploitation of a range of ideological, religious, and cultural resources.” For details 
see, Davidson, Dubai, 137-138.  
61 Steffen Hertog, “The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems: Societies of Intermediaries,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 52, no.2 (2010): 282-318. 
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many ways, a statement that trivializes the impact of the city's multiple economies on 
its state, society and politics in both oil and post oil times.
Oil was a relatively late entrant in the emirate's urban, political and economic 
existence.  Although concessions were signed as early as 1939,62 hardly any oil was 
discovered in the emirate until 1966 or exported until 1969.  Abu Dhabi by this time 
had been exporting about 2.5 million tonnes of crude a year for close to six years.63  
At least four offshore oil wells were discovered in the early years of the 1970s, but 
despite their production put together Dubai could not claim more than 4 percent of 
all the oil found in the Emirates, a figure not exceeding 4 billion barrels of proven 
reserves.  By 1975, oil revenues accounted for two-thirds of Dubai's GDP following 
which it was on a downward swing to 50 percent in 1985 and just about 18 in 1995.64
Interestingly, it was in the early 1970s, as reported by the British press, that Dubai's 
trade in gold, more of which we will see in chapters 3 and 4 of the dissertation, was 
running at almost £120 million annually.65  It was also the phase in its economic 
history when the annual import of wrist watches alone was estimated at "40 or 50 per 
head of its population," with these making their way, not unlike gold, as "smuggled 
goods" into India.66  With a creek filled with dhows67 and a modern port where 
container ships loaded with goods imported from as many as seventy countries 
called, Dubai was a vibrant relay market in an entire spectrum of commodities from 
at least the late fifties when oil was still missing from the picture and the Emirates as 
a federation had not yet materialized.68  These figures of the city's trade at a cursory 
glance must explain why I move away from the grand narrative of oil, while focusing 
62 The reference is to the agreement between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Sheikh Said of 
Dubai in 1939 by which the latter was to receive ground rents to the order of 200 rupees per month for 
a plot of land leased out to the company in Hamriya bordering the creek.  For details see “Agreement 
between Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Shaikh Said Bin Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai to lease a plot of 
land,” File No: 1939 R/15/4/3, 7-8. National Centre for Documentation and Research, Abu Dhabi. 
63 “Economist Intelligence Unit, January 2009 UAE Country Report” is quoted by Jim Krane, Dubai, 
50.  
64 Jim Krane, Dubai, 50-52. 
65 Anthony Pearson, “Dhows now turn to trade,” The Guardian, April 24, 1975, 19. 
66 Pearson, “Dhows now turn to trade,” 19. 
67 Dhows are the traditional sailing craft found off the coasts of India, the Persian Gulf and East 
Africa. They have been plying the waters of the Indian Ocean for centuries.  
68 Anjali Chanda, “India—Paradise for Smugglers,” The Times of India, May 23, 1971, 5. For the 
discussion of Dubai's entrepôt trade and the commodities traded from the fifties up until the eighties, 
see chapter 3 of the dissertation.  
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on its economy of trade, re-export and 'smuggling' as significant aspects of its 
urbanity.
As a first step towards studying the history of capital in Dubai as well as the multiple 
dimensions of its economy of trade, I extricate the city from the oil geographies of 
the Middle East as its frame of reference and restore it as a conceptual and 
geopolitical entity in its own right.  I then combine the categories of state, economy 
and culture segregated in the official discourse of the corporate city-state to propose 
a historical reading of the city as a place as well as a site of mobility, exchange and 
transactional flows.  Culture, as it is written back into Dubai in the dissertation, is not 
the reified culture of an imagined Arab past, tribal, homogenous and ethnically pure, 
but a culture of cosmopolitanism entrenched within the particular histories and 
practices of earlier and existing regimes of commerce in the Indian Ocean.  A shift in 
spatial perspective from the Middle East to the Indian Ocean entails more than 
expanding Dubai's economy in space, scale and time or addressing the geographies, 
politics and cultures of global capital that define it.  It is also an attempt to write the 
emirate's urban history from the point of view of a different set of actors, constituted 
in the political discourse of the Emirati state as migrants and foreigners and whose 
distinctive claims to a legitimate presence in Dubai derive from the commercial 
traditions and shared cultures of the Indian Ocean world.  The significance of 
retrieving shared economic, political and spatial structures as well as cultures and 
categories of meaning lies in their potential to explain life in Dubai as it is lived and 
experienced by these different communities of actors in relation to each other and the 
urban society at large.  Lest we are mistaken, it is not just migrant communities of 
traders and immigrants whose perceptions and everyday lives are shaped by these but 
the state itself with its inherited concepts and vocabularies of economic development, 
political governance and bureaucratic administration.  A due analysis of these 
concepts and vocabularies also sheds light on the structural continuities between 
earlier regimes of commerce in the Indian Ocean and its contemporary practices 
ranging from 'smuggling,' to re-exports and the trade in counterfeit, all of which as 
the dissertation shows, are paramount to the transnational urban economy and its 
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social relations in Dubai.  It also reveals the ontological configuration of the state in 
Dubai as concurrently an Indian Ocean city-state, an emirate and the corporation or 
Maktoum Inc., to say the least.
An almost uncritical view of oil as central to the political project in Dubai perhaps 
nowhere more exemplified than in its ruling bargain, deflects attention from other 
more significant practices and constituencies defining the politics of the Maktoums .  
In fact, to construe the ruling bargain as symptomatic only of state-citizen relations is 
to write off non-citizens as insignificant to the constitution and legitimacy of the 
state, a notion this work challenges through historical and ethnographic analyses of 
trade in the city.  Alongside the ruling bargain, as the dissertation illustrates, exists a 
tacit commercial consensus with a much deeper history and a more nuanced texture 
to it.  The trajectory of this consensus goes back to the 19th century and was at the 
core of the state-merchant relations through the times of the burgeoning trade in the 
Persian Gulf.  As a  dynamic political strategy replete with its own set of conflicts 
and conjectures, the dissertation continues to mark the social, ethnic and cultural 
hierarchies prevailing in Dubai's urban economy even today, besides explaining the 
configuration of its smuggling and other illegal trades.  The commercial consensus 
drawing its substance from the cultural and commercial milieu of the Indian Ocean 
world has personal, structural and often (il)legal dimensions to it.  Its intensity and 
indelible presence can be gauged only against the scale and form of the many 'illegal' 
trades in question and the degree of state participation in the production and 
perpetuation of such illegalities.
I illustrate the multiple forms, regimes and practices constitutive of the commercial 
consensus, including that of banking, labour migration and law in chapters 3, 4 and 5 
of the dissertation.  I also signpost the ways in which these regimes, forms and 
practices obfuscate the legal, the formal and the licit; insofar as economic and 
commercial practices in Dubai are concerned.  At this juncture in the discussion, I 
only draw attention to the ways in which the elements of the commercial consensus  
were co-opted by the oil state privileging certain ethnicities of merchants as 
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"gatekeepers around senior regime figures"69 while rendering certain others invisible 
in the domain of political and economic authority.  An interview with a certain 
Muhammad Mahdi Al Tajir, the ambassador of the UAE to the UK and the trusted 
personal adviser of Sheikh Rashid of Dubai that appeared in The Observer lays out in
clear terms the intricacies and shifts in the commercial consensus during the oil 
years.70  Al Tajir, born in Bahrain but exiled as a young man, at the time of the 
publication of the interview in April 1975, had a personal fortune of £ 2,000 million 
and was supposedly "the richest man in the world."  Although he was born into the 
largest family of merchants in Bahrain, he was believed to have made his initial 
capital through the "cut on the gold trade" in Dubai where he had at the behest of 
Sheikh Rashid, taken charge of the Customs, Lands Department and the Ruler's 
Office.
Identifying a whole range of possibilities in the gold trade, apparently destined for 
smuggling into India, he advised the ruler to build adequate port infrastructure while 
the 'business community' asked for a hike in port duties to raise capital required for 
the establishment of public institutions such as a municipality, a school, hospital etc.  
With the discovery of oil, Al Tajir began to negotiate oil leases for many other rulers, 
besides Sheikh Rashid, eventually becoming an international investor with inter-
continental interests in real estate, mining, diamonds and precious stones.  There 
were others like Al Tajir with a similar Arab-Persian ethnicity71 and a trajectory of 
commercial and political success in Dubai and who rose to the ranks of brokers with 
the Maktoums and other sheikh families during the era of oil.  They were from 
among the Al Ghurairs, the Al Tayers and the  Gargashes, to name a few merchant 
families in the Emirates.72  However, the 'business community' in Dubai was not all 
of Persian and Arab merchants, nor was the commercial consensus restricted to these 
ethnicities who naturalized as Emirati citizens following the consolidation of the 
69 Hertog, “The Sociology of Gulf Rentier Systems,” 290-291. 
70 Colin Chapman, “The Richest Man in the World,” The Observer, April 16, 1975, 15. 
71 This Arab-Persian ethnicity was characteristic of the Indian Ocean in pre-oil times.  See James 
Onley, “Transnational Merchants in the Nineteenth Century Gulf: The Case of the Safar Family,” in 
Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf, ed. Madawi Al Rasheed (New York: Routledge, 2005), 
59-89.
72 Hertog, “The Sociology of Gulf Rentier Systems,” 291.  
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federation.  Indian merchants who had historical connections with Dubai from at 
least the mid 19th century and had settled in as diasporic communities were also 
factored in as key constituencies of the consensus, although with much less visibility 
than their Arab and Persian counterparts.  The transition that the latter made as 
gatekeepers, brokers and intermediaries between the regime and its citizens in times 
of oil was certainly not an option available to them.  This however is not to say that 
they did not have privileges or sovereignties tied to their financial position and 
commercial standing within Dubai or that they did not participate in its urban 
development.
Neha Vohra has studied the "unofficial citizenship" and "expatriate client" identities 
of particular categories of Indian merchants in Dubai as effects of what she calls 
"multiple logics of governance."73  These effects, she argues, are most visible in the 
realm of the economy which as neoliberal and open as it claims to be, prohibits the 
entry of other ethnicities into commodity sectors like gold, textiles and electronics, 
over which Indian mercantile communities were granted and have held commercial 
monopolies for the longer part of Dubai's history.  Complicit with the state's project 
of producing social and economic hierarchies beneficial to citizens and to these 
clients, the latter have written themselves out of the political domain and chosen 
much to the state's pleasure, to exert rights and extend the state's practices of 
governance over lower class migrants among Indians.  While these aspects of the 
pact between the state and the Indian elite are significant to thinking politics in 
Dubai, it is the routes that these mercantile communities have taken to reinforcing 
their client positions within the city-state's power grid that help navigate and chart 
the course of the argument in this work. Vohra's emphasis on the merchants' use of 
the informal economy practices for the accumulation of wealth and the creation of 
transnational ethnic strongholds are what offer it entry points into the discussion on 
the commercial consensus.
The informal economy in Dubai revolving around the import and illicit transfer of 
gold, textiles and electronics to India where private trade was heavily regulated well 
73 Vohra, Impossible Citizens, 11-14. 
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into the 1990s relied on, I argue, a completely different order of urbanity and politics 
to that engendered by oil in other Gulf states.  Yet in Dubai, as the dissertation 
shows, politics and urbanity existed at the interface of the two colluding with each 
other in several ways and at the level both of the emirate and the federation so much 
so that the one cannot be made sense of without the other.  If the formal and the 
informal intersected rather than co-existed with each other, it cannot be the case that 
the state was not implicated in this nexus.  In other words, the state in Dubai was in 
its official capacity, the guardian and distributor of oil wealth while remaining in its 
private domain a set of players comprising the Maktoums and their allied families.  
While there is no conclusive evidence to pinpoint the involvement of the Maktoums 
in the informal economy that the Indian state referred to as smuggling, that they 
could not have been unlike the other merchant communities themselves is a closely 
guarded secret within diplomatic circles in India and the Indian population in the 
larger Gulf.  Not uncommon in Indian Ocean societies before and during 
imperialism, the role of the state as a conglomerate of private players was anything 
but legitimate in the post-imperial system of nation-states.  The commercial history 
of Dubai as part of the Indian Ocean world had to be erased following the advent of 
oil not merely because the continuing presence and legacy of this past in the public 
memory would have been fatal to the political legitimacy of the Maktoums and their 
relations with the rest of their oil rich neighbour states.  It was also since Dubai's 
commercial history was one of transnational trade, often illicit than not, and one in 
which not just Indian merchants and others, but Arab traders, citizens and even the 
sheikhs themselves had a dominant role to play.
In order to map Dubai in its present urban contours, it is imperative that we leave 
behind our moral prejudices and return to this commercial past, nuance current 
thinking on migration and trade as merely international border crossing phenomena, 
and revisit the economic, social, historical and political aspects of mobilities, flows 
and structures constitutive of the city.  The key to such an exercise as it is undertaken 
here is the commercial consensus.  At the heart of Dubai's mobilities, structures and 
flows, the commercial consensus is not, I argue, confined to the high profile 
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relations, informal and otherwise of the Maktoum state with Vohra's Indian elite.  On 
the contrary, it is with its multiple social and political gradients, a logic that 
permeates the urban social and cultural fabric in Dubai to its grassroots level and 
expedites particular kinds of urban possibilities in the process.  It has shaped the 
social relations and intertwined the lives of migrants, citizens, tourists and consumers 
within the structures of the ruling bargain and the sponsorship system. With its 
powerful but nearly invisible presence, the commercial consensus looms over if not 
supersedes the state's spatial logic of segregation and containment of migrant 
populations, particularly of non-elite Indians, as I illustrate in the dissertation.  It is 
important to factor in the commercial consensus if we are to explain why so many of 
these non-elite migrants have been afforded particular forms of social mobilities by 
the city.  The trajectory of their mobility, engaged with here as the switch from 
labour to entrepreneurship and mercantilism, is in many ways, I illustrate, 
representative of the trajectory and nature of Dubai's urbanization and deserves to be 
addressed at some length.  While I address the recent past and the present 
contingencies of Dubai's commercial consensus through an ethnographic study of 
Indian migrants—specific categories of these with differential histories of migration 
and distinct social and cultural relations to the city—I locate its origins and its 
structural continuities in the historical and mercantile past of the Indian Ocean world.
Indian Ocean Dubai
Trade in the Indian Ocean, even before the rise of Islam in the 7th century AD, was a 
key factor  building, perpetuating and institutionalizing social relations between 
people of different ethnicities, languages, religions and classes along its shores.  
Historians like K.N. Chaudhuri and others have brought to bear on our imagination 
of history webs of geographies knit through long distance maritime trade during the 
pre-modern and early modern periods in the Indian Ocean.74  These were geographies 
that shaped and defined the economic, social, cultural and political lives of different 
civilizations, drawn directly or otherwise into these webs of trade for centuries 
74 K.N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe; Ashin Das Gupta and Michael Pearson, India and the Indian 
Ocean World, 1500-1800 (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
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together.  The entry of Europeans into the picture shattered the sense and purported 
imagination of its spatial unity and the fluidity of its boundaries, transforming the
Figure 1.2: The Indian Ocean World of Dubai (Courtesy: Google Maps)
Indian Ocean world into an imperial system of commerce.  Its spatial, cultural and 
political contours changed still further in post-imperial times with the hegemonic 
structures and policies of postcolonial nation-states beginning to define and delimit 
territorial boundaries and social identities in absolute, even monolithic terms.  This 
however, is not to say that the Indian Ocean and its contexts of social, political and 
cultural meanings as well as the logic of its distinctive commercial practices are now 
extinct.  The argument put forth here, on the contrary is that Indian Ocean histories 
of trade, mobility and exchange continue to both define and contest other structures, 
contexts and practices, including those of nations-states and modern polities and 
societies in the region.  These correlations and contestations visible in multiple 
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realms ranging from the cultural to the political and the economic constitute a major 
theme of the dissertation, contributing to its interpretation of such phenomena as 
migration, smuggling, consumption and social mobility as significant markers of 
Dubai's contemporary urbanity.
The relevance of the Indian Ocean in thinking Dubai and other Gulf states as 
transnational spaces, rather than as bounded oil cities, has been duly acknowledged 
in much recent writing, ethnographic and historical, by Karen Leonard, Sugata Bose, 
James Onley, Nelida Fuccaro and Neha Vohra.  Karen Leonard, in her comparative 
study of Kuwait and Dubai, asserts that transnationalism inspired by the history and 
structural continuity of Indian Ocean connections have resulted in diametrically 
opposed strategies of economic and political governance in the two states.75  Dubai 
with its multiple ethnic groups and socio-economic classes of South Asians which 
not only looks to South Asia for its popular cultural practices, but also modifies its 
language, gender and policing practices in tune with such practices is spatially and 
politically oriented towards South Asia.  In sharp contrast, Kuwait with a narrow 
range of expatriate bachelors from among South Asians belonging to either a small 
elite professional class or the broader working class, is positioned as part of the 
Middle East. 76 
The historical connections between the Persian Gulf and the British Raj in India have 
also been clearly mapped both at a structural level and in terms of actual practices of 
trade and politics.  Sugata Bose, elaborating on the changing imperial political milieu 
of the 19th century in the Indian Ocean World, outlines the events that culminated in 
the incorporation of the Persian Gulf, called the "the pirate coast," by administrators 
in British India, as part of the empire.77  James Onley, who refers to the Persian Gulf 
as the "Arabian Frontier of the British Raj," examines its political system as a 
synthesis of Britain's residency system and indigenous tribal chieftaincies 
75 Karen Leonard, “South Asians in the Indian Ocean World: Language, Policing and Gender 
Practices in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East 25, no.3 (2005): 677-686.  
76 Leonard, “South Asians,” 682.  
77 Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of the Global Empire (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 43-48. 
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underwritten by particular codes of power sharing between the political resident, 
native agent and the ruler or chief.78  An observation Onley makes and that helps 
mark the significance of Indian merchants within the configuration of the current 
political system in Dubai is the role of the political or native agent within the 
residency system in the Gulf.  Mostly Indian, Arab or Persian, these agents were 
recruited by the Resident from among powerful merchants trading in the Indian 
Ocean to act as local mediators between the Arab Chiefs and the British Resident and 
help sustain Britain's informal empire in the Gulf.79  The indispensability of these 
agents being drawn into empire on account of their substantial knowledge of local 
cultures, languages and indigenous politics, and extensive social, familial and 
commercial networks, brought them wealth, prestige and political influence as 
individuals and situated them in many ways as insiders to societies in the Gulf.  
Officially, the residency system has graduated into consular structures in 
contemporary times.  Nevertheless, what remains significant from the perspective of 
the work is its legacy, manifested in an informal sense, of the convergence of 
political leverage and private enterprise in legitimizing the position of Indian 
merchants in Dubai even today.
Neha Vohra who has studied forms of urban citizenship among middle-class Indians 
in Dubai offers us a more textured account of the present day contours of an Indian 
Ocean society in the city.  She highlights the "overwhelming Indianness of Dubai" in 
the clustering of Emirati life with Indian popular culture, in the nostalgic sense 
prevalent among the Indian elite of a fast receding Indian Ocean cosmopolitanism, in 
the histories of power, migration and cultural exchange across the Indian Ocean and 
the sheer number of migrants from the subcontinent in the city.  At the level of 
business practices, she points to the transplantation and reproduction in Dubai of 
patriarchal informal economic forms commonly found in India, particularly through 
the social organization of Indian migrant labour.  By foregrounding the significance 
of transnational diasporic networks of Indians to the cultural and political 
78 James Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers and the British in the 
Nineteenth Century Gulf (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
79 Onley, Arabian Frontier, 2-5. 
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constitution of the urban in Dubai, Vohra has shifted the terms of its global city 
discourse away from transnational corporations and rendered new possibilities for 
research on the city.80  Ahmed Kanna, meanwhile, warrants the resilience of Dubai's 
Indian Ocean attributes despite the state's spatial projects to contain and erase them 
by citing instances in which such attributes emerge through the cracks and fault lines 
of a neoliberal regime of urban citizenship.81
Having justified the intent to take recourse to the distinctive spatial frame of the 
Indian Ocean towards a study of Dubai's urbanity and its trajectory of capital, what 
must follow, logically speaking, is a discussion of the manner in which it is 
specifically used in the work, or to put it differently, the method it yields for the 
study.  The question I am asking is not how much of an Indian Ocean city Dubai 
really is but how and why it continues to be so and how its being so enables the city 
to engage with the economic, social, spatial and cultural processes of a much later 
globalization.  My narrative of contemporary Dubai, no doubt, extends the cultural 
aspects of the Indian Ocean into the realm of everyday acts of commercial exchange 
as well as the processes and transactions defining mercantile and financial activity 
both within and across its borders.  These processes and transactions must not, 
however, be construed as random practices rooted entirely in earlier traditions of 
commerce and its concomitant social institutions and networks in the Indian Ocean 
world.  On the contrary, I argue that they make greater sense if looked at as responses 
to the changing contours of capital within the international order of monetary 
regulations and restrictions82 and its (capital's) latent contradictions of geography, 
history and politics over the course of the 20th century.  Capital is understood here as 
a system riddled with its own set of contradictions in terms of space, politics and 
history.  Its logic of accumulation and its tendency to exceed the limits of its own 
geographies—prescribed by political, social or cultural factors—in its quest for 
profits contains within it the seeds of its own crisis.  It was to check the excesses of 
80 Vohra, Impossible Citizens, 107.
81 Kanna, Dubai, 204.
82 For a history of the changing contexts, policies and structural frameworks of regulation, see 
Andrew Leyshon and Nigel Thrift, Money/Space: Geographies of Monetary Transformation (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 59-81. 
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capital and to maintain systemic equilibrium that regulations were established.  I am 
here referring to the imperial and post-imperial policies of international regulation 
formulated in the inter-war and post war years of the 20th century.  While in the 19th 
century, regulation revolved around the disciplinary mechanisms of money in its 
abstract form, that is to say, the linking of currency to the gold standard and ensuring 
its convertibility into the metal, the post war forms of regulation were primarily fixed 
exchange rates and predictable currency markets facilitating international trade.  
The international regulatory order defined by the Bretton Woods system83 was 
oriented towards creating a system of nation states that were economic entities in 
their own right and linked to each other through reciprocal flows of money, goods 
and services.  A "nationally regulated capitalism" which  had to balance domestic 
accumulation strategies with a competitive international economy, it leaned heavily 
on industrial capital as the engine of the state's economic development and political 
sovereignty.  This shift in the perception of the system of capital as the global sum of 
its national parts was much to the disadvantage of merchant and financial capital 
which had to be contained and regulated within the territorial borders of the nation-
state now synonymous with the boundaries of the national economy.  The pathways, 
geographies and activities of financial capital in the midst of these restrictions have 
formed the stuff of much academic discourse particularly with reference to the 
question of the global city and the part played by financial capital in the creation of 
such cities as New York, London and Tokyo.84  Merchant capital, on the contrary, still 
remains understudied in its contemporary articulations and is often imagined as Marx 
did, as symptomatic of pre-modern economies, pre-capitalist societies and their 
corresponding urban formations.85  My interest in the  Indian Ocean owes much to 
the predominance of and the ways in which merchant capital, its conceptions of 
space, its historical and current geographies and the political management of its 
urban economy and society shapes contemporary Dubai and its imaginaries as a 
83 For a detailed discussion of the Bretton Woods system see, Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing 
Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1996), 92-95. 
84 For details see Saskia Sassen, The Global City, 110-113. 
85 See section on “Historical Facts about Merchant's Capital”, Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of 
Political Economy Vol III, Part IV (New York: International Publishers, 1894), 651-680.
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place.  To put it briefly, the Indian Ocean in Dubai, as it is engaged with in the 
dissertation, is among other things, the structural continuity of mercantile capital in 
an age when industrial capital held sway over all other forms of capital.
Gold, Silver and the Politics of Monetary Value in the Indian Ocean
Merchant capital which according to Marx is “historically the oldest free state of 
existence of capital,”86 has its origins in and is conditioned by the circulation of 
commodities and money.  Money is the form of capital that makes and breaks the 
circuit of exchange or circulation of commodities.  Likewise, it is in the process of 
circulation that money is transformed into capital and products into commodities and 
ultimately, money itself.  The circulation of commodities insofar as these are values 
in themselves and therefore money, is what adds value to merchant capital.  Money 
in its commodity form, say gold or silver, also circulates, acquiring and transferring 
values in the very process of circulation.  This might seem like a contradiction in 
contemporary times given that we understand money in its universal functions as a 
standard measure, an abstract value and a means of exchange, rather than as a 
commodity in itself.  Money for all practical purposes, no longer circulates in the 
form of gold coins unlike in earlier centuries.  Where it circulates in the form of 
silver, it is only as token coin, an abstract representation of monetary value and not 
as material or commodity value accruing to its silver content that it is significant.  It 
is certainly true that following Marx, we relate to money as the absolute form of 
commodity and hence of wealth or hoard, so that its conservation and accumulation 
as money becomes an end in itself.  Nonetheless, money as something easily 
replaced with gold or silver owing to its character as Georg Simmel refers to it, "an 
intermediary," in the series of relative values and a "means to store and transport 
values," both of which it shared with these metals is still not justifiable except as a 
feature characteristic of pre-modern societies.
The material value of money as a functional value of its gold or silver content,87 I 
86 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol III, 654.
87 This idea has been taken from Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money ed. David Frisby. Trans. 
Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2004), 152-169. 
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argue, is perhaps nowhere more empirically true than in the modern spaces 
constitutive of Dubai's trading networks.  The social, cultural and political conditions 
that defended and conserved the material value of money in the context of actual 
transactions in the Indian Ocean even as elsewhere money was rapidly renouncing 
such value for its universal functional value, form key aspects of discussion in the 
dissertation. While I do not refute its having been in some sense a carryover from 
historical times, I equally recognize the need to contextualize it within the changing 
monetary regimes of the 19th and 20th centuries in the Indian Ocean as well as the 
international economy.  The politics of value within these monetary regimes meant 
that money was slotted as one commodity among other commodities like gold and 
silver in the same series of values and more significantly for our purposes, the same 
circuit of flows informing trade, mobility and commerce in the post-imperial world 
of the Indian Ocean.
A cursory glance at the evolution of the emerging monetary framework in the Indian 
Ocean is in order here, while, its recent contingencies will be discussed in relation to 
the actual processes of trade and mobility and the politics of an inter-state system in 
the Indian Ocean in later chapters.  Precious metals, particularly silver, functioned 
both as currency in the settlement of trade balances as well as a commodity from 
early on in Indian history.  Key determinants of its textile trade with West Asia in 
pre-modern times and Europe in modern times, gold and silver were not only used in 
ornamentation but hoarded as liquid assets by households and merchants.  The often 
blurred boundary between silver as commodity and silver as currency gave the 
concept of money in India, and to some extent the larger Indian Ocean, a certain 
flexibility and was to become in later times, a significant aspect of their monetary 
geographies.  Mughal India had an exchange economy defined by open coinage, a 
practice which enabled the suppliers of gold, silver and copper—mostly sarrafs who 
were money changers and buyers for the mint and big merchants—to procure freshly 
minted coins for the market on payment of mint charges.  The sources of supply of 
monetary metals for the mint were internal stocks of demonetized coins and hoards 
as well as foreign trade88 in which European companies converted the silver coins 
88 Due to a favorable balance of trade, India required a reasonably adequate supply of money and so 
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they brought in from the Americas to Mughal Indian rupees.
The flexibility that accrued to the rupee was also manifest in the practice of copying 
it in weight and the fineness of its silver content in other places in the Red Sea and 
the Persian Gulf, this continuing well into the early half of the 20th century.89  
However, with the British gaining political hegemony in mid-19th century in India, 
the terms of this monetary framework began to shift towards a more monolithic 
system underpinned by the rupee as standard currency and principal medium of 
exchange within the colonial geography of the Indian Ocean.  The consequences of 
this included among other things, India's mints having to issue rupees to facilitate 
colonial projects and commercial transactions within a domain stretching all the way 
from Turkish Arabia to the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, besides 
meeting the financial commitments within the mainland.90  The rupee, which was a 
coin 180 gm of silver 11/12 fine began to go through phases of destabilization with 
the plummeting prices of silver brought about by the demonetization of the metal in 
rapidly industrializing economies like Germany and the US towards the closing years 
of the 19th century and the subsequent flow of their stocks of currency into India.91  
Precious metals were even otherwise the preferred store of value in Indian society; 
the falling exchange rates of the rupee only intensified the situation, much to the 
apprehensions of the Bank of England and the imperial government in London.  With 
India's history of liquidating its trade surpluses, nearly a third of them, on the imports 
of silver and gold,92 in the pre-First World War years and the declining supplies of 
had to import foreign currencies, bullion and raw copper to augment its internal stock.  Towards the 
closing decades of the 16th century, India had become the greatest importer of bullion outside Europe.  
For details see, Najaf Haider, “Precious Metal Flows and Currency Circulation in the Mughal 
Empire,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 39 (1996): 326-342 and Shireen 
Moosvi, “The Silver Influx, Money Supply, Prices and Revenue Extraction in Mughal India,” Journal 
of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 30, no. 1 (1987): 47-94. 
89 Om Prakash, “Foreign Merchants and Indian Mints in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth 
Century,” in The Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India, ed. John F. Richards (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1987) and European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India Vol. 2 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998): 315- 336.
90 Michael E. Edo, “Currency Arrangements and Banking Legislation in the Arabian Peninsula,” Staff 
Papers—International Monetary Fund 22, no. 2 (1975): 511.  
91 J. Laurence Laughlin, “Gold and Prices Since 1873,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1, no.3 
(April 1887): 319-355. 
92 For details see, G. Balachandran, “Towards a 'Hindoo Marriage': Anglo-Indian Monetary Relations 
in Interwar India, 1917-35,” Modern Asian Studies 28, no. 3 (July 1994): 615-647 and “Britain's 
Liquidity Crisis and India, 1919-1920,” The Economic History Review, New Series 46, no. 3 (Aug 
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these metals during the war years, controls on the inflow of precious metals through 
colonial policy interventions became inevitable.
Despite rising silver prices and the stagnating production of the metal in inter-war 
times, the rupee in the form of silver coins found its way into private hoards or 
accumulated currency reserves and securities such as British Treasury Bills.93  These 
had serious implications for the convertibility of the rupee at home and the domestic 
currency system as it were.  The threat that it posed to the imperial government in 
London in the form of potential loss of its gold reserves through India's liquidation of
its securities was even greater.  It was important to stem the flow of gold into India 
and check the spiraling expansion of the rupee if crises along these lines were to be 
averted.  Limited capital flows alongside exchange rate intervention were put forth as 
policies directed towards these ends.  In the global political and economic climate of 
the post-war world marked by stable exchange rates, reduced capital mobility and the 
rise of the dollar as the sole currency to which gold was linked,94 the urge to save and 
hoard in gold and dollars rather than the rupee was even more compelling.
The point I wish to make here is that Indian merchants, traders and others responded 
with great acuity to this monetary order and its regulatory structures.  They 
undertook specific forms of trade including gold, currency exchange and commodity 
re-exports, and mapped particular commercial geographies around these 
commodities with Dubai as their centre.  In the process, they negotiated, adapted and 
subverted the monetary framework and its conceptions of space and territoriality as 
well as its organizing principle of stable exchange rates.  With exchange rates that 
could be manipulated by private traders and profits engendered by price differentials 
of currencies across borders, the rupee in its paper currency form alongside silver in 
its metallic and token coin forms continued to be traded for gold in practices that 
helped money markets in the Indian Ocean gravitate towards their pre-Bretton Woods 
contours.  These practices identified as smuggling and other illegal trades and 
1993): 575-591. 
93 See Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital, 23. Also see, Balachandran, “Britain's Liquidity Crisis,” 
576. 
94 Leyshon and Thrift, Money/Space,70. 
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situated in historical processes of migration, movement and consumption dispersed 
between Dubai, India, Southeast Asia and the rest of the Persian Gulf in the Indian 
Ocean form the principal themes of discussion in the dissertation.
Geographies of Commerce: Proposing an Alternate Framework for the Study of 
Dubai
Many of the themes and structures mapped out in the discussion so far have been 
attempts to justify the shifts in the terms of the discourse of the city in Dubai from its
urban form to the processes of urbanization and the forces of history that delineate 
them.  As it is with the city, so is it with the global city.  My suspicion of the term 
'global city' as it has been used in the case of Dubai, whether as non-place or as 
symbolic icon, stems precisely from the conviction I share with other scholars that 
urban forms must not be taken for granted as symptomatic of urban processes95 that 
mark cities or the ways in which they function in reality.  Like cities elsewhere in the 
world, Dubai is a material embodiment of social, cultural, political and spatial 
processes that must constitute the subject of history and be studied as such.  Tied to 
pre-existing structures and rather long periods of economic, social and political 
change within the canvas of global history, these are processes that must be studied 
geographically, rather than as limited within the paradigms of a statist or nationalist 
history.96  Looked at from this perspective, the global city argument on Dubai must 
be an analysis of its history of global relationality, and spatial interdependence 
manifested in and across different scales rather than one of its recently established 
external connections, hierarchical dependencies and top down urban development.  
In other words, it must be a thesis that not only accords a certain historical compass 
and a wider temporal and spatial scope to the city's globalization but also one that 
views the phenomenon as a different set of practices rooted in such history and 
spatiality—this history and spatiality existing at odds with the structural order and 
95 Janet Abu Lughod, “The Islamic City—Historic Myth, Islamic Essence and Contemporary 
Relevance,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no.2 (1987): 155-176. Also see R. 
Champakalakshmi, Trade, Ideology and Urbanization: South India 300 Bc to AD 1300 (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 6-7. 
96 These in any case cannot offer us anything more than a past that is not older than forty years or so, 
nor does its politics allow us to engage with structures, processes and players that challenge the 
legitimacy of the state and its modes of governance. 
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abstract logic of 21st century global capital.
The conceptual framework and methodology that articulates the study of urban 
Dubai in its historical and spatial dimensions, I choose to call "geographies of 
commerce.”  The groundwork for commerce as its basis has already been discussed 
in earlier sections and need not be reiterated here.  The theoretical insights for the 
project of "geographies of commerce" have been drawn primarily from Indian Ocean 
and Gulf Studies literatures, early travel writing and archival sources on the Persian 
Gulf, Indian economic and postcolonial histories, literatures on Islamic, African and 
Southeast Asian cities, the sociology and anthropology of space, place, capital, 
commodities and globalization, cultural studies, migration literatures and finally the 
discourses on smuggling, counterfeiting and illicit trades and the networks of 
criminality spawned by these.  Each of these forms the key themes, concepts and 
methods in the chapters that follow.  “Geographies of commerce” builds on the 
foundational concepts of space and place as essentially relational, processual and 
historical categories at the heart of urbanization, not just in Dubai but everywhere in 
the world.  Space produced in and by the movement of capital, commodities, money 
and people, is not homogeneous, but fragmentary, diffuse, multiple and constitutive 
of particular social relations and historical forms, as also spatial, cultural and 
material practices.97  The history of space is one that is related to human society and 
the social energies, forces and relations that impart it a certain identity and transform 
it into what we understand as place.  To put it differently, place is space understood 
in its social specificity, as locality, as the domain of everyday life, of lived 
experiences and meanings, of human activity structured and repeated in time and 
space.
My use of place as it relates to Dubai in the dissertation, is an amplification in scalar 
terms, of Appadurai's concept of locality which is “a complex phenomenological 
quality constituted by a series of links between the sense of social immediacy, the 
97 The literature on space from which the argument has been taken include Henri Lefebvre, The 
Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Edward W. Soja, 
Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) and Doreen Massey,
For Space (London: Sage, 2005). 
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technologies of interactivity and the relativity of contexts.”98  What this means is that 
places are far from "intimate," "spatially confined" and "geographically isolated 
situations" insulated against other places and the social institutions that animate 
them.  On the contrary they are textured realities shot through with the imprints of 
multiple contexts pitched at diverse spatial scales as well as political configurations, 
say the local, the national, the regional and the global, even as they constantly impact
on and shape these contexts.99  Much of what the dissertation does is exemplify what 
Appadurai refers to as the reciprocal and dialectical relations of place and context 
and the ways in which such relations have shaped history in Dubai as also 
determined its course in spaces that were linked to it in imperial and post-imperial 
times.
Dubai as place, contrary to what officials and theorists of global cities would have it, 
is not a growth machine, a commodity that lends itself to marketing as a strategy 
towards wealth creation and the acquisition of symbolic capital.  It is rather, the 
context and consequence of human experience, social agency, historical memory and 
the spatial bases of many different imagined communities and collectives.  Its history 
as it is engaged with in the thesis is the history of place-making, beginning with the 
19th century in the context of what Christopher Bayly calls the "tribal breakout" of 
the 18th century100 and its wide ranging effects on imperialism and the concomitant 
political geographies of empire.  Stretching through the 20th and early 21st centuries
—the former defined by pearling, the evolution of new urban economies, local 
polities, smuggling, labour migration and the onset of an Emirati consciousness and 
the latter by globalization and a new phase of urbanization—the history of Dubai is a 
complex of and an interface between different spatialities and temporalities.  It is as 
an urban formation existing at the intersection of multiple economic, political, social 
and temporal orders and a site affecting these diverse orders in its own specific ways, 
that the city deserves much academic attention.  This however is not to call for a 
98 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization ( Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 178.
99 For a detailed discussion of the production of locality under conditions of contemporary urban life, 
see Appadurai, Modernity, 182-191. 
100 For details see Christopher Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-
1830 (Harlow: Pearson Education, 1989), 35-52. 
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cumulative approach or to pretend to be able to portray a comprehensive picture of 
the city by delineating these diverse orders and their social increments in 
chronological fashion.  Any attempt along these lines would be to defeat the very 
notion of place as lacking a single identity at the heart of the argument on 
"geographies of commerce.”101  In other words, it would be writing place from 
outside the frame of human agency and social relations and the multiple cultural and 
political perceptions afforded by these in what may be a return to the notion of place 
as an essential and stable entity.
The intent in the work, even as the need to evolve a methodology and a framework 
that will as Bill Freund proposes "give character to evolutionary change," is to 
reconstruct Dubai through the lifeworlds of Indian migrants and traders that have 
mapped and traversed the commercial, political, social and consumer geographies of 
the western Indian Ocean for more than a century now.102  In the 19th and early years 
of the 20th century, they were pearl traders, financiers and merchant capitalists 
dealing in credit as well as the trade in commodities between India, the Persian Gulf 
and other ports in the Indian Ocean.  A new wave of migration to Dubai began in the 
mid-fifties following the partition of India which caused Hindu merchants and other 
communities from the province of Sind which was now part of Pakistan to migrate.  
This wave complemented the earlier generations of merchants now settled in Dubai 
with the two merging to create a distinctive kind of commercial economy based on 
the re-export trade, otherwise known as smuggling, in the city.103  Yet another wave 
of migrants in quick succession followed in the 1970s, this time from Kerala, the 
southwestern coast of India and in the wake of the oil boom in the Emirates.  This 
was however a more heterogenous group and with hardly any mercantile history to 
their advantage.  Yet the Malayalis hailing from the state of Kerala constituted the 
largest ethnic group of foreigners in the Emirates and permeated every sphere of 
public life, including labour, services and the lower orders of commerce in Dubai.104  
101 For the argument on place as imbued with multiple identities, see Doreen Massey, Space, Place 
and Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 147-155. 
102 Bill Freund, The African City: A History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1. 
103These migrations form one of the major themes of chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
104For details on the Malayali migration, see chapter 4.
37
It is through the optical lenses and narratives afforded by the lifeworlds of these 
diverse groups of Indians that the work looks back at the structures and contexts both 
defining and borrowing from Dubai and its concepts of the state, government, society 
and economy rather than the other way around.105      
In the dissertation, I construct "geographies of commerce" as a matrix of commodity, 
capital and community and as a structure within which economic values were 
created, subscribed to and resisted through social, cultural and political practices.  
The discussion in the preceding section on merchant capital and gold, silver and the 
politics of monetary value in the Indian Ocean feeds into the argument on 
"geographies of commerce" and need not be addressed here.  What I wish to 
highlight here rather, is its historical dimension and dynamism as a conceptual tool.  
In other words, "geographies of commerce" has structurally and historically evolved 
from what Fernand Braudel106 and Claude Markovits,107 writing in connection with 
the pre-modern world of capitalism and the Indian trading diaspora respectively, 
refer to as 'trading networks,' to incorporate ordinary migrants, travellers, labourers, 
small-time entrepreneurs, couriers and other players, including consumers produced 
by more recent histories and regimes of physical and social mobility in the Arabian 
Gulf.  These cumulative histories of trade, migration, entrepreneurship and 
consumption underlying Dubai's "geographies of commerce" have also been vital to 
creating the city's niche markets and cultural domains for commodity brands, 
including gold, and counterfeit goods elsewhere in the world.  These markets and 
cultural spaces of consumption in taking Dubai and its commodity brands to newer 
geographies across Central Asia and Eastern Europe in what were its most visible 
forms of globalization are in turn constituting newer "geographies of commerce" as 
realms of new social realities and meanings.
105 Ethnographic analyses of the social, cultural and political discourse informing these lifeworlds 
and the lived experiences of the diverse geographies defining the city as part of the Indian Ocean 
world as well as of the 21st century global political economy are what contribute to the research 
perspective and methodological frame constitutive of "geographies of commerce.”
106 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Vol:1 The Structures of Everyday 
Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 148-167. 
107 The reference is to Claude Markovits, “Indian Merchant Networks Outside India in the 19th and 
the 20th Centuries,” in Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans and China Sea Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s, ed. Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk 
Hoerder (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 92-97.
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“Geographies of commerce” are thus what people map through their everyday 
practices and processes of movements and mobilities as merchants, labour, tourists, 
couriers of commodities and currencies, small-time entrepreneurs, consumers and as 
family and individual affiliates of ethnic constituencies.  They are the generational 
histories of migrant families and communities whose destinies as individuals and 
ethnic groups coincide with Dubai's destiny and are symptomatic of the shifts in its 
trajectory of urbanization.  They can be represented as spatial connections, economic 
networks, financial conduits and circuits of culture in the Indian Ocean.  Much more 
significantly though, the work engages with them as social contiguities defining the 
everyday realities of communities which move and experience the larger effects of 
their movement.  Technologies of movement, communication and commerce 
certainly matter in constituting particular social and spatial connections as 
"geographies of commerce" but we must be careful not to reduce these connections 
to the effects of such technologies.  If that were the case, every place that is linked to 
Dubai in the global context of urban networks as represented on the route map of an 
airline would ideally form a commercial geography in itself. 
“Geographies of commerce” as conditioned by commodities and the ways in which 
they organize spatial experiences of mobile and sedentary communities in history is a 
major contention of the work.  It is through commodities that old spatialities and the 
spatial histories of cultures live on in the social imaginaries of communities, often 
disrupting the spatial order and logic as well as the territorial geography of the 
nation-state.  Commodities inserted into the domain and subjected to the logic of 
what David Ludden calls “territorial mobility” and the politics and regimes of 
economic and monetary values underlying such mobility constantly challenge these, 
thus creating their own spatialities and mobilities.108 Spatialities here include the 
actual routes of transportation and commerce that commodities create and are 
implicated in as we have seen in the preceding paragraph.  They also include spatial 
practices or ways of relating to space at multiple scales, ranging from the familial to 
the social and the national.  
108 David Ludden, “Presidential Address: Maps in the Mind and Mobility of Asia,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies 62, no.4 (2004): 1065.
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Spatialities of commodities defining Dubai make sense if looked at from the vantage 
points afforded by such phenomena as smuggling, illegal migration and 
counterfeiting and the “mobility of territorialism” that they reinforce across its 
(Dubai) urban canvas.109 Mobilities of territorialism visible in the import businesses 
of the Bhatias,110 the dual base jewellery systems of the Malayalis111 and the retail 
trades of the Malabar Muslims112 have been produced, theoretically speaking, in the 
contestations, conflicts and compromises between mobility and territorialism.  In 
other words, geographies of commerce and the mobilities of territorialism they 
encompass are actually social and territorial spaces in movement.  They are the 
conduits of social and cultural meanings and simultaneously the spaces of economic 
investment and political synergies.  “Geographies of commerce” are thus frames for 
the mobility of social life as well as of lives that represent social mobility. 
In Dubai, these spatialities of commodities and their mobile territorialisms have been 
institutionalized as urban practices in significant ways and have been instrumental to 
shaping the city's global relations of trade, as we shall see in the following chapters.  
These mobilities, spatialities and commercial geographies have existed alongside and 
in opposition to the politics of commodities as linked to the territorial politics of 
nation-states and their border regimes as also the structural configuration as well as 
the changing dynamics of an international political economy.  Much of what this 
dissertation does is address the intersections between these changing structures and 
the ways in which traders, migrants and entrepreneurs have negotiated them through 
the spatial, commercial and political logic of Dubai.  Gold has, since the days of 
imperialism, tied Dubai to markets like London and banks in Zurich; textiles, 
electronics and household appliances, the trade in which Dubai continues to a key 
global player, have their sources in Southeast Asia, Japan and now China; and traders 
from the erstwhile Soviet republics in central Asia and Eastern Europe have 
contributed in many ways to its commercial architecture of globalization.
109 Ludden, “Presidential Address,” 1061-1063. 
110 For details see chapter 3.
111 See chapter 4. 
112 See chapter 5. 
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These movements and flows punctuating different phases of Dubai's migration and 
trade histories were initiated, co-ordinated and tapped into by Indian migrants and 
traders who besides galvanizing the requisite social capital around particular 
commodities, also defined the city's urban and global geographies of production, 
circulation and consumption in myriad ways and forms.  It is the engineering of 
Dubai's global connections and conduits via the movements and flows of 
commodities in history and the articulation of its urban contours in step with these 
movements and flows that are at the centre of the argument on "geographies of 
commerce.”  With "geographies of commerce," we come to terms with a Dubai 
imagined differently to the one that urban scholars, with their focus on global city 
discourses, the Maktoums and their neoliberal citizens have foregrounded.  It is a 
Dubai in which social processes of urbanization take precedence over discursive 
structures and practices often arbitrarily mapped onto its morphological contours.  It 
is to sum up, what allows for a view of the city as sites of “fluidity and interactivity 
that crystallize the possibilities within which we re-imagine, re-make and re-
experience urban conditions and the notion of the urban itself.”113
A Brief Note on Methods and Sources
Scholars who have worked on contemporary Dubai as well as the larger Arabian Gulf 
have pointed to the many difficulties of doing research in as well as writing a history 
of the region.114  The absence of a culture of writing among its tribal and coastal 
societies, of textual forms of preservation of history and of the artefacts reifying what 
Pierre Nora calls the "memorial consciousness" of the nation,115 say the archives, 
museums etc., have all contributed to the anxieties of the historian working on 
Dubai.  The National Centre for Documentation and Research in Abu Dhabi 
(NCDR), designated as the official National Archives of the Emirates by Federal 
Decree Number 7 of 2008, is only a recent development in the direction of a national 
113 Aihwa Ong, “Worlding Cities or the Art of Being Globalization,” in Worlding Cities: Asian 
Experiments and the Art of Being Global, ed. Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (Malden, Massachussets: 
Blackwell, 2011), 10. 
114 For details see Andrew M. Gardner, City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community 
in Bahrain (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2010), 10-11. 
115 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History,” Representations 26 (1989): 12. 
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culture of documentation and preservation of historical records.116  Despite its 
proclaimed efforts at augmenting its archival holdings by bringing in collections 
from institutions and repositories around the world, the NCDR falls short in many 
ways, particularly in its reluctance to provide unmediated public access to these 
collections.  I worked in the Emirates Library housed within its premises for two 
months in early 2012, trying to negotiate with the archivists to browse the catalogue 
on the collections available. Not only was I politely denied access to the catalogue 
but ceremoniously escorted back into the reading room of the library and treated to 
coffee like an important guest every time I made an attempt.  Eventually, I was taken 
to an archivist who had been with the NCDR since its establishment in 1968 and 
asked to leave an inventory of the matter I was looking for with her.  I was told that 
they would take anywhere between a month to two to retrieve everything and have 
the files photocopied before sending them over to me at the address I was asked to 
leave with her.
I returned to Johannesburg and had started to write up from the field notes and 
interviews conducted during my stay in Dubai when the files arrived.  They were 
documents and photographs that the archivist, obviously in line with the politics of 
history espoused by the federal state, wanted me to have access to and reproduce in 
my writing and not quite what I had asked for.  Interestingly, they were documents on 
Dubai produced from within the framework of the federation and a past that suited its 
political project, alongside reports and newspaper cuttings on Abu Dhabi and the 
other emirates.  If I had hoped that the institution, the guardian of history and the 
federal state's ideologies of power, would supply me with details other than what was 
required to produce a history of Dubai no different to the genre I have critiqued in the 
initial pages of the chapter, I would have been putting on an act.  I was attempting to 
write the history of trade in Dubai in the latter half of the 20th century and the social 
constituencies and the political attitudes that put trade before all else in the city.  
What this meant was that I had to deal with aspects that do not go down well with 
not just the ruling regimes of the emirates but its indigenous and Indian elite as well 
116 See the web page of NCDR, http://www.cdr.gov.ae/ncdr/english/index.aspx (accessed August 12, 
2012). 
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as the state in India.  Smuggling, counterfeiting and the illicit origins of capital and 
urban wealth in Dubai, and the ideological ruptures, structural discontinuities and 
challenges to the historical memory of the Indian state were some of them.  The 
archives, whether in the Emirates or India, were certainly not places to look for 
materials on these.
To make sense of what the archives mean to the work, it is important to understand it 
in its attempts to bring together the structural and contextual aspects of Dubai's 
history and reconciling that with the everyday lives and social practices of Indian 
migrants and others in the emirate and in India.  Ann Stoler's observation on colonial 
archives as “both transparencies on which power relations were inscribed and 
intricate technologies of rule in themselves” has been central to thinking the imperial 
dimension of Dubai's evolution and history in the 19th century.117  The records of the 
East India Company, the Bombay Presidency and the British Government of India 
housed in the Maharashtra State Archives in Bombay,118 hereafter MSA, have helped 
reconstruct the colonial geographies of power within which Dubai's establishment as 
a permanent settlement made sense.  The historical developments in the imperial 
Indian Ocean of the 19th century, including the rise of the pearl economy and the 
larger structural changes associated with it have all been addressed using the papers 
of the colonial government sourced from the archives in Bombay.  The National 
Archives of India, New Delhi, hereafter NAI, provided materials on imperial policies 
and local politics in the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf for the early years of the 20th 
century.  The details on practices, and events constituting state-defined smuggling in 
the post-colonial period, including statistics have been sourced from The Times of 
India archives housed at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, hereafter 
NMML.
This work in many ways responds to the call for "anthropologization" of history, or a 
historical understanding of non-European cultures that scholars like Evans 
117 Ann Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” Archival Science 2 (2002): 87. 
118 Research at the MSA was undertaken for a consecutive period of 4 months between 2010 and 
2013. 
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Pritchard,119 Marshall Sahlins120 and Hans Medick121 have insisted on.  The social and 
cultural perspective it brings to bear on the past in Dubai and the historical sensitivity 
that it invokes in our approach to the city puts critical ethnography at a premium in 
the work.  It was through field research and ethnography undertaken over a period of 
one year in Dubai and Kerala between 2009 and 2013 and among the Sindhi and 
Malayali communities that I have been able to understand Dubai in its historical 
depth and complexity.  The insights that I have gained during the many formal 
interviews, informal conversations and participation in special events have helped me 
come to terms with the city as a composite of collective relations and their 
metamorphosis in time, as a site of construction and representation of diverse modes 
of agency and social power and eventually as a set of contexts within which new 
cultural frames and concepts of interpretation of the selves and others of my subjects 
were generated.
As an ethnographer, I have had to encounter resistance in its various forms, 
particularly when it came to questions of transgressions of the border, of law and of 
the moral codes of societies.  However, with increasing experience in the field and a 
greater awareness of the often clearly marked power relations between my 
informants and I, the ethnographer in me evolved strategies of building mutual trust 
and the exchange of information.  I discovered these strategies from the very 
repertoire of my social being, my ethnicity as an Indian and a Malayali, my shared 
history of migration and of "being there" myself, as Clifford Geertz122 would have it, 
in ways both defining and different to that of an ethnographer's.  My current status as 
a researcher based at a university in South Africa who had arrived in Dubai to gather 
the life stories and strategies of migrants amidst the fears, anxieties and uncertainties 
prevailing in the Emirates did evoke suspicion of all kinds among my informants.  
Interestingly, their realization of the power of my writing to grant the elite among 
119 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Anthropology and History, (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 
1961), 20. 
120 Marshall Sahlins, “Other Times, Other Customs: The Anthropology of History,” American 
Anthropologist 85, no.3 (1983): 534. 
121 Hass Medick, “'Missionaries in the Row Boat'? Ethnological Ways of Knowing as a Challenge to 
Social History,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 29, no.1 (1987): 76-98. 
122 The idea of "being there" has been taken from Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives: The 
Anthropologist as Author (California: Stanford University Press, 1988), 1-24. 
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them, the extra fame that associated them with the Dubai, and to offer the others the 
anonymity even as I could have their voices heard, helped establish meaningful 
relations with many of them.  Subsequently, I became a part of their lifeworlds, and a 
participant in their activities of narration, interpretation and production of meanings, 
much like themselves and the social subjects they incorporated, denied and colluded 
with in their everyday lives as migrants, traders, labourers, consumers and 
individuals.  In that sense, much of what has been accomplished in this work is a 
recovery of categories of understanding and a translation of specific cultures of 
social existence that lend meaning to urban Dubai into the vocabularies of academic 
discourse.
Chapter two locates Dubai in the 19th century imperial world of the Indian Ocean.  It 
addresses the historical developments informing different contexts ranging from the 
local to the regional and the imperial in making Dubai a place.  Chapter three 
discusses Dubai in the decades following the pearl crisis and global depression and 
the ways in which smuggling, emerging as an alternative economy to pearl, created 
particular political and urban forms and practices within the emirate.  Chapter four 
looks at smuggling through the act and meaning of consumption, particularly of gold 
and the ways in which these meanings are mapped on to the commercial landscape of 
Dubai creating spatial and discursive possibilities for its projection as a global city.  
Chapter five addresses globalization in Dubai through the Russian shuttle trade of the 
1990s and its significance in producing a culture of counterfeit in the city. 
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Chapter 2
Pearls, Pirates and Politics:
Reclaiming Dubai as Part of Indian Ocean World Histories
Dubai, the second most significant emirate in the United Arab Emirates and home to 
its largest city, is situated on the Persian Gulf Coast and lies within the Arabian 
Peninsula on its southeastern side.  It is bordered by Abu Dhabi, the capital of the 
Emirates, to the south, Sharjah to the northeast and the Sultanate of Oman to the 
southeast.  The territory of the emirate covers an area of 4,114 sq km of which the 
city, including parts of New Dubai reclaimed from the sea and extending towards 
Abu Dhabi, takes up roughly 70 sq km.  The city is situated at the mouth of a narrow 
islet or the creek called in Arabic as Khor Dubai, and spreads out on its shores 
towards Sharjah in the east and Abu Dhabi in the west.  Bur Dubai, literally 
translated as mainland Dubai, on the western side of the creek was the major site of 
urban development in the early years of the twentieth century, reflecting the material 
prosperity ushered in by the pearling boom in the Gulf.  The first commercial 
districts including the Souk Al Kabir or Meena Bazaar as it is more popularly known, 
and Bastakiya, currently preserved as major sites of historical importance were built 
by Arab, Persian and Indian merchants who had migrated from the southern coasts of 
Iran during the times.  Deira on the eastern side of the creek was a settlement from as 
early as the 19th century.  However it was with the construction projects undertaken 
through the 1960s to create wharfage, open storage and warehousing facilities at 
Port Rashid, that Deira began to garner greater attention as a site of urbanization 
along the lines of the mainland.
An extensive network of paved roads connecting spaces within the city and a 
highway linking it to Sharjah, had by the end of the sixties, consolidated and defined 
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Dubai's fundamental topography as a modern city.  An emerging corridor of industry 
and logistics on the far western side of the emirate's territory in Jebel Ali 
complemented the emirate's urban geography in the eighties.  Although planned 
otherwise,1 Jebel Ali has remained more of a utilitarian shipping point and 
warehousing district for the city, the economic and cultural artery of which continued 
to be the creek.  Spiraling global aspirations, the limitations of geography, the scale 
at which development was envisioned and the classes that such lifestyle altering 
development zeroed in on swept 21st century Dubai's urban life away from the creek 
and in the westerly direction towards Abu Dhabi.  The New Dubai that has been 
celebrated as the city par excellence of the future and to which the earlier Dubai 
functions as a historical and cultural adjunct on the one hand and a worker's outpost 
on the other is a highway of supersonic expansion that stretches from Zabeel to 
Jumeirah on Sheikh Zayed Road.  The city today has a resident population including 
expatriate workers of more than 2 million and is the highest in the country.2 An 
additional million or more comprising mostly tourists, business travelers and 
residents of other emirates, it has been estimated, float in and around its many 
entertainment, leisure and institutional spaces3 on any given day.  
Dubai, in the sense of a city characterized by continuity of settlement and political 
institutions of public governance is a twentieth century phenomenon.  Like other 
cities in the Persian Gulf, say for instance Bahrain or Sharjah, it does not have what 
can be called a colonial past, nor are its urban structures by any means a legacy of 
colonial administration or governance.  Evolving as an urban settlement in the 19th 
century around the creek, it developed as a native town with the tribal monarchic 
regime of the Maktoums at its head resting on a mercantile economy.  This is not to 
say that Dubai developed independent of any kind of colonial or imperial influence 
or that it can be studied as devoid of such influence.  The chapter  vouches for and 
locates the city and its trajectory of development within the larger historical canvas 
1 The initial plan was to build Jebel Ali, which is 17 kms away from Dubai's city centre as a city on its 
own. But the plan did not take off. For details see, Alexander Melamid, “Urban Planning in Eastern 
Arabia,” Geographical Review 70, no.4 (1980): 473-477. 
2 Dubai Statistics Center, Government of Dubai, Dubai in Figures, 
http://www.dsc.gov.ae/en/pages/dubaiinfigures.aspx (accessed June 4, 2013).  
3 Dubai in Figures. 
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of imperialism and its changing dimensions of the phenomenon over two centuries in 
the world of the Indian Ocean.  As of now, it suffices to say that imperialism was an 
extremely complex phenomenon that even without a territorial dimension in Dubai 
and the region at large, was still instrumental in shaping the evolution and character 
of the city in more ways than one.  This chapter explores these processes and their 
making of Dubai as an urban space through the frame of the Indian Ocean and the 
politics of empire defining it.  The narrative of the city's evolution unfolds through an 
analysis of piracy, pearls and the mercantile politics of the emerging Maktoum city-
state. 
Figure 2.1: Dubai between the Desert and the Sea (Courtesy: Google Maps)
Migratory Origins: Between the Desert and the Sea 
As a  place Dubai was apparently a blank spot on the political map of the world until 
about the early decades of the 19th century when, as the records of the East India 
Company have it and the historical narratives of the Maktoums reiterate it, the latter 
migrated into its present day territory and constructed a permanent settlement there.  
The little that we know of Dubai around this time come from the writings of officials 
appointed to the company's Residency4 at Bushire or Bushehr in present day Iran 
4 For details see the on entries Basra/Baghdad Residency (1756-1915) and Baghdad Embassy (1915-
1933) in Guide to the Records/Part X (25) A-K, National Archives of India, New Delhi. Also see 
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which served as a radar for all kinds of commercial and political activity in the 
Persian Gulf.  The British whose commercial interests in Persia and Turkish Arabia 
go back to the 17th century had set up a system of trading posts or factories as they 
were called to direct and oversee trade, source supplies and seek out new markets in 
the surrounding areas.5  The residency system which came into being in the latter half 
of the 18th century took off from the factories of the East India Company and was 
symptomatic, broadly speaking, of a shift in the interests of the company from 
commercial to political.6
The shift was brought about by the  increasing competition for the trade of the 
Persian Gulf among the Dutch, the French and the English, the wars that were raging 
in Europe7 and the rising significance of India to contentions over economic power 
and political supremacy.  In the Near East, for instance, the duties of the resident, the 
highest official at the residency, had by 1798 become exclusively political and for 
reasons that had more to do with Britain's rivalries with France and the balance of 
European power in Asia than with any form of political investment in or direct 
influence over the region itself.  Britain's fear for the major part of the 18th century 
was that Anglo-French hostilities in Europe might lead to a struggle for the 
domination of India.  To prevent this it was imperative that the East India Company 
at Calcutta received timely information on the outbreak of war in Europe.  What 
preoccupied the officials appointed to the Residencies in the region were the routes 
for the post from Britain to India of which the one via Egypt and the Red Sea was 
called the direct route and the other through Constantinople and Basra, the overland 
route, and the safe and speedy despatch of mails.  What this meant was that the Near 
Edward Ingram, “From Trade to Empire in the Near East: III: The Uses of the Residency at Baghdad, 
1794-1804,” Middle Eastern Studies 14, no. 3 (1978): 278-306 and James Onley, The Arabian 
Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers and the British in the Nineteenth Century Gulf (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
5 J. B Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 64-
98.  For more details on the factory system see K.N.Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the 
English East India Company, 1760-1860 ( London: Cambridge University Press, 1978) and C. U 
Aitchison, “Treaties and Engagements Relating to the Arab Principalities in the Gulf,” in A Collection 
of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. XI 
(Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1909), 4-6. 
6 Ingram, “From Trade to Empire,” 279. 
7 The reference is to the war of Austrian succession fought from 1740-1748 and the Seven Years' War 
fought between 1754 and 1763.  
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East and the Persian Gulf, which was but one arm of the overland route, were 
important in only as much as they prevented France, Russia and even Germany from 
obtaining strategic advantage over Britain, a vital aspect in ensuring the latter's 
unchallenged mastery over India.  
The Persian Gulf had not quite begun to figure except as a marginal geography in the 
imagination of the British until the closing decades of the 18th century when they 
entered into an alliance with the Imam of Muscat who was now obliged under the 
terms of the treaty of 1798 to deny the French any commercial advantage or 
maritime post in Muscat.8  Even so, the Persian Gulf remained peripheral to the 
scheme of British power in the East and was eclipsed in significance by the landed 
empires of the Ottomans, the Mughals and the Persians.  This was reflected in the 
minimal degree of British interference and administrative control over the region 
until the First World War.  Even during and after the war, the British only involved 
themselves in administering the foreign relations of the different proto-states 
(sheikhdoms as they were called) comprising the region while adopting a hands-off 
approach to the governance of its peoples and refraining from any kind of territorial 
claims over them.9  The region comprising Dubai, the other emirates of the UAE, 
Bahrain and Qatar were viewed and written about by residents and other officials in 
the 18th and 19th centuries from two distinct, but overlapping geographical, 
topographical and political frames of reference.  The first, of the vast featureless 
desert was contingent on, as we have seen, the line of Britain's imperial presence in 
Turkish Arabia and parts of what were then called the Near East in the 18th century.  
The second premised on the sea, was related to the changing dimensions of the 
British establishment in the 19th century in Bombay and the coastline of western 
India and offered a relatively more focused view of the region as littoral societies 
along the Persian Gulf and Oman (this forms the substance of the discussion in the 
section on the imperial context of maritime urbanism).   Much of what this chapter 
attempts to do is analyze these frames and the kind of structures and politics that lent 
8 For the text of the treaty, see C. U Aitchison, “Treaties and Engagements,” 287-288. 
9 See Michael Fisher, “Indirect Rule in the British Empire: The Foundations of the Residency System 
in India (1764-1868) Modern Asian Studies 18, no. 3 (1984): 395. 
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them meaning as also indicate the ways in which Dubai was placed geographically, 
politically and economically within each of them.  These frames themselves evolving 
as part of particular historical and political developments in the world of the Indian 
Ocean structure both the argument and layout of the chapter and position the sources 
available for a historical study of Dubai.  
To return to the question of the migration that created modern day Dubai, Lieut. A. 
B. Kemball, Assistant Resident for the company at Bushire,10 writing in 1844 
described the event as a move of about 800 persons belonging to the Al Bu Falasah 
and Rumthath tribes towards "Debaye" in the year 1833 under the leadership of Obed
Bin Syed and Maktoum Bin Butye.  These tribes, he adds, had seceded from the Bani 
Yas, a tribal confederation based in Abu Dhabi.  The secession followed the murder 
of Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Shakhboot, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and head of the Bani Yas 
and the subsequent rise to power of Sheikh Khalifa, his brother.  Obed Bin Syed died
not much later than they had moved to Dubai and Maktoum assumed charge of the 
tribes.  Meanwhile, hostilities with Abu Dhabi continued and raids and plunder of 
property on both sides were not uncommon.  In 1841, Sheikh Maktoum obtained 
permission from the Qawasim, a seafaring tribe whose authority extended over 
Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah and other pockets of the northern emirates, to build a fort at 
"Derah" or present day Deira along the coastline between Dubai and Sharjah so that 
he could provide his people with a secure residence .  This arrangement, Kemball 
points out, was necessitated by fever and the rising mortality in the town of Dubai 
which had to be abandoned, leaving only about 25 men to its care.  At Deira new huts 
were built and camps set up at the pleasure of the Qasimi chief, Sheikh Suggur of 
Sharjah to whom Sheikh Maktoum furnished “a written document, duly signed and 
sealed, setting forth that the ground to be occupied belonged to Sheikh Sultan Al 
Suggur and that the tower was to remain there only as long as he thought it proper 
and was to be destroyed upon his requisition to that effect.”11 
10 For details refer, Memoranda on the Resources, Localities and Relations of the Tribes Inhabiting 
the Arabian Shores of the Persian Gulf, in Chronological Events Connected with the Government of 
Muscat from the Year 1730-1834 submitted to the Government on 6th Januaury 1845 by Lieut. A. B. 
Kemball, Bombay Artillery, Assistant Resident at Bushire.  Selections from the Records of the 
Bombay Government No. XXIV, the Maharashtra State Archives, Bombay.
11 A. B. Kemball, Memoranda on the Resources, Localities and Relations, . 
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In the years following the tribal migration to Dubai there were numerous instances of 
raids and attacks on the town of Dubai, initially by the chief of Abu Dhabi and later 
by the one of Sharjah, sketchy details of which are found in Kemball's account.  
Kemball, however was no historian, he neither provides a background to nor 
furnishes an explanation for these events.  He also does not report on the specific 
state of affairs defining the dominions of these warring chiefs, the nature and strength 
of their individual tribal communities or the territorial extent and boundaries of their 
sheikhly authority, an approach that was not without adequate reason.  A cursory look 
at the rubric under which these events are listed provides the clue, to such lack of 
interest on the assistant resident's part.  Memoranda on the Resources, Localities  
and Relations of the Tribes Inhabiting the Arabian Shores of the Persian Gulf  
indicates the physical geography that Dubai and the other sheikhdoms were a part of 
and the ambiguity of its political stakes for the Company.
The organization of society and ways of life along tribal lines with no stable 
administrative structures or permanent tributary relations to a particular state or 
empire posed challenges of a different kind.  As a result, many of the aspects of  their 
existence, including migration, raids and the state of perpetual warfare were 
subsumed under tribal practices not amenable to narrative forms of history.  His 
description then is a loose account of the general tribal constitution and practices as 
random events on the Arabian shore as a whole.
The inhabitants are divided into a number of large tribes, acknowledging each its feudal 
superior, which are again sub-divided into branches or clans composed of the relatives and 
dependents of some connexion of the general head, or of a powerful and wealthy 
individual.
The superior of the tribe collectively has the general control of all, possess the right of 
claiming at his pleasure their military services, and appropriates the small taxes that are 
levied.
The Kazee or Ecclesiastical Judge constitutes the only tribunal and decides upon all cases 
according to the Mohammedan law.
It is by no means uncommon for one of the branches of a tribe, to the number sometimes 
of several hundred individuals, in order to escape excessive taxation and oppression or 
with a view to secure to themselves greater immunities and advantages, to secede from the 
authority and territory of their lawful and acknowledged chief into that of another, or to 
establish themselves and build a fort on some other spot and assert and maintain 
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independence; nor is it a matter of great moment that the chief they are about to join is a 
rival at implacable feud with their own; the advantages attending any numerical increase 
of subjects ensure them welcome asylum and protection.  It will not escape observation 
that the facilities thus mutually offered to seceders on the one hand, and the loss of 
authority and revenue consequent on their secession on the other, act, vice-versa as a 
salutary check to the tyranny and oppression of the respective chiefs.
The Arabs of the coast are more or less connected with the Bedouin tribes of the interior, 
either by ties of relationship or from consideration of mutual interests and defence.
Of so great importance is their alliance or forbearance considered by the maritime 
chieftains, that these, particularly Sultan Bin Suggur who is especially interested in 
maintaining a sort of balance of power, find it their best policy to conciliate them by 
repeated and considerable presents.
To go over from one chief to another, with whom they may be or have been at feud, and 
even to plunder the territories and subjects of their patron, should he not coincide in, and 
follow out their views of ambition, honour or revenge, or withhold the usual payment of 
blackmail are shown by the sketches of the Arab tribes to be of constant occurrence with 
these fickle allies.12
Kemball's perception of sheikhdoms as vacillating territories of constantly inflecting 
tribal communities with fragile and ephemeral political affinities existing  under 
circumstances of political despotism and economic oppression echoes in many ways 
the tradition of writing on Arabia that began with Carsten Niebuhr13 in the 18th 
century and continued well into the latter half of the 20th century.  Arabia was 
perceived as a vast geography of mostly hostile desert roamed by Bedouins and 
dotted rather occasionally by coastal hamlets and interior villages of settled tribal 
populations.  The physical  struggle of traversing it coupled with the complex social 
relations and political rivalries among its inhabitants rendered the colonial project of 
"knowing" it rather difficult.  Of all the places in Arabia it was the southeastern arc 
constituting the territory of the modern day Emirates that was the least explored and 
hence the least known.
Even Palgrave14 who undertook an expedition in 1864 across the breadth of Arabia 
from Maan15 in the west to Muscat in the east completely bypasses the part where 
12 Kemball, “Memorandum,” 93-94. 
13 Carsten Niebuhr, Travels through Arabia and Other Countries in the East, Vols 1 and 2, trans. 
Robert Heron (London: Edinburgh, 1792). 
14 The reference is to the expedition to Arabia undertaken by William Gifford Palgrave in the year 
1864.  Palgrave was an English scholar of Arabic and a Jesuit priest.  For details see Rashid Shaz, In 
Pursuit of Arabia (New Delhi: Milli Publications, 2003), 75-79.
15 Maan is in present day Jordan. 
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Abu Dhabi and Dubai lie, opting instead to gloss over the first in the voice of the 
other tribes and inhabitants he meets with in the course of his journey.  Part of the 
reason for his decision to skirt around these spots was their entrenchment within the 
geography of a desert lying on southern and eastern ridges of the peninsula and one 
that was a desert in the full sense of the term—"hopeless, irremediable sterility and 
desolation."16  They were not on routes that connected villages in the interior with 
market town and trade centres like Mecca and Medina in Arabia or port towns like 
Sur and Muscat in Oman and provoked little commercial interest.  Where there were 
bedouin tracts, it was often dangerous even for settled populations of Arabs to travel, 
let alone Europeans.  Thus it is as one among the three "troublesome neighbours" to 
the pastoral lands of Katar (Qatar), the others being Menaseer (Manasir) and the 
"restless bedouins" of Aal Morrah (Al Murrah) that we catch a glimpse into the 
village of Aboo-Debee (Abu Dhabi).  The "Aboo-Debee" which he puts down as the 
nearest limits of the province of Sharja (Sharjah) is vague, even misleading on many 
grounds.  It is most likely that he was actually referring to Dubai which as it stands 
now is not more than 12 kms distant from Sharjah.  Palgrave is perhaps giving away 
the dominant epistemic frame of the 19th century, a frame that is European, modern 
and conflating the categories of place and people, even as he strives to reveal another 
world which did not fit in.  The punch line of his description of the village, “the 
marauding and assassinating bedouins of Beni-Yass, formerly pirates too, though 
now repressed at sea by the British flag, occupy this unfertile spot” confirms our 
suspicions in no uncertain terms.17  It is also probable that the tribes he was in 
conversation with, like the Menaseer and Aal Morrah Bedouins18 who furnished him 
with details of the Dahna, referred to the village as belonging to and a dependency of 
Abu Dhabi, the seat of Bani Yas power in the day.  In terms of topography, it was 
Arabia or the Arabian Peninsula rather.  However, the fact that it was referred to as 
Oman in political terms even when the Sultan exercised far less authority over it than 
he did over Bahrain or Qatar only obscured the terms of the political configuration 
16 W. G. Palgrave, “ Observations made in Central, Eastern and Southern Arabia during a Journey 
through that Country in 1862 and 1863,” Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London 34 
(1864): 113.
17 Palgrave, “Observations,” 145. 
18 Palgrave. “Observations,” 122. 
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on which it rested and the nature of political power that defined it.
It is only with a much later generation of scholars like Frauke Heard-Bay, Rosemarie 
Said Zahlan and Hendrik Van der Meulen19 writing in the context of and analyzing 
state formation in the United Arab Emirates that we get to have a more specific 
picture of tribal existence, the nature and dynamism of their traditional economies, 
seasonal occupations, the social and cultural meanings of life in the desert and a 
sense of a tribal group as a polity on its own terms.  While Heard-Bay gives us 
insights into tribal or more specifically Bani Yas life, economics and society and 
argues for the particular constitution of its politics as mechanisms with which to 
manage the scant natural wealth in the southeastern region of the Arabian desert, Van 
de Meulen points up the enduring significance of tribal relationships and kinship 
bonds in the federal political system of the Emirates whose national economy 
remains contingent on oil.  The framing of the tribe, now synonymous with the Bani 
Yas, as central to political life in the Emirates, evident in the work of Rosemarie Said 
Zahlan and Frauke Heard-Bay was enabled by Abu Dhabi's rising hegemonic powers 
as an oil state and its institutionalization as the seat of the Federation.  It was in many 
ways instrumental to bestowing legitimacy on the new ruling dynasty of Abu Dhabi 
and the Emirates as a whole—a legitimacy that was grounded in the past when the 
Bani Yas was the dominant tribe in the region and the Al Bu Falah, the family of the 
ruling Nahyans, their leaders.
A view that foregrounded the tribe as a pristine community that leapfrogged from the 
oases of Liwa and Al Ain into the seat of power in Abu Dhabi with a short span spent 
on the pearl coasts20 reined in Dubai's political brand of mercantilism as an adjunct to 
the economic policies of the emergent tribal federation and subsumed the emirate 
within the structures of the latter.  This is not to say that Dubai was non-tribal in its 
political orientation or that it had set aside its tribal past in lieu of a mercantile future.  
19 For details see Frauke Heard Bey, “The Tribal Society of UAE and its Traditional Economy,” in 
United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective, ed. Ibrahim Abed and Peter Hellyer (London: Trident 
Press, 2001), Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social 
History of the Trucial States (London: Macmillan, 1978) and Hendrik Van der Meulen, “The Role of 
Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates” (PhD diss., Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy, 1997). 
20 Frauke Heard-Bey, “Tribal Society of the UAE”, 110. 
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Indeed, Dubai was as much Bani Yas as Abu Dhabi was, at least at the level of its 
leadership.  Nevertheless, with Dubai there is a sense of the tribe as a dynamic entity 
acted upon and responding to historical and structural forces of change at a level 
beyond the economics and politics of the tribal order in Arabia, evidence in the 20th 
century for which we have seen at the beginning of the chapter.  It is important to 
take note of this dynamic view of tribes if we are to understand Dubai's migratory 
origins in the desert and the coastline at once and to come to grips with its peculiar 
practices of urbanization.
Pearls and the Waves of Urbanization in the Persian Gulf
Recent studies on the Persian Gulf have brought to the fore the question of the urban, 
its multiple manifestations and historical forms as responses within tribal 
communities to a spectrum of political and structural changes in the larger world of 
the Indian Ocean.  Robert Carter's analysis of archaeological data read alongside a 
range of literary and historical sources on pearl fishing in the Gulf offers fresh 
perspectives on the evolution, nature and modes of functioning of coastal settlements 
rigged out by such tribes as the Hawala in Bahrain, Utub in Kuwait, Qatar and 
Bahrain, the Bani Yas in Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the period between the late 18th to 
the mid 20th centuries.21  Pearl fishing was recorded as an activity prevalent in the 
region around the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea from as early as the 6th century 
BCE.22 The islands of Bahrain, referred to as Tylos by Pliny,  were noted for its pearl 
fisheries and its premium quality of pearls which were highly valued in ancient 
Roman society.23  Their significance in the jewellery of pre-Islamic and Islamic 
empires including those of the Sassanians and Abbasids also finds mention in a range 
21 For details see, Robert Carter, “How Pearls Made the Modern Emirates,” in Proceedings of the 
International History Conference on New Perspectives on Recording UAE History (Abu Dhabi: 
National Centre of Documentation and Research, Ministry of Presidential Affairs, 2009): 265-281. 
22 Archaeological evidence shows that pearls formed a vital component of inter-regional trade, 
particularly that between the  Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia.  The pearl fishing activities of the Gulf 
were thus implicated in one of the world's oldest long distance maritime trading networks.  See Robert 
Carter, “Boat Remains and Maritime Trade in the Persian Gulf During the Sixth and Fifth Millennia 
B.C.,” Antiquity 80 (307): 52-63.  
23 Richard LeBaron Bowen, Jr., “The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf,” The Middle East Journal 5, 
no.2 (1951): 161-180. Also see Robert Carter, “The History and Prehistory of Pearling in the Persian 
Gulf,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 48, no. 2 (2005): 162-164. 
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of sources dating to their times, apart from Byzantine, Syriac and Christian texts.24
Pearling was centered, broadly speaking, on a dual spatial order until the political 
movements and market expanse of the 18th century reconfigured it along new lines.  
To the first order of spaces belonged towns like Bahrain, Rishahr and Julfar25 which 
were permanent settlements with pearl banks along its coast and market centres both 
on the coast and hinterland.  They were towns of great mercantile and commercial 
significance inhabited by pearl merchants from India, Persia, the rest of Arabia and 
key revenue points for empires, particularly in Persia.  Pearling played a crucial role 
in the capital formation of the Sassanian empire in pre-Islamic times and has been 
considered to be at the core of expansion of trade and development of port towns 
along the Persian coast.  Although it is not clear as to the extent to which the activity 
was taxed, there is evidence illustrating the financing of pearling expeditions by the 
Sassanians and the existence of an elite market for the catch during their reign and 
the revival of trade routes.  Of the second order were seasonal pearl banks and 
temporary pearling encampments that had their fortunes and destinies tied to the 
economic and political conditions of empire, its demand for pearls, levels of taxation 
and the share of profits the pearling fleets were entitled to.  Pearl fishing in these 
second order spaces concentrated mostly on the Arabian side of the Gulf was hardly 
lucrative except for intermittent periods of a rather brief span until about the early 
seventeenth century.  This was because unlike the former, the latter were 
environmentally marginal zones with very little supplies of potable water and other 
resources to support a substantial population and an economy that could sustain 
them.  They were resorted to only when the demand for pearl was rather extensive 
and its price considerably high.  Even in  boom times habitation in them was 
restricted to the two pearling seasons in a year and to the crew of the pearling fleet.   
It is interesting to note how these seasonal camps, even the entire region between 
Bahrain and Julfar slip in and out of textual sources that belong to different periods 
in history, thus illustrating the paramount importance of pearls to their configuration 
24 Carter, “History and Prehistory of Pearling,” 144. 
25 Rishahr was the name for Bushire or Bushehr on the Persian Gulf coast of Iran.  Julfar was the 
name for modern Ras Al Khaimah in the UAE.  For details see, David Whitehouse and Andrew 
Williamson, “Sassanian Maritime Trade,” Iran 11 (1973): 37-38. 
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as places in the social life of communities.   Al Idrisi writing in the 11th century 
portrays the region in question as a cluster of many desert islands but makes no 
reference to pearling anywhere on the islands, leaving us to infer that these seasonal 
banks may have fallen into disuse at that time.  Four centuries later, Gaspero Balbi 
comes up with an entire list of islands like Sir Bani Yas, Das and Dalma in present 
day Abu Dhabi and coastal settlements like Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman etc., as places 
frequented by pearl fleets, although we must not discount the fact that his attention to 
detail in this regard stemmed from his commercial interests in pearls.
The fluctuating geographies characteristic of pearling for the larger part of its history 
gave way to a new more stable pattern dispersed across multiple sites, even as its 
centres shifted from the Persian to the Arabian side of the Gulf in the latter half of the 
18th century.  While Bahrain continued to thrive as a flourishing centre of pearling 
and a mercantile town, Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi were all new coastal centres 
that emerged in the course of the long and turbulent 18th century.  Scholars like Carter 
and others have attributed the explosion of new pearl fisheries and coastal towns 
along the breadth of the Arabian coast of the Gulf from Bahrain to Sharjah to the 
changing dimensions of tribal migration and politics in the wake of the slackening 
and the ultimate loss of Safavid hold over Bahrain.  With the dissolution of Persia's 
centralized control over taxes, the scramble for the pearl revenues of the coast of 
Bahrain became a dominant feature of tribal politics impelling movement and 
settlement along new lines and in new directions.  Groups and families of tribes both 
from the coast and the inland terrain of the Arabian desert spread out to Qatar and 
further east to partake of the new economic opportunities and social and political 
benefits afforded by pearl.  Alongside changes within the Gulf was the increasing 
demand for pearls in India and elsewhere in the world which made pearl fishing a 
highly lucrative pursuit for several inland tribes some of whom like the Qubaisat and 
the Rumaythat, sub-tribes within the Bani Yas switched over completely to a life of 
the seas.26 Interestingly for the work, it presents new ground with which to think the 
celebrated Maktoum migration and the making of Dubai in the 19th century, the 
discussion with which the section opened.
26 Carter, “How Pearls Made the Modern Emirates”, 275. 
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If the foundations of modern Dubai were laid in the process of migration to the coast, 
the case of Abu Dhabi, as illustrated by Carter, Fuccaro27 and others was no different.  
That migration built up to a different trajectory of growth Abu Dhabi culminating in 
the oil urbanism of the seventies and the tribal state that reinforced it is another 
matter altogether.  Abu Dhabi, a term that now represents all territory under the 
jurisdiction of the emirate began as an island northwest of Liwa where the Bani Yas, 
a tribal confederation that claim origins from Nejd in Central Arabia and the interior 
of Oman had  consolidated their first capital in the early part of the 18th century.28  
Liwa then was a cluster of around forty oasis settlements in the Dhafrah region 
which the Bani Yas shared with the Manasir.  Abu Dhabi is believed to have been 
first inhabited in 1761.  The discovery of a fresh water source may have been 
incidental to its founding but its expansion into a settlement with forts, watch towers 
and about 400 houses29 in just over two decades was, as Carter insists, certainly more 
than a bedouin strategy to protect the newly discovered water source.
Unlike the bedouin economy which was more or less subsistence and barter based, 
the pearl economy into which Abu Dhabi inserted itself revolved around cash that 
accrued to the sheikh in the form of taxes on boats, royalties on pearls and other dues 
extracted from merchants and crews of pearling vessels for the protection of property 
and lives from Bedouin raids as well as pirates at sea.  J. C. Wilkinson who studied 
the social, legal and political foundations of territorialism in the tribal constituencies 
of Oman and the Emirates points to the significance of a pearling port in raising the 
status of a sheikh to that of a ruler in these parts.30  The sheikh in tribal societies in 
Arabia and the Middle East, as anthropological studies have shown, was a leader in a 
"political egalitarian system" where leadership was based on social consensus and 
had to do primarily with mediation of disputes within the tribe and the organization 
27 Nelida Fuccaro, Histories of City and State in the Persian Gulf: Manama since 1800 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 45.
28 Christopher Davidson, Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond (London: Hurst and Company, 2011), 4-5; 
Frauke Heard-Bey, “The Tribal Society of UAE,” 102. 
29 Alan Rush, ed. Ruling Families of Arabia: The United Arab Emirates (Slough: Archive Editions, 
1991), 29-30.
30 J. C. Wilkinson, “Traditional Concepts of Territory in Southeast Arabia,” The Geographical 
Journal 149, no.3 (1983): 301-315. 
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of raids and wars.31  In societies where conceptions of sovereignty and government or
hukm were based on control of territorial resources as against their exclusive 
ownership, it was not unusual to find limitations on sheikhly authority more apparent 
than its strengths, particularly when it came to the enforcement of decisions made by 
the sheikh.   However, with the onset of pearling, and the demographic and economic 
changes it engendered, the territorial, social and political dimensions of tribal power 
altered bringing in newer institutional meanings and structures to sheikhly authority 
and influence.  Since the pearl banks constituted a resource rather vulnerable to 
depredations from multiple quarters pitched at various scales of the economy, they 
had to be, in order that the industry remained lucrative, subjected to taxation in one 
form or another.  The basis of protection taxes were levied on all aspects of the 
industry giving it the contours of an economy streamlined more or less along 
political lines and forging the division of tribal society along new lines.  The revenue 
apparatus and the flow of tax monies to the sheikh as the protector of the coast and 
the industry enabled the creation of fledgling states with increased and more 
permanent forms of control over their territorial resources.
As for Abu Dhabi, all these changes translated into the expansion of Bani Yas power 
now beginning to be consolidated over desert and islands along the coast, with the 
latter providing the wealth and resources required for a life of relatively greater ease, 
influence and prestige in the former.  The sheikhdom now had its officials, retinue of 
guards and tax collectors some of whom drew salaries for services rendered to the 
ruler.  To be sheikh was now more prestigious, rewarding and formidable than ever, a 
development vital to explaining the squabbles within the Al Bu Falah prior to 
consolidation of the reign of Khalifa and subsequent secession of the Maktoums.  
Besides, Abu Dhabi's strategic position on the island affording it a broader 
perspective of the coastline enabled increased surveillance and control over its 
territory and improved mechanisms of defense against attack.  All of these 
developments in the direction of the Bani Yas' rising maritime power were viewed 
31 Thomas J. Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective,” in Tribes and State 
Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 159-160.  
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with suspicion by the Qawasim whose maritime supremacy in the Persian Gulf had 
been unchallenged for a while even by the powerful Omanis of the East Coast.  In the 
desert and for the Wahhabis looking to extend their territorial expanse beyond the 
borders of the Nejd, Liwa with its newfound wealth was a potential source of 
revenue, vulnerable to proselytization and political control by the newly emerging 
state.32
The Bani Yas had a history of conflicts with the Wahhabis through the 18th century.  
Despite the major part of the raiding unleashed on their oases settlements they 
evaded tributary control and domination by the latter.  With the Qawasim however, 
fighting broke out only in the early years of the 19th century and had to do as much 
with access to and control over Dubai as with the rivalries emerging in the wake of 
the Bani Yas' rise to eminence as a regional power.  Dubai, ever since the 
consolidation of Abu Dhabi had served as some sort of a border between the 
territories subject to the control of the Bani Yas and those dominated by the 
Qawasim.  Deira on the western side of the creek separating the two territorial 
components of modern day Dubai was under the protection of the Qawasim sheikh of 
Sharjah and Dubai was more or less a dependency of Abu Dhabi.33  While much of 
the feuding was brought under control and to the advantage of the Bani Yas in the 
years following British maritime intervention in the region, the infighting among the 
Al Bu Falah for the ruler's position called for a twist in Bani Yas' relationship with 
the Wahhabis.  Khalifa who with the help of Sultan had murdered their brother 
Tahnoon, the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, and consequently lost the trust of the Bani Yas 
sought protection from the Wahhabis.  To this effect they collected money and gifted 
it as tribute to the Wahhabi governor, thereby enraging their fellow tribesmen whose 
efforts at warding off the Wahhabis for so long were defeated and their pride deeply 
hurt.  In response to the autocratic ambitions of Khalifa as sheikh of Abu Dhabi and 
the new power equation with the Wahhabis created to that effect,  a coup was 
32 The Bani Yas were closer to the Omanis in their religious beliefs. They adhered to the more 
moderate Maliki school as against the Wahhabis who followed the stricter Hanbali School of Sunni 
Islam. 
33 See Report on the Piratical Tribes, submitted to Francis Warden Esq. Chief Secretary to 
Government, Bombay on 27th February, 1823.  File No.8 of 1823 in Political Department, Vol. 37/132 
of 1823, Maharashtra State Archives, 212-270.
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attempted, as per the conventions of tribal politics, from among the families and 
clans of the Bani Yas.  Unsuccessful as it was the rebels led by Obed Bin Syed Al 
Falasi and his nephew Maktoum Bin Buti Al Falasi had to flee Khalifa's rage and set 
up camp at Dubai, which given the conflictual state of affairs between the Qawasim 
and the Bani Yas the Falasis presumed was not easy for Khalifa to attack.  
Nonetheless, attacks and raids continued with Khalifa trying different strategies to 
choke Dubai's trade and supply routes in the interior and entering into fleeting 
alliances with the Qawasim to reduce Dubai to its control.  Maktoum, the judicious 
politician that he was, kept both powers at bay by switching alliances and playing off 
Abu Dhabi against Sharjah until well into the 1850s.  There were conflicts between 
these different sheikhdoms in the later decades of the 19th century too; however, they 
can only be made sense of from within a canvas of history that has a scope wider 
than what we have seen so far.  The structures and politics of the conflicts defining 
these petty skirmishes between sheikhs now subsumed under piracy change with 
significant consequences for Dubai's urbanization and become embedded in a 
scheme of empire, its geographies, economics and ideologies.  Much of what follows 
is an attempt to uncover Dubai within the frame of empire and its practices in the 
region.
Piracy, Politics and Trade: The Imperial Context of Maritime Urbanism
Dubai's entry into the documented sources of the East India Company preceded its 
founding event of the Maktoum migration by a little over a decade.  In 1820, 
following the assault on the Qawasim by the British in Ras al Khaimah, the third in 
the series of naval expeditions34 sent out to chastise the aggressive seafarers of the 
Persian Gulf, a set of agreements were concluded with different sheikhs on its 
Arabian shores.  Called the preliminary engagements, these were a preface to the 
34 The first of these expeditions by the British was in 1806 after which a treaty was signed with the 
Qawasims which enjoined them to respect the British flag and property and to refrain from the plunder 
of vessels touching their coastline in Persia.  The second was in 1809 when the strongholds of the 
Qawasim in Ras Al Khaimah, Lingah, and Al Shinas were captured by the British and their piratical 
fleets at sea destroyed.  For more details see, C. U Aitchison, “Treaties and Engagements Relating to 
the Arab Principalities in the Gulf,” in A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to 
India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. XIII (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 
1909):152. Also see Chapters II and III of C.R. Low, History of the Indian Navy, 1613-1863 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
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General Treaty of 182035 which formally marked the beginnings of British 
interference in this part of the world besides creating a new political geography along 
its coastline.  Sheikh Mohammed Bin Hazza Bin Zaal of Dubai along with the 
sheikhs of Bahrain, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, and Abu Dhabi and the chiefs of other 
tribes committed to the terms of the treaties36 primary among which was the dictate 
enjoined on them to refrain from acts of "plunder and piracy" by land or sea.
The articles of the preliminary engagement say very little about Dubai or any other 
chiefdoms as places with settlements, communities and social conventions of public 
life.  We are certainly given to understand the obvious, that all of them had the 
trappings of a town whose inhabitants engaged in piratical activities.  They had 
towers mounted with guns and possibly prisoners taken captive in the course of 
plunder.  There were vessels too that the sheikh and his dependents used for, besides 
predatory activities, fishing and pearling in the waters of the Gulf.  Nonetheless, 
these and the articles of the General treaty, soon to be followed by others, offer us a 
window into the broader set of commercial and political circumstances under which 
they were drawn up, the alliances and rivalries that underpinned them, the goals 
towards which they were directed and the ways in which the Arabs made parties to 
the treaty were to be framed as part of these goals.
Dubai's evolution and establishment as an urban space in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, not unlike that of the other port towns in the Arab Gulf, can scarcely be 
understood outside of the maritime geographies and political structures that it was 
incorporated into via the treaty regime of the British.  Nelida Fuccaro writing on 
Bahrain draws attention to these structures and frameworks, describing it as “a new 
port regime" established under the aegis of the Government of India.37  The new 
imperial port regime acted as the bulwark against forces intrinsic to tribal polities 
that had deferred urbanization even after a regional economy in pearls had fostered 
35 For the English translation of the text of the treaty, see C.U. Aitchison, “Treaties, Engagements and 
Sanads,” 169. 
36 Sheikh Zaal was a minor, therefore the preliminary engagement dated 9th January, 1920 was signed 
on his behalf by a certain Ahmed Bin Futeiss, and the General Treaty dated 15th January, 1920 was 
signed by his uncle Saeed Bin Syuf.  
37 Nelida Fuccaro, Histories, 43. 
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settlements along the Arabian coastline since the mid-18th century.  Variously referred 
to as the politics of protection, informal empire and the trucial system, the trajectory 
and nature of urbanization that the new order set down continues to define 
contemporary Dubai, marking it out as a city with a distinctive urban character and 
spirit among other cities in the Arabian Gulf.  The argument here is not that Dubai 
was singled out in history for the kind of urbanization that the dissertation attempts 
to elucidate.  Instead it is the particular history and spatial politics of Dubai 
reinforced by the divergent trajectory of oil in the constitution of its city and state 
that is vital to preserving the historical continuities of an urbanism more or less 
rejected by the other cities in the wake of the oil euphoria that took over their urban, 
social and political imaginations in the latter half of the 20th century.
The pretext as we have seen on which Dubai and the rest of the territories inhabited 
by the maritime tribes of southeastern Arabia was incorporated into the treaty was the 
piratical threat they posed to British and indigenous shipping in the sea lanes of the 
Persian Gulf and the western Indian Ocean.  The Muscat Arabs as the maritime tribes 
of the region were called, and not without adequate reason as we shall see, were 
notorious for their predatory activities at sea even in the 17th century.  Europeans like 
John Fryer38 observing them at Surat on his travels to the East and as early as 1677 
had remarked thus:
They are true Rovers both by Sea and Land; they are constantly upon the Plunder with 
Portugals, but care not to engage where nothing is to be gotten but Blows, wasting those 
Places that lie most open on the Sea-Coast and unguarded. 
These have lately fitted themselves with good stout Ships at Surat, their own Country 
supplying them with no Materials for Building; their non-payment whereof, according to 
the Contract with the Governor, at present has put a stop to their increase that way in 
Shipping; and has kindled matter for farther alarming the Merchants: For the Governor for 
his security has seised the Imaum's Vockeel, nor intends he to enlarge him till the 
uttermost Gosbeek be paid.  
On this Pretence they begin to interrupt the Merchants, on the Seas, seising their Vessels 
and furnishing themselves at cheaper Rates. 
Nor does their late Enterprize over the Portugals make them less formidable; so that if they 
38 John Fryer, A New Account of East India and Persia in Eight Letters: Being Nine Years Travels 
Begun 1672 and Finished 1681: Containing Observations Made of the Moral, Natural and Artificial 
Estate of Those Countries (R.R, London: 1698), 119-120. 
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be not be checked by these Knights of Lisbon, they will infect this Ocean, no less than the 
Moors of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoly, do the Narrow Seas in the Mediterranean, especially 
the Gulf of Persia in which Mouth they are conveniently feated and villainously inclined; 
in which it concerns them to omit no Diligence.
It is obvious from Fryer's observations that much of the predation that the Arabs were 
involved in had to do with assaults against the Portuguese whom the rising Yariba 
state of Oman had chased out of Muscat, the major port of the latter in the Persian 
Gulf after the loss of Hormuz, in 1650.39  Portugal had failed miserably in its 
imperial designs in the western Indian Ocean by the mid-seventeenth century.  They 
could never monopolize the spice trade, nor were they able to cut off Ottoman access 
to trade routes between the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, the 
primary objectives defining their presence in the East.  They had lost Hormuz to the 
Safavids in 1622, following which came the fatalities of Muscat, Malacca, Ceylon 
and their remaining possessions on the Malabar coast, all of which except for Muscat 
they had to cede to their main competitors, the Dutch.  Owing to such humiliating 
defeat at the hands of the Safavids with whom the Portuguese had been in alliance 
for a while, the latter embarked on an aggressive course of action turning into a 
"predatory naval power desperate to gain its former supremacy," taking islands like 
Qishm and Kong and exacting tribute from them.  Additionally, they spent the 
decades until the collapse of the Safavids in 1722, fighting the Omani Arabs whose 
retaliatory campaign against the Portuguese involving the seizure of their ships and 
cargoes and assault of their crew extended along the coasts of the Persian Gulf, 
western India and Eastern Africa.
Much including the semantic, political and pragmatic dimensions of piracy had 
changed in the Indian Ocean since the advent of the Portuguese in the closing years 
of the 15th century.  Whereas in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, the sea had for 
centuries been a site of multiple forms of maritime violence, ranging from 
commercial predation and freebooting to privateering and naval warfare between 
city-states, the Indian Ocean was a thoroughfare of indigenous economic activity and
39 For details on the rise and fall of the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf, see Rudi Matthee, “The 
Portuguese Presence in the Persian Gulf: An Overview,” in Imperial Crossroads: The Great Powers 
and the Persian Gulf,  ed. Jeffrey R. Marcis and Saul Kelly (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 
1-12.
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maritime pursuits with no state or power claiming rights to the sea.40  It was an 
oceanic space to which was alien notions of exclusive maritime sovereignty and 
where, as Janet Abu-Lughod rightly observes, several "locally hegemonic powers" 
co-existed with no single power ever dominating the system.41  Divided into 
interlocking circuits along the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the western and eastern 
coasts of the subcontinent, the Straits of Malacca, the islands of Java and the ports of 
the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean was a bed of "contrasting richness" with 
distinct cultural zones, multiple economic ridges and complex articulations of 
political sovereignty.42  Its geographically, ethnically and culturally diverse 
mercantile societies were set in intertwined political systems ranging from landed 
empires and states to tribal chiefdoms and maritime polities.  Rulers and 
administrators within these overlapping political arrangements often traded for 
themselves not as rulers but as merchants alongside other merchants, a practice far 
removed from the "monarchical capitalism" that had begun to characterize Spain, 
Portugal and other European nations in the Middle Ages.43  In an environment of 
economic competition as opposed to political control and the exercise of monopoly 
over commerce, it was on the contrary, not uncommon for merchants trading in the 
Indian Ocean to accumulate the kind of wealth that helped finance the state in times 
of difficulty, a possibility that set them free of any kind of political allegiance to the 
latter.44 
When the Europeans made their foray into the Indian Ocean in the numbers that they 
did in the 15th century, they brought much more than their past rivalries and inherited 
notions of trade, piracy and the state to its waters.  While there is no denying the 
40 Michael Pearson, The Indian Ocean (London: Routledge, 2003) 
41 Janet Abu-Lughod. Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 253.  
42 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise 
of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 67-71; Ashin Das Gupta, 
“Introduction II: The Story,” in India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800, ed. Michael Pearson and 
Ashin Das Gupta (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1987) and Himanshu Prabha Ray and Edward A. 
Alpers, ed., Cross Currents and Community Networks: The History of the Indian Ocean World ( New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
43 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Written on Water: Designs and Dynamics in the Portuguese Estado da 
India,” in Empires: Perspectives from Archaeology and History, ed. Susan E. Alcock et al. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 46-51.
44 Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 17.  
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incidence of violence, or the presence of privateers and pirates before the Europeans, 
it must be said that they, beginning with the Portuguese in the 15th century, did much 
to add to its existing perceptual repertoire and its realtime manifestation on the deep 
seas and in inland waters.  The doctrine of mare clausum45 and the numerous papal 
bulls that had secured for the crown sovereign authority over all the seas and lands it 
might discover in the Atlantic complemented by the papal grant of monopoly of 
commerce within these regions were put to use in the Indian Ocean with major 
implications for the commercial arrangements and punctuated sovereignties of the 
latter.  In accordance with the papal ruling that other nations could not trade without 
license from the Portuguese sovereign whose authority could be enforced by the use 
of naval force, the Portuguese initiated a series of operations that added newer 
dimensions to the perception, practice and political prospects of piracy.  Controlling 
the movements of merchant shipping through regular naval patrols, the enforcement 
of customs duties and cartazes,46 or safe-conduct passes to local merchants, and the 
outlawing and confiscating of the seaborne property of those that violated the 
dictates of the Estado da India were some of them.  Frequent raiding expeditions and 
the brutal violence of competition unleashed on offenders, particularly the merchants 
of Gujarat, Malabar, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, in whose hands rested the 
trade in spices were justified in the name of protecting trade that was licensed and 
made legal under Portuguese authority.  In short they introduced a system that as 
Michael Pearson observes was “a vast protection racket, for the Portuguese were 
selling protection from violence which they themselves had created.”47 
45 The doctrine of mare clausum, meaning the closed sea under the sovereignty of a power and 
restricted in terms of use by other states was derived from the notion in ancient the Roman Law of 
mare nostrum. The mare nostrum as it was conceived of by the Romans meant subjugating the 
Mediterranean sea to European rule.  Mare clausum was set against mare liberum which meant the 
high seas open to all nations.  In medieval and early modern times, these doctrines were used by 
different powers in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to legitimate and further their individual 
dominion over the seas and the lands adjoining them.  They formed the underlying principles of the 
dual naval and commercial aspect of sea power and constituted the legal basis of the system of 
European thalassocracy. For more details on mare nostrum see Michel Mollat du Jourdin, Europe and 
the Sea, trans. Teresa Lavender Fegan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).  For a detailed history of the uses of 
these doctrines in the Nordic, Atlantic and Mediterranean seas, see Bo Johnson Theutenberg, “Mare 
Clausum et Mare Liberum,” Arctic 37, no.4 (1984): 481-492.  
46 K. S. Mathew, “Trade in the Indian Ocean and the Portuguese System of Cartazes,” in The First 
Portuguese Colonial Empire, ed. M.Duffy, B.J.Coles, M.D.D. Newitt and I.A Roots (Exeter: 
University of Exeter, 1986), 69-84.  
47 See Pearson, The Indian Ocean, 120-121. 
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The Portuguese may not have been able to forge an imperial system the way the 
British did in the 19th century, yet the regimes, imaginaries and ideologies of power 
they provoked were crucial in rapidly politicizing the world of the Indian Ocean and 
transforming it into a "territorialized" space of competing commercial rivalries and 
political interests.  Players on the western coast of India and the Persian Gulf aspiring 
to higher levels of sovereignty in the 17th and 18th centuries were in fact only 
adapting Portuguese piratical strategies and state-sponsored tactics of violence48 to 
serve an assortment of political purposes, including the filling in of power vacuums 
left behind by declining landed empires, staging bouts of resistance against newly 
rising imperial claims and  the stifling of potential maritime rivals.49  A case in point 
are the Marathas collecting coastal revenues to finance their campaigns against the 
Mughals in India and to compete with Surat which was the principal Mughal port in 
the early years of the 18th century.50  The Omani depredations exceeding their 
Portuguese targets and spilling over to Maratha, Mughal and European shipping, 
resulting in prolonged naval battles between these different maritime players is yet 
another example.
The Portuguese were able to project a hegemonic understanding of maritime piracy 
and an ethnicized, even religious notion of pirates, both of which were deeply rooted 
in their history of crusades and conflicts with the Turks and other Islamic rivals in the 
Mediterranean, a point one cannot miss in Fryer's remark on the Arabs.  
Progressively, and by the end of the 18th century, when the British were beginning to 
consolidate their power in the Indian Ocean Portuguese impressions of piracy had 
acquired the status of an absolute truth that could implicate practices and players 
anchored in a very different set of historical, political and maritime traditions to 
Europe's.  Then and in the 19th century the British marshaled piracy in all its political 
48 For details on piracy as a state-sponsored program of the Portuguese see Michael Pearson, “Piracy 
in Asian Waters: problems of Definition,” in Pirates, Ports and Coasts in Asia: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives, ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 15.
49 For a textured account of piracy as it was mobilized in the western Indian Ocean and the Persian 
Gulf in the 17th and 18th centuries as well as the distinct cultural perceptions and vocabularies of piracy 
in history with which they could be read, see Patricia Risso, “Cross-Cultural perceptions of Piracy: 
Maritime Violence in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf during a Long Eighteenth Century,” 
Journal of World History 12, no.2 (2001): 293-319.  
50 Risso, “Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy”, 302-305. 
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potential as a master signifier to cover any kind of maritime activity that was deemed 
a challenge to their evolving maritime empire including competing claims to 
resources and pre-existing commercial practices.  An empty category that could quite 
conveniently be filled in with changing sets of players and practices and according to 
the changing needs and priorities of empire, it also offered legitimate grounds for 
political intervention in spaces that were defined almost exclusively in terms of it.  
Thus it was not the Muscat Arabs that Fryer had seen in the 17th century but the 
Qawasim involved in maritime conflicts with the former who had now forged an 
alliance with the British that predominantly figured as pirates in the imperial 
imagination of the 19th century.  
The structures and semantics of empire however, had changed drastically in the days 
since the Portuguese and so had the modes in which it operated.  The papal regime of 
Catholic law that the Portuguese had taken recourse to, constituted their rivals, 
principally the Turks and Muslim traders, as structurally, even geographically outside
of law and empire,51 thereby justifying the concerted efforts of the Portuguese at their
systemic commercial and political marginalization within the world of the Indian 
Ocean.  The British in spite of their monopolistic trading policies whether of the 
Company or Crown, believed in an architecture of power that was rather inclusive 
and co-opted indigenous merchants, rulers and even so called pirates to their 
commercial and political advantage.  They attempted to create an order of things, an 
imperial political economy within which alliances with native players at different 
levels of what Sugata Bose calls a "layered sovereignty," were more permanently 
entrenched and stable.52  In the case of Dubai and the pirate towns along the Arab 
51 Theutenberg in his illustration of the papal benediction of the Doge of Venice, which was an annual 
ceremony marking the sovereignty of Venice and its dominion over the sea, points up the political 
background to legal doctrines and clauses in the Christian world of the Middle Ages.  He affirms that 
Venice on the Adriatic Sea was a “useful barrier to further expansion in Europe by the Turks and 
served as a scourge to the Saracen pirates.” See Theutenberg, “Mare Clausum et Mare Liberum”, 488-
489.  Michael Pearson talks about how such law having structurally precluded Muslim traders, 
whether Arab or Turkish, shaped Portuguese practices of surveillance and control in the Indian Ocean.  
The Portuguese forcing their ships to stop at ports or towns controlled by them and even prohibiting 
their travel if they were from spaces deemed hostile must all be considered in the light of these 
historical and legal developments in the Mediterranean.  The Muslim traders in the Portuguese scheme 
of things were illegal not so much because they were defiant to existing laws as they were structurally 
precluded and by default illegal in the Christian law governing nations.  See The Indian Ocean,  121.  
52 Sugata Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire (Cambridge: 
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Gulf coast, it was the treaty regime that set off a series of developments towards 
urbanization and steered them along the imperial course of history the ramifications 
of which continue to inform their economies and politics in contemporary times.
It is difficult to assess the immediate effect of the 1820 treaties on the pirate towns 
themselves especially since raiding and conflicts on land and to some extent at sea 
continued among them and well into the latter half of the 19th century.  Nonetheless, 
the disciplinarian tactics of the British enforced through naval patrols and 
surveillance at sea froze existing local and regional political structures, somewhat 
striking a balance in power between the command of the Qawasim and that of the 
Bani Yas.  More stable and consolidated maritime bases in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and 
Sharjah whose sheikhs were now held responsible for the conduct of their townsmen 
and the desert tribes owing allegiance to them proffered the tribes and their territories
a distinctive identity as well as a legitimate purpose in the evolving maritime order 
dominated by the British.  Captain J. McLeod, Resident in the Persian Gulf, 
undertaking a tour of the Arabian ports in 1823 and reporting on the general state of 
calm prevailing in them, drew the Chief Secretary's attention briefly to a shift in the 
commercial ventures of the various chiefs residing there—a shift enabled by the 
stipulation within the treaty that the latter could trade with ports that were allies of 
the British.53  While most other sheikhs had three or four boats that were employed in 
fishing, Sultan Bin Suggur, McLeod observed, had "many fine vessels" of which at 
least 30 had a carrying capacity of between 50 and 100 men and was now building a 
buggala54 of about 120 tonnes for trade to India.  By 1844, there is clear evidence to 
show that Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah and Abu Dhabi had been trading with India and 
Africa besides being involved in pearling and the Gulf trade alongside Dubai.55
A controversy that arose in 1847 over customs duties to be paid by vessels belonging 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 41. 
53 Report on the Piratical Tribes, submitted to Francis Warden Esq. Chief Secretary to Government, 
Bombay on 27th February, 1823.  File No.8 of 1823 in Political Department, Vol. 37/132 of 1823, 
MSA, 212-270. 
54 A buggala is the term used for a dhow in the Persian Gulf. 
55 Statement of the Maritime Resources of the Piratical Ports on the Arabian Coast, Memoranda on 
the Resources, Localities and Relations of the Tribes Inhabiting the Arabian Shores of the Persian 
Gulf, submitted to the Government on 6th Januaury 1845 by Lieut. A. B. Kemball, Bombay Artillery, 
Assistant Resident at Bushire, MSA.  
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to these sheikhs and their subjects trading with Canara on the western coast of India 
sheds light on the commercial milieu that had as early as 1839 begun to bind the 
Arabian Gulf and British India.56  The exchange of correspondence on the issue 
between different officials and departments of government, including the Collectors 
of Customs at Bombay and Canara and the Secretaries to the government and the 
Board of Revenue hinges on a certain notification published by the Government of 
India on 9th January 1839 regarding the status of ports of Arabia, the Persian Gulf, 
Red Sea and Oman within the imperial domain of trade.  The notification stated that 
“the goods exported into the several ports of the Presidency of Bombay in the vessels 
of any of the states and territories herein undermentioned on which British vessels 
are received and treated on terms as favorable as native vessels and likewise goods 
exported from the ports of Bombay in the vessels of such states and territories shall 
be treated and dealt with in all respects as goods imported and exported in British 
Bottoms.”57 What this meant for the vessels of the Arab chiefs and their subjects was 
their exemption from payment of double duties on trade with ports in British India.  
It was a privilege made available in return for their deference to the imperial order, 
the telltale sign of which was their having to carry registers and passes signed by the 
Persian Gulf Resident on their trading expeditions.
Sources directly pertaining to the trade in question as well as statistics on its volume 
and records of shipping are scanty at least until the 1880s.  Officials writing in 
connection with the measures taken by the residency and the government to ensure 
that peace was maintained on the waters of the Persian Gulf refer often tangentially 
to the success of pearl fishing in a particular season, petty instances of aggression on 
pearl banks and the increase in the trade, movement and even theft of slaves in these 
territories.  Kemball relating the circumstances under which the maritime truces, 
entered into for the first time in 1835, and the enthusiasm of the chiefs to have it 
56 Letter from Officiating Secretary to Government of Fort St.George to Secretary to Government of 
Bombay File No. 34 of 8th January, 1847 enclosing Collector's Report No. 41 of 1847 and Letter from 
Major Hennell, Political Resident at Bushire to Secretary to the Government of India of 8th September, 
1847 in Vol. 79/1961 of 1847, MSA.  
57 Minutes: Reported H.C. No. 82 of 1847 enclosed in Letter from I.L. Blanc Esq. Collector of 
Canara to the Secretary to the Board of Revenue No. 98 of 28th October, 1846 in Vol. 79/1961 of 1847, 
MSA.
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renewed until the permanent truce was established in 1853, gives us good reason to 
believe that there was a steady increase in pearl production and the associated 
carrying trade of provisions and general merchandise in the years following the 1835 
truce.
A letter despatched to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay on 23rd November 
1846 by the Political Resident and enclosing the extract of a letter from Moollah 
Hussein, the native agent at Sharjah, comments on the modes of capture of slaves at 
Zanzibar and the Swahili coast and their transportation to the ports of the Arab Gulf 
during the trading season in the latter.58  Hussein's sketch of the regional geography 
of the slave trade drawn out between the Swahili coast in Africa, Sur and Muscat in 
Oman and the ports of the Trucial Coast, and his  description of the districts of the 
Gulf Arabs as so full of slaves that it was not unusual for them to outnumber the 
freemen of the towns, both point to the flourishing trade in pearls in the mid-19th 
century.
While British political interests along the coast remained intact through the period 
following the treaties, their commercial and shipping investments in the region were 
rather negligible.  This was to change in the mid-19th century when the British India 
Steam Navigation Company supported by mail subsidies from the Government of 
India launched its steamer services to the Persian Gulf.59  The British policy of 
granting mail subsidies to private shipping companies had been in existence since 
1837, and was instrumental to the expansion of private British trade60 on the one 
hand and the extensive reach of empire on the other.61  We have in the beginning of 
the chapter looked at the indispensability of the post and the flow of information to 
the survival of empire and the relevance of the 18th century Near East in all of this.  
The state of affairs in the 19th century had remained more or less as then, except that 
it was the Russians that now posed a threat to British India.  The Russians had in 
58 See pages 203-205, Vol. 79/1961 of 1847, MSA. 
59 Stephanie Jones, “British India Steamers and the Trade of the Persian Gulf, 1862-1914.” The Great 
Circle 7, no.1 (1985): 23-44.  
60 Freda Harcourt, “British Oceanic Mail Contracts in the Age of Steam, 1838-1914.” Journal of 
Transport History 9, no.1 (1988), 1-18. 
61 Frank Broeze, “The Ports and Port System of the Asian Seas: An Overview with Historical 
Perspective from c. 1750.” The Great Circle 18, no.2 (1996), 73-96.  
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1826, defeated Persia, conquered the latter's territory and forced the Shah to pay a 
huge indemnity to the Tsar.62  Persia's loss and entry into treaty relations with the 
Russians had much to do with Britain's failure to abide by the Treaty of Tehran 
(1814) which enjoined upon the British to provide military aid to the Shah in the 
event of an attack by a European power.  This soured relations between Persia and 
Britain, hence the need to consolidate power on its own terms and look away from 
Persia as an ally in its project of the defense of India.  The collaboration between 
British private capital and the state in the field of commercial shipping and the 
concomitant opening up of new markets in hitherto unexplored territory in the Near 
East and Persian Gulf was the means envisaged towards the accomplishment of such 
ends.63
The shipping lines of the British India steamers and their timetables of regular 
services with fixed times of departure and arrival created in the western Indian 
Ocean, Persian Gulf and the Near East, a commercial and political geography 
centered on different kinds of ports and the production and transit of specific 
commodities like opium and arms, apart from the trade in provisions like rice, coffee, 
sugar and cotton piece goods.  It is important to distinguish between the two 
interlinked systems of trade, indigenous and European, defining the hierarchical 
order of this imperial port geography that was beginning to be institutionalized with 
steam shipping and  subsidized mail services in the mid-19th century in order that we 
understand Dubai's evolution as a native town in the early part of the 20th century.
In the western Indian Ocean or the Arabian seas,  Bombay which was only secondary 
in importance to Surat until the decline of the latter,64 had begun to rise to 
prominence during this period as its premier port.  Nevertheless, it was not a port that 
relied excessively on foreign trade like its predecessor but one to which the trade of 
other newly emerging steamer ports on the BISN shipping line were of equal or even 
greater significance. Frank Broeze argues that the rise of Bombay gave a fillip to 
62 J.B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
63 Jones, “British India Steamers”, 26.  
64 For details on Surat and its decline see Ashin Das Gupta, The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 
1500-1800, ed. Uma Das Gupta (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 351-368.  
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indigenous shipping and related commercial activities of the Banias, Arabs and 
Parsis,65  who now began to permanently settle in the city alongside migrant laborers 
and workers from the hinterland.  Amar Farooqui, points to the shift in the direction 
of European trade from the west to Madras on the Coromandel coast and Calcutta on 
the Bay of Bengal and Bombay's new role as the supplier of opium to the eastern 
ports from where it was shipped to China in exchange for tea, one of the key items of 
English trade.66  The trade in opium was a private, "particularly indigenous 
enterprise" that strengthened Bombay's economic connections with the opium and 
cotton growing interior on the one hand and created a new form of commercial 
partnership between British companies like Jardine Matheson and Co and indigenous 
Bombay-based opium merchants like Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy on the other.67
Bombay's opium revenues helped finance its other indigenous trades particularly 
with the ports of the Persian Gulf like Bushire, Bandar Abbas, Basra and Lingah 
from where it imported dates, almonds, gums, hides, specie and pearls in exchange 
for coffee, sugar, rice, and cotton piece goods.  Of these, all the others except Lingah, 
were ports that had substantial trade with Britain especially in firearms, cotton, wool, 
carpets etc.  Unlike in Bombay and Calcutta, where established private trading 
companies that managed the sourcing, shipping and distribution of opium, cotton and 
other commodities existed from the 17th century, these ports had no such 
arrangements before the BISN started its services on the Persian Gulf route.  British 
merchant firms and shipping agencies like Gray Mackenzie and Co., and Gray Paul 
and Co., could be established and their activities carried on only with the help of 
indigenous partners.  The latter sourced supplies from producers and artisans within 
the catchment area of these ports on their behalf and acted as intermediaries in the 
Persian Gulf trade to Europe.
In the sub-imperial maritime network created by the BISN in the western Indian 
Ocean with Bombay as its principal artery and core port, Lingah held a distinctive 
65 Broeze, “The Ports and Port System of the Asian Seas,” 75-76.  
66 Amar Farooqui, Opium City: The Making of Early Victorian Bombay (Gurgaon: Three Essays 
Collective, 2006), 1-16. 
67 Amar Farooqui, Smuggling as Subversion: Colonialism, Indian Merchants and the Politics of 
Opium, 1790-1843 (New York: Lexington Books, 2005), 209-220. 
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place as a transshipment centre between Bombay and Bahrain, Dubai and Sharjah, 
although it was perhaps the least important insofar as the Gray Paul, the official 
shipping agency68 of the BISN at the port, was concerned.  It hardly catered to the 
British trade and nor did it have a hinterland unlike Bushire that could support the 
production of opium or dates for export.  Its history as a re-distribution centre for 
pearls brought in from Bahrain, Dubai and Sharjah and provisions brought in from 
India was short-lived since by the turn of the century the high taxes imposed by the 
Persian government on its trade sometimes up to 400 per cent on certain goods had 
begun to shift all trade away from the port to Dubai.69  Dubai by 1903, had begun to 
embark on a new phase of commercial and political history as a place with a 
potential for an urban future with national, regional and global dimensions.
Dubai, An Indian Ocean City-state in the Twentieth Century
Dubai could take off from where Lingah left off on the course of the transshipment 
trade connecting western India and the Persian Gulf because its merchants, Arab, 
Persian and Indian, had been involved in Lingah's trade even before it had become a 
port of call for the BISN steamers on the Bombay-Basra route.  The city's pearl 
exports had grown ten fold between 1870 and 189070 which was an incentive for 
more of these merchants from Persia and India to make Dubai their commercial base.  
The Indian merchants or Banias financed the annual pearling expeditions in Dubai, 
Sharjah and the ports of Oman, via the banks in Bombay, buying back pearls from 
the fleets in return for the cash advances and the supplies of provisions made to the 
crew of the pearling vessels and their families.  In 1891 when Gray Paul and Co., 
opened a shipping office in Dubai, some of them began to work as representatives for 
them, co-ordinating the sourcing and shipping of pearls and other commodities and 
organizing their movement into and out of the ports.  As British Indian subjects, they 
also functioned as intermediaries between the shipping agents and officials of the 
BISN and local Arab traders, securing a niche for themselves as traders of textiles, 
68 The office of Gray Paul and Co., was established here in 1875.  
69 Mohammed Al Fahim, From Rags to Riches: A Story of Abu Dhabi (London: Centre for Arab 
Studies, 2005). 
70 Davidson, Dubai, 22-23. 
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provisions and other goods in the markets of Dubai. Today, one can find in Dubai, 
the descendants of some of these Banias, particularly of the Thattai Bhatia 
community of Sind, whose claims to have been pioneers of the wholesale trade in 
foodstuff and textiles in Dubai make sense if looked at in the light of this 
information.  As Lingah faded into insignificance, they relocated their base to Dubai 
like the Persian and Arab merchants who had hitherto looked to the Persian port for 
their commercial enterprises, recreating in turn the Lingah's economy within the 
territorial confines of Dubai.  A steady stream of artisans, clerks, shopkeepers and 
pearl divers from Persia, Iraq, Bahrain, Oman and the interior regions of the Emirates 
followed the Persians and the Indians, adding to the changing social, economic and 
demographic profile of the city and taking its spatial expansion in a new direction.71
This new phase of economic and urban expansion was facilitated by the 1904 
declaration of Dubai as a tax free port made by Maktoum Bin Hashar, the sheikh of 
Dubai under pressure from his majilis.  The majilis was a council of merchants, a 
polity where they played a key role in decision making, economic affairs, and urban 
policy and where the ruler himself was, as Al-Sayegh observes, a "paternalist 
merchant prince.72"  The portrait of the ruler as "paternalist merchant prince" may be 
slightly misleading since it could persuade the reader to equate his position with or 
place him above the Persian and Indian merchants trading in the city, something that 
was not quite true until at least the decline of the pearl industry through the early 
1930s.  For unlike the latter who were part of an imperial structure of commerce and 
its concomitant political order manifest during the times in the British Government 
of Bombay, the ruler was a local figurehead deriving his political legitimacy from the 
desert tribes and their customary notions of leadership.  Even as the ruler of the town, 
he did not have access to the kind of financial resources that the merchants had at 
their disposal and was dependent almost entirely on pearl taxes and customs 
revenues.  With his fortunes tied almost irrevocably to the fluctuations of the market 
it was not infrequently that he had to turn to merchants who provided him with 
financial assistance in return for greater political privileges and a seat in the majilis.
71 Jones, British India Steamers, 28-30. 
72 Al-Sayegh, “Merchants' Role,” 87-102. 
76
Even as Dubai took on greater functions as a port and had about 34 steamers of the 
BISN calling on an annual basis from 1905 until about 1930, it remained a modest 
town of about 10,000 people of whom 7,000 were employed in the pearling sector.73  
There were no modern institutions of state or urban governance and no infrastructure 
in the form of bridges, roads or concrete structures.  Some of the pearl merchants 
established schools of which the Al Ahmadiyyah School started in 1903 was the most 
renowned, and a hospital.  The creek remained in many ways the lifeline of the city.  
For one it was the entry and exit point defining the activities of the city's pearl 
economy.  It was also what separated the three spatial constituents of Bur Dubai, 
Deira and Al Shindagha defining the Dubai of the 1930s.
Conclusion
This chapter has mapped the dual frames of the desert and the sea from which 
Dubai's history has been written by colonial officials.  It has laid out the diverse 
contexts and the scales through which Dubai emerged historically, thus elaborating 
on the specific forms of economic, social and political activity underlying the making 
of the city as a place and an Indian Ocean city-state in the 19th century.  It is the 
specificities of the Indian Ocean city-state and the forms of mobility, power and 
politics defining it that sees Dubai through the barren years of the 20th century 
following the demise of pearling and the onset of the economic depression in the 
1930s.  What the specificities were and how they were tapped into by merchants, 
traders, entrepreneurs and others form the major theme of discussion in the following 
chapter.
73 Stephen J. Ramos, Dubai Amplified: The Engineering of a Port Geography (Surrey: Ashgate, 
2010), 59.
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Chapter Three
After Pearls, Before Oil: 
Trade, Smuggling and Urbanization in Dubai 
A new and extended chapter in the urban history of Dubai began in the early 1930s.  
Marked by economic depression worldwide and declining pearl fortunes in the 
Persian Gulf, the long decade witnessed the newly emerging Indian Ocean city-state 
thrown into political disarray.  In response to such turbulence within its local context 
as well as the developments associated with the Second World War in the imperial 
Indian Ocean, including the restrictions on trade,1 the merchants of Dubai embarked 
on an uneasy realm of commerce, identified in the popular memory with smuggling.  
The principal concern of this chapter is the phenomenon of smuggling as it defined 
Dubai's urban character and economic trajectory over the latter half of the 20th 
century.  Smuggling is addressed in relation to Dubai's commercial relations with 
India in the imperial Indian Ocean and the ways in which these relations tied into 
later waves of Indian migration into the city and the larger Persian Gulf in post-
imperial times.  Scholars like Ahmed Kanna and Neha Vohra have commented on the 
phenomenon and its imaginaries as centered predominantly around the illegal 
transfer of gold into India following decolonization in the subcontinent in 1947.2 I 
add to the existing literature on smuggling in Dubai by historicizing it in the shifting 
context of the post-colonial state in India and its economic policy designs of 
'developmentalism' and import substitution as well as examining the actual processes 
of transfer and 'contrabanding' that were categorized as smuggling in the discourses 
of the newly formed state.  I also examine the nature of the urban economy in Dubai 
that stemmed from and reinforced a particular sociology of smuggling, grounded in 
1 See page 97 of the chapter. 
2 Kanna, Dubai, 60; Vohra, Impossible Citizens, 93-96.
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ethnic hierarchies and marked by the conjunction of the formal and the informal both 
within its territorial confines and across the border in India.    
It would be futile to attempt to define smuggling since it encompasses a range of 
diverse practices pitched at differing degrees of 'illegality' and undertaken in 
response to the differential policies of political regimes whose legitimacy rests on 
territoriality and the institutions that define and enforce it.  We have seen in the 
preceding chapter how with the Portuguese 'territorializing' the waters of the Indian 
Ocean, its hitherto unregulated maritime trades were made illegal except in the event 
of payment of customs duties to the Estado da India.3 The early efforts of the 
Portuguese to identify smuggling in its rather crude forms in the maritime space of 
the Indian Ocean gave way to a different political vocabulary of smuggling during 
the early 20th century in the Persian Gulf.  It was the clandestine trade in arms 
directly or otherwise to the enemy or its allies during the Second World War that 
defined smuggling for the British empire.  With the post-colonial Indian state coming 
into power, smuggling was essentially any trade that evaded taxes, thereby depriving 
the state of its revenues, most importantly of its earnings in foreign exchange, and 
jeopardizing its policy of boosting domestic manufacture.  Smuggling was thus more 
of an economic offense against the state and perceived as that which challenged its 
developmental ambitions and its emerging political economy of industrialization.  
With the onset of globalization, it has become even more difficult to frame 
smuggling as it is often found lurking in the shadows of legitimate transactions 
defining international corporations, private individuals and nation-states.  Carolyn 
Nordstrom draws attention to the global shipping industry to illustrate this point, 
highlighting the ways in which legitimate trades routinely intersect with a range of 
practices constitutive of smuggling on shipping routes and in ports.4 What makes 
smuggling doubly resistant to definition in current times is that multiple practices 
and domains of 'illegal' or 'illicit' economic activity as the case may be, are crammed 
together in a perspective that aligns it to international organized crime networks and 
3 For details see, page 66-67 of chapter two. 
4 Carolyn Nordstrom, Global Outlaws: Crime, Money and Power in the Contemporary World 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 117. 
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makes it coterminous with underworld mafias, traffickers and international terrorists.  
Economic insurgency is seen as coalescing with political insurgency in acts that 
strike at the very foundations of international law and order and threaten the security 
and legitimacy of nation-states everywhere.5 
Smuggling is a phenomenon that has intrigued both imperial and post-colonial states 
alike in the larger arena of the Indian Ocean World.  Scholars like Amar Farooqui, 
Claude Markovits and John F. Richards6 have worked out the political economies of 
opium smuggling in 19th century India, while others like Carl Trocki have elaborated 
on the role of the drug in “laying the foundation for European colonial structures in 
Asia, both economic and administrative.”7 Richards has focused on the peasant 
production of opium and its contribution to the finances of British India and 
Markovits the ways in which opium producing areas in western India, particularly 
Sindh was integrated into the British imperial trading system.  Farooqui interestingly, 
has looked at opium smuggling as an act of subversion and the conduit for the rise of 
indigenous capitalism in western India.  Eric Tagliacozzo, has drawn up a 
comprehensive picture of smuggling in the region in the 19th century, focusing on its 
many key questions, say of the state, borders, law, technologies of surveillance and 
institutions of enforcement of border regimes, commodities, violence and the pre-
colonial histories of smuggling as open trade.8  This chapter borrows insights from 
Tagliacozzo's work on the phenomenon, including notions of the border as a 
physical, economic and political construct symptomatic of the ideologies and 
anxieties of the state.  It addresses smuggling as a set of activities emerging and 
existing in parallel to the territorial expanse of the state and its transformation as a 
5 I have taken this argument from R.T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance and 
the Underworld Economy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002). 
6 Amar Farooqui, Smuggling as Subversion: Colonialism, Indian Merchants and the Politics of 
Opium, 1790-1843 (New York: Lexington Books, 2005); Claude Markovits, “The Political Economy 
of Opium Smuggling in Early Nineteenth Century India: Leakage or Resistance,” Modern Asian 
Studies 43, no.1 (2009): 89-111; John F. Richards, “The Indian Empire and Peasant Production of 
Opium in the Nineteenth Century,” Modern Asian Studies 15, no.1 (1981): 59-82. 
7 Carl Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade, 
1750-1950  (London: Routledge, 1999), xi. 
8 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian 
Frontier, 1865-1915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); “Ambiguous Commodities, Unstable 
Frontiers: The Case of Burma, Siam and Imperial Britain, 1800-1900,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 46, no.2 (2004): 354-377.  
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legal landscape.  Furthermore, it resists the tendency to engage with smugglers as 
ontological categories whose lives, identities and commercial activities are singularly 
defined by the phenomenon of smuggling.  
Smuggling has also formed a critical area of interest outside the commercial and 
political realm of the Indian Ocean, besides contributing in many ways to the 
discourse on globalization, its historical trajectory and its contemporary dimensions 
of illicitness.  Peter Andreas who refers to the US as a nation of smugglers, revisits 
American history and the rise of its particular form of capitalism as tied primarily to 
smuggling and the politics of state interaction with it.  The diverse forms of state 
interaction ranging from “collusion and toleration to discouragement and 
condemnation,” that Andreas points out, reveal the dynamics of smuggling and state-
making as mutually defining and inseparable processes in history.9  Andrew Wender 
Cohen signposts the significance of the tariff in conceptions of the country's 19th 
century political economy, highlighting how its evasion and the import of foreign 
goods in contravention of its policies, were construed by the state and treasury 
officials as violations of national identity.10 In the age of globalization where 
smuggling is collectively taken to mean the illicit traffic in drugs and arms, money 
laundering and the international trafficking in women and children, scholars like 
Gargi Bhattacharyya11 have illustrated its significance as “an alternative route into 
the global economy,” while Castells and others12 have rendered it a parallel global 
economy, rather a global criminal economy in itself.   
To begin to understand smuggling in Dubai, it is, as Nordstrom, writing of economic 
globalization reminds us, “useful to see the world as traders always have.”13 It is a 
world in which movement is paramount and stasis unwarranted.  Borders, laws and 
other regimes of territorial sovereignty, whether of the imperial colony or the nation-
9 Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 2. 
10 Andrew Wender Cohen, “Smuggling, Globalization and America's Outward State, 1870-1909,” 
The Journal of American History 97, no. 2 (2010): 371-398. 
11 Gargi Bhattacharyya, Traffick: The Illicit Movement of People and Things (London: Pluto, 2005), 
32. 
12 Manuel Castells, End of Millennium (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000). 
13 Nordstrom, Global Outlaws, 115.  
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state that work to frustrate movement are secondary, sometimes even tertiary and 
spell out other meanings and possibilities for those that transgress them.  They are 
not so much regulated national institutions as unregulated opportunities, nor are 
tariffs obligations as much as they are obstacles.14  Dubai offers an interesting case 
study in smuggling which as reported in the international and Indian press, prevailed 
well into the 1980s and as I write about it in 2014, is resurfacing with even greater 
force than in the past.15 We have seen in the previous chapter how Dubai had 
emerged as a mercantile city-state in the early years of the 20th century, meaning that 
it espoused a view of the world not entirely different to that of a trader's.  The trader's 
view permeating and defining multiple levels of the social and political hierarchy 
existed at odds with the laws of the modern state and its ideologies of political and 
economic legitimacy elsewhere, particularly in India.  While for India, smuggling 
was trading outside the state's vision, much as it was elsewhere in the developing and 
developed worlds, in Dubai it was only legitimate trade as was the case before India 
embarked on its policies of economic nationalism.16
India, on grounds ranging from the historical, to the economic, political and the 
cultural suffered major setbacks as a result of this view of the city-state's, and hence 
provides the ideal site from which to engage with smuggling as it defined the urban 
economy and its social relations in Dubai.  It is in the acts, processes, interactions 
and hierarchies constitutive of smuggling in the post-imperial Indian Ocean world, 
the chapter argues, that the contemporary histories of India and Dubai, and the 
Arabian Gulf at large remain intertwined and inextricable from each other.  It was 
smuggling which to a large extent institutionalized Dubai's imperial geographies of 
commerce in post-imperial times through aligned practices as migration and the 
tenured visa system all of which have remained marginal to Indian history even to 
14 Nordstrom, Global Outlaws, 116. 
15 For details see Sarika Malhotra, “Yellow Peril,” Business Today, December 8, 2013 
http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/gold-smuggling-resumes-in-india/1/200605.html (accessed 
January 31, 2014). 
16 For details on economic nationalism as an ideology, see Eric Helleiner, “Economic Nationalism as 
a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th Century,” International Studies Quarterly 
46 (2002): 307-329.  For the programme of economic nationalism in India see Vivek Chibber, Locked 
in Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India (Oxford: Princeton University press, 
2003). 
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this day.  
Methods and Sources
This chapter is premised on an understanding of smuggling as an abstract category in 
the service of power regimes that have aimed to freeze pre-existing mobilities of 
people, capital and commodities in a bid to establish a particular order of hegemony 
over their subjects.  The discourses informing such abstraction have been political, 
legal and economic, and less frequently, social.  The narrative on smuggling here is 
reconstructed partly on the basis of these discourses through newspaper reports, 
editorial columns and features in the Indian and international press.  As for the social 
history of smuggling, I have traced its pathways, networks and the hierarchies 
defining its multiple processes through field research and ethnographic material 
collected in Dubai, the other emirates and parts of Kerala in India.  
I situate smuggling in the context of migration and the changing contours of the 
political space in the Indian Ocean as well as the economy in Dubai.  Therefore, it is 
mostly through the histories of migration that I recoup aspects of smuggling.  As 
pointed out earlier, smugglers could never be engaged with as ontological categories 
since there was hardly anyone who did not smuggle even once in their sojourn in 
Dubai.  This is not to say that it was never a large scale activity involving multiple 
players and structural hierarchies, nor that it was a purely economic activity free of 
political undertones.  The point on the contrary is that individuals, mostly migrants 
and makeshift syndicates moved in and out of smuggling in line with changing 
financial circumstances and social and political possibilities on either side of the 
economic border.  
The migrant frames of reference, each of which is distinctive in itself, yet differently 
placed in relation to the other and entrenched in divergent social, economic and 
political locations in their connections with Dubai provide different insights into the 
phenomenon of smuggling.  Two communities, the Thattai Bhatias of Sindh and the 
Malabar Muslims of Kerala, some members of which I interviewed extensively as 
part of my ethnographic fieldwork, are at the centre of the discussion owing to the 
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very specific and intimate functions they performed within the commercial economy 
of Dubai.  Others from Sindh referred to as Sonis and Sindhis, and those from Kerala 
called Malayalis also figure in the work in some detail.  
The Thattai Bhatias were the pioneers of mercantilism, not just in Dubai but the 
whole of the Persian Gulf and Oman and were believed to have had trading 
settlements in Muscat from the 15th century at least.17 In the 18th century they were 
supplanted by the Kutchi Bhatias and a group of Khojas from Sind known as 
Luwatiyas in Muscat, owing to which a vast majority of them settled down in 
Zanzibar while a small group moved to Bahrain, Kuwait and Dubai where they 
played a huge role in the pearl trade up until the 20th century.18 With the province of 
Sind going over to Pakistan and the loss of Thatta and Karachi as commercial 
strongholds the Thattai Bhatias became among the many trading communities of 
Hindus in Sind displaced territorially by Partition. Today they figure among the 
many diverse groups of Sindhi diaspora that are spatially dispersed across the Persian 
Gulf, North America, Southeast Asia and East Africa.19 
The Malabar Muslims, otherwise called the Mappilas have figured in many historical 
accounts and colonial documents as peasants, traders, sea pirates and rebels of 
empire.  Unlike the Bhatias, they are neither a homogenous group nor a trading 
diaspora, yet have a history that ties them in more closer, even intimate social 
relationships with the Arabs at least from the 7th century.20 With the advent of the 
Portuguese, they lost their predominance as merchants and traders in the Indian 
Ocean, a state of affairs which continued well into the days of British colonialism.  
They moved into Dubai and other parts of the Gulf in post-independence times.  
17 Claude Markovits, “Indian Merchant Networks Outside India in the 19th and 20the Centuries: A 
Preliminary Survey,” in Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s, ed. Donna R. Gabacchia (Leiden: 
Brill, 2011), 96-97. 
18 Claude Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947: Traders of Sind from 
Bukhara to Panama (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
19 Markovits, The Global World, 11-12.
20 Roland E. Miller, Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study in Islamic Trends (Bombay: Orient 
Longman, 1976).  Stephen F. Dale, “ Trade, Conversion and the Growth of the Islamic Community of 
Kerala, South India,” Studia Islamica 71 (1990): 156.  Also see Prema Kurien, “Colonialism and 
Ethnogenesis: A Study of Kerala, India,” Theory and Society 23, no. 3 (1994): 385-417. 
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They were labour migrants even before oil had become a source of income in Dubai 
inserting themselves into its diverse commercial circuits in varying capacities.  As oil 
began to bring in more stable returns, they took up a whole host of jobs ranging from 
dock and construction workers, drivers, cooks and cafeteria labour and couriers and 
lower level operatives associated with smuggling rings.  More of their place in the 
fledgling economy of Dubai in the 1970s and 80s will be discussed in the following 
chapter.      
Smuggling, A Kaleidoscope of Economic and Political Activity During and After 
Empire
Travel narratives, popular histories and academic writing on Dubai often tangentially 
refer to smuggling as an economic activity that characterized the period from the 
1950s up until the 1980s.   Indian newspapers of the times, particularly the Bombay 
editions of national dailies like The Times of India, provide us with significant details 
and figures on the illegal traffic in gold, as also consumer electronics, home 
appliances, imported liquors and cigarettes as well as textiles and cosmetics that 
linked Dubai with Bombay and other ports on the western coast of India. Smuggling, 
read against a timeline roughed out by the Indian press can broadly speaking, be 
slotted into three phases between independence and the partition of the country in 
1947 and the onset of liberalization in 1992—the first of these stretching from 1947 
to 1954 when economic nationalism was only beginning to emerge as a political 
ideology; the second and the most important phase from 1954 to 1974 when 
smuggling transformed into a full-fledged industry enabled by proliferating social 
networks and rapidly advancing mobile and communication technologies; and the 
final from 1977 to 1990 following the lifting of the emergency, the spiraling labour 
migration to the Gulf and the return to normal of the activities of smuggling outfits.21 
Between 1947 and 1954 alone, it was reported that about 1.3 million ounces of gold 
was illegally imported into the country, and this was not including other goods for 
21 For details see S. Dharmarajan, “Gold Smuggling on Way Out: Some Facts and Figures,” The 
Times of India, December 26, 1974,  6. 
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which we have hardly any statistics.22  It was estimated by bullion dealers in London 
that the figures for the gold purchased by Middle East buyers ranged between 6 
million ounces in 1964 and 11 million ounces in 1971.23  Interviews with bankers in 
Dubai revealed that the city's monthly outflow of gold destined for India alone was at 
least 21 tons a month between 1966 and 1971.  With the help of these figures the 
annual drain on foreign exchange on gold alone was at put down at 250 crore rupees 
a year, while an approximately equal amount was considered to have been spent on 
other smuggled goods.  
Periodic cutbacks in the phenomenon did occur particularly in the 1970s but this was 
not to remain consistent for long or to effect a paradigm shift in social attitudes 
towards smuggling. For close to two years between 1971 and 1973, the country 
witnessed a decline in the smuggling of gold which was relegated to the fourth place 
in the list of contraband items after textiles, wrist watches and miscellaneous goods 
like household appliances and their spare parts.  According to figures provided by 
Timothy Green, representative of a London based bullion firm, Dubai's imports from 
London showed a downward trend—from 260 tons in 1970 to 212 in 1971 and 140 
tons in 1972 and 1973.24  This slump was registered as a result of a whole host of 
factors.  On the domestic front was the stepping up of surveillance by the Indian 
Navy along the western coast following the Bangladesh Liberation War in 
March1971, and the drought in Maharashtra in 1972 and 1973 when distress sales of 
jewelry by the rural population led to a decreased demand for the metal.25 On the 
international scene, the devaluation of the US dollar in February 1973 and the 
subsequent rise in the international price of gold from US$ 38 to 42. 22 an ounce 
made very little dent in the price of the metal in Indian markets, meaning there was 
little to be gained from smuggling.26  The next phase when smuggling was recorded 
22 For statistics and a description of the method by which figures of gold smuggling were arrived at 
see “Tungku's Travels: Smuggling Gold,” The Times of India, July 31, 1971, 8.  
23 “Gold Smuggling on Way Out: Some Facts and Figures,” The Times of India, December 26, 1974, 
6. 
24 “Distress gold sale by the drought-hit,” The Times of India, May 31, 1973, 1.
25 “Distress gold sale,” The Times of India, May 31, 1973, 1. 
26 Peije Wang, The Economics of Foreign Exchange and Global Finance (New York: Springer, 2009), 
24.  Also see “Distress gold sale,” The Times of India, May 31, 1973, 1 for India's unenthusiastic 
response to international gold prices.
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to have hit an unprecedented low was during the emergency in India, when the 
authoritarian Indira Gandhi regime of the Congress party detained scores of 
'smugglers' under the COFEPOSA (Conservation of Foreign Exchange and 
Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974), a move that rendered it impossible 
for these men to liaise with their bosses in the Gulf for the transfer of contraband.27 
This steep decline with Dubai importing no more than a total of 5 tons of gold in 
1975 was a rather short-lived phenomenon and smuggling was reported to have 
kicked back to its pre-emergency levels soon after the emergency was lifted in March 
1977.
Smuggling was to be found literally everywhere particularly during the second and 
third phases.  It existed in numerous forms and practices with very few individuals 
and hardly any foreign manufacture escaping its vast sweep.  Even as early as 1968, 
it was reported to have been 'over-crowded'28 like any other profession in India and 
by 1977, there were according to Yusuf Patel, who was a notorious smuggler himself, 
“about 3200 smugglers in India” alone.29 Arab dhows fitted with engines and manned 
by Arabs, Indians and Pakistanis carried consignments of gold, diamonds, Japanese 
textiles, cigarettes and wrist watches from Dubai and had them transshipped to 
fishing vessels and country craft in Indian waters in the night in the fifties and the 
sixties.  Air hostesses flying from and via Dubai carried gold and foreign currency 
hidden in handbags with false layers,30 male passengers lugged gold and diamonds in 
their clothes, shoes and suitcases with false bottoms.31 Other airline staff concealed 
gold in the bathrooms of flights,32 wheeled them in flasks and ovens on food trolleys 
into flight kitchens on the ground33 and 'shortlanded' all kinds of contraband goods in
27 For the definition of the act and the grounds and conditions of detention under the act, see 
COFEPOSA Act (Act 52 of 1974) in Acts and Subordinate Legislation, published online by the 
Ministry of Finance, Government of India, http://finmin.nic.in/law/cofeposa.pdf (accessed August 2, 
2013). Also see “Campaign Against Smugglers: Assessing the Impact,” The Times of India, September 
26, 1974, 4; “'Gold too Costly for Indians:' Dubai Smuggling Wanes,” The Times of India, August 18, 
1975, 7 and “Gujarat Coast No Longer A Smugglers' Paradise,” The Times of India, April 24, 1976, 
page 11. 
28 Kumud Khanna, “Smugglers' Paradise,” The Times of India, January 7, 1968, 8. 
29 “Smuggling was there even during Emergency,” The Times of India, July 28, 1977, 7. 
30 “Smuggling Bid Foiled,”The Times of India, July 21, 1968, 6.
31 “Two held at airport on smuggling charge,” The Times of India, November 3, 1982, 3. 
32 “Airlines staff held for smuggling gold,” The Times of India, February 13, 1987. 
33 “Three Convicted for Gold Smuggling,” The Times of India, February 17, 1983, 4. 
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undeclared baggage. While gold concealed in consignments of books, tape recorders, 
refrigerators and air conditioners was also a popular technique of smuggling, there 
were even more skilled cavity specialists that hid gold in the cavities of their bodies 
while flying to India. Consignments of foreign currency concealed in vegetable and 
fruit packages due for shipment by flights to Dubai were intercepted in an incident or 
two while smugglers like Haji Mastan smuggled silver into Dubai on flights from 
Bombay and brought back slabs of gold with the profits made in the sale of the 
metal.34 Traders also sent huge consignments of silver to corporations and mercantile 
houses in Dubai, sometimes close to a ton, labeling them as licensed export items 
like textiles and hand looms.35 Other more innovative ways of financing the purchase 
of gold also existed such as the withdrawal of foreign exchange on the basis of 
forged 'A' forms (these were meant for procuring foreign exchange for studies 
abroad) through personal links in the Reserve Bank of India.36
A clearer view of the phenomenon from the other side emerges with the post-colonial 
Indian state beginning to press for diplomatic presence in Dubai in the early 1960s in 
a move that the officials at the Political Agent's office suspected was related to its 
urge to curb smuggling into India.37  As is evident from the report of the Patrick 
Fyere, the Commercial Officer at the Political Agency stationed in Dubai, smuggling 
was certainly the lynchpin of the economy in the 1960s. Classifying it as “gold 
smuggling” and “the smuggling of anything else,” he signposts the nature of Dubai's 
trade that was at the core of the phenomenon, tying the city into the economic and 
political lives of other economies in the Indian Ocean region, say Iran, India, 
Pakistan, Oman and Hong Kong on the one hand and those of Europe on the other.  
It is hard to say how much of Dubai's brisk but uncatalogued trade with the interior—
Oman and Saudi Arabia—is smuggled; but since the lowest rate of duty on goods imported 
into the Sultanate  is 17 ½% and on some goods duties are up to 100% and since Sultanate 
customs officials are known to be corruptible and the border is long, no doubt much is 
34 “Watch Haul only of Rs 89. Lakhs,” The Times of India, July 8, 1983, 9; “Smuggling Silver out of 
India: One held,” The Times of India, October 5, 1969, 8. 
35 “Bail for Suspect in Silver Haul Case,” The Times of India, March 10, 1983, page 3. 
36 “Racketeer “kingpin” arrested,” The Times of India, September 22, 1976, 1. 
37 For details refer the confidential report on smuggling prepared by Patrick Fyere, Commercial 
Officer at the Political Agency, Dubai in “External Relations” of the Annual Records of the Gulf, 
UAE, 1962 (Slough: Archive Editions 1993); 514-518. 
88
smuggled.  
Gold is smuggled from Dubai to India because the price of gold in India is almost twice 
the price of gold on the world market (the price of gold in Pakistan is rather less than that 
of gold in India); the reason for this difference in price is that a traditional love of gold 
ornaments and a desire to find a hedge against inflation have created a keen demand which 
is impossible to satisfy officially because of currency shortage. 
While no exact figures are available, I believe that the value of gold imported into Dubai 
and re-exported may be rather more than the total value of all other imports, perhaps as 
much as £ 10,000,000 per annum.  
Gold is bought with free dollars from London, Zurich, Paris or New York; most comes 
from London.  It is flown generally into Dubai already cast in 10 tola bars and stamped 
with sassy marks (ten tolas are 1800 grains troy and worth about £ 47).  A single shipment 
form London may be worth £ 250,000 at world prices.  
All sorts of craft take the gold from Dubai to India or Pakistan; large and small country 
craft, steamers and sometimes aircraft.  Probably most goes by country craft (often small 
launches fitted with 200 or 300 hp British engines and capable of 17 knots).38  
Much more significant, however, than the description of the phenomenon by the 
Commercial Officer is the manner in which correspondences between officials on the 
issue betray the Residency's politics in addressing and engaging with it.  The spatial 
frames from which smuggling was looked at were different in times of empire and 
after it, and so were the political dimensions of these.  During imperial times, 
smuggling was the clandestine movement of such articles as cloth, tea, rice and 
sugar, besides rupees and silver coinage from the coastal districts to the interior of 
Oran where these commodities undercut British prices and destabilized the empire's 
trade in these goods.39 Much more serious was the question of the illicit trade in 
firearms among the various peoples of the Gulf littoral for military use against the 
British and Persian authorities, particularly during the Afghan wars.40 This trade was 
essentially a British trade.  In other words, “the rifles were made in England, the 
exporting firms were British, the ships that carried the arms were British and the 
firms that handled the trade in Persia were British.”41 Dubai was implicated in this 
imperial geography in ways radically different to those of its post-imperial variants 
38 Patrick Fyere, Commercial Officer at the Political Agency, Dubai in “External Relations” of the 
Annual Records of the Gulf, UAE, 1962 (Slough: Archive Editions 1993); 514-518. 
39 “Bushire Diaries for the Year 1935,” in File No. 84-N/35, Foreign and Political Department, NAI. 
40 Arnold T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf: An Historical Sketch from the Earliest Times to the Beginning 
of the Twentieth Century (London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1928), 269-271. 
41 Wilson,  The Persian Gulf, 271. 
89
of smuggling.  It was through Oman that was considered the centre of the traffic in 
arms in the late 19th century that Dubai and other ports like Bahrain, Qatar and 
Kuwait became nodal points in this circuit linking India with Persian territory in the 
Persian Gulf.  Since Dubai was a pearling centre to which divers and slaves were 
brought in from Oman, particularly the Batinah coast, it was assumed that the large 
number of rifles sold locally to tribesmen in the interior of Oman reached the coast 
via these seasonal migrants.  It was Dubai's location on the slave route from Persia to 
Oman and the Trucial Coast that made it a centre for the reverse traffic in arms into 
Persia and Afghanistan, a fact noted by the officers of the Admirality during the early 
years of World War I.42 The imperial policy of curbing smuggling placed undue 
emphasis on crackdown at the point of importation rather than at source, meaning 
that the pursuit of smugglers became the sole responsibility of governments into 
whose territories goods were smuggled.43  
That smuggling in post-imperial times whether of gold or other articles was not 
something which in the view of either the Political Agent himself or the officials 
associated with the Commonwealth Relations Office warranted legislation must be 
read in some sense as the legacy of this imperial policy.  Since Dubai was one of the 
last outposts of empire in the Indian Ocean, officials had even begun to take on a 
more liberal view of the phenomenon conceding that, “however great the annual loss 
to India arising from gold smuggling through the Gulf, this traffic is a natural feature 
of Gulf life and is not regarded by the local Rulers as in any way illegal.”44 Besides, 
legislation in Dubai which was still considered the prerogative of the British 
Government, could only be enforced in principle through exchange control.  In real 
terms however, limited territorial control underlying British hegemony in the region 
rendered the Exchange Control Act powerless “in actually preventing any transaction 
of even the most undesirable kind in these states.”45 The nature and terms of British 
42 For details see, Extract from A Handbook of Arabia Vol. I, Prepared on behalf of the Admirality 
and War Office, Admirality War Staff, Intelligence Division, 1916 L/P&S/20/E 84, NCDR.
43 During the third Afghan War of 1879-80, the British had forced the Shah of Iran to prohibit the 
import of arms into Persian territory while nothing much was done to stop their traffic into the Indian 
Ocean from Britain.  Wilson, The Persian Gulf, 270. 
44 The Political Agent A.J.M. Craig's confidential letter dated October 16, 1962 “External Relations” 
of the Annual Records of the Gulf, UAE, 1962 (Slough: Archive Editions 1993), 525. 
45 “Dubai—Gold Smuggling into India,” letter dated September 17, 1962 “External Relations” of the 
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intervention in the Indian Ocean had also drastically changed following the 
decolonization of India.  This was to the effect that the British administrators had no 
legal prerogative to interfere with the gold trade which became 'illegal' and therefore 
smuggling only when it actually took place in Indian or Pakistani territory where it 
was an unmistakable legal offense.  It was thus in the power and interest of these 
governments to curb it.  In any case, anti-smuggling legislation was of very little 
consequence insofar as the British exchequer was concerned and hence not deserving 
of much attention on the part of British officials.  
Smuggling which started off as a major concern for the colonial and imperial 
governments in the wake of imperial rivalries and war in Europe had thus by the end 
of the days of empire become an irrelevant issue for Britain and a rather serious one 
for India.  The post-colonial state had inherited the structural legacies of British 
India's political administration and financial management and along with these the 
crises inherent in them.  Imperial Britain's problems, including the loss of gold and 
foreign exchange reserves and the domestic crisis of the rupee were thus transferred 
to and became the newly emerging nation-state's problems.46 Since the problems 
were hardly new, the solutions proposed were no different.  The 'license raj' as the 
post-colonial regime came to be retrospectively called, continued to impose in much 
the same manner as its predecessor, import controls on gold as well as restrictions on 
foreign exchange.  What was new nevertheless, were a more rigid sense of a border 
and an ideology of nationalism as legitimizing features of the state, its moral and 
political cultures as well as its legal system, all of these making sense within “an 
international system driven by co-operating or conflicting national political 
economies.”47  
Smuggling acquired new dimensions within the territorial boundaries of the Indian 
state which under Nehru, its first Prime Minister, launched a totally non liberal 
economic regime as a significant pathway to nationalism and the reinforcement of 
Annual Records of the Gulf, UAE, 1962 (Slough: Archive Editions 1993); 526.  
46 For details see page 28-32 of chapter one. 
47 Christopher Alan Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 
234. 
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nationalist identities.  Import-substitution along with tariff and exchange rate policies 
specifically adopted to protect the domestic economy characterized independent 
India's political economy and its particular form of developmentalism well into the 
late 1980s.48 The closed statist model of development with its suspicion of open 
trade, emphasis on public sector industry and socialist proclivities was one that relied 
heavily on tariffs and quotas as well as indirect taxation of consumer goods.49 
Imports, in principle to be undertaken solely for purposes of production for export, 
were subject to the state's approval granted in the form of import licenses, a process 
mired in bureaucratic red tape and political corruption, leading to powerful interest 
groups monopolizing state resources.  Looked at from the perspective of the state in 
India hostile to private capital for the major phase of its post colonial history, any 
attempt at trade or even imports for personal consumption could have been 
smuggling.    
A broad and sweeping approach espoused by the state to smuggling was nowhere 
more visible than in the changing landscape of the law, as well as that of the 
bureaucracy and institutions that were created to prevent infringement of the law and 
enforce it.  A customs barrier was raised between India and Pakistan for the first time 
in March 194850 deeming as illegal the transfer of goods across their borders and 
closing off all legitimate possibilities of individual commercial activity between 
them.  Transgression of the border was the first and the most offensive of acts 
constitutive of smuggling and a violation of the law in criminal terms.  However, 
aligned to and deriving from it were other illegal acts or economic offenses as it 
were, including the possession of gold and warranting proceedings under non-
criminal revenue jurisdiction.  Such proceedings included the confiscation of goods 
by customs or the order to payment, in lieu of confiscation, tariffs and rates evaded 
as well penalties imposed for attempts to breach statutes prohibiting the import and 
export of goods.51
48 See Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global 
Periphery (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 15 and 263. 
49 Kohli, State-Directed Development, 266. 
50 See Amba Lal vs The Union of India and Others on 3 October, 1960, 1961 AIR 264, 1961 SCR (1) 
933. 
51 For details see the Supreme Court verdict in Thomas Dana vs The State of Punjab of 1958, 1959 
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The post-colonial legal approach to smuggling owes much to the colonial history of 
customs and the beginning of its administration along modern lines in the 19th 
century in India.  Legislation against the transfer of contraband cargo into Indian 
territory had therefore not been wanting at any stage in its post-colonial history.  A 
number of regulations, acts and statutes pertaining to diverse aspects of cross-border 
economic activity ranging from the Sea Customs Act of 1878, the Indian Tariff Act of 
1894 to the Indian Aircrafts Act of 1911, Land Customs Act of 1924 and the Indian 
Customs Act of 1934 all inherited from the colonial past were drawn upon to 
prosecute smuggling, particularly of gold in post-colonial times.52  However what 
was different despite the legal infrastructure inherited from colonial times was the 
conception of the territory of India, the borders defining it and the political ideology 
legitimizing the two.  Despite the existence of so many laws the colonial Indian 
economy was based on a broader notion of imperial space rather as against the notion 
of national space defining the post-colonial state.  Besides, that the colonial economy 
was in reality a laissez faire economy geared to the advantage of British traders 
rather than one set up to promote growth in the colony is something attested to for a 
fact by several scholars.53  The post-colonial nation-state unlike the colonial 
authorities had to take a much more restricted territorial view of smuggling.  The fact 
that smuggling could be addressed only from within its borders took legislation to 
unprecedented levels permeating every aspect of economic life defining the state.
All kinds of import and export activity undertaken by individuals or firms were 
prohibited in the immediate years following independence unless they were carried 
out with a license granted by the Central government and in accordance with the 
Imports and Exports (Control) Act of 1947.54  Licenses were, in “a permit-license-
AIR 375, 1959. Supl (1) 274.  
52 See Ram Singh, International Trade Operations (New Delhi: Excel Books, 2009), 343-346.  Also 
see, Germano Franchescin and Francesco Misuraca, India: Commercial Law, Customs and Taxation 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluver Law International, 2011). 
53 See Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2004), 73-83.
54 For details on the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1947 and a discussion of events that were 
interpreted as a breach of its provisions, see the supreme court judgement in Amba Lal vs The Union 
of India and Others on 3 October, 1960, 1961 AIR 264 1961 SCR (1) 933 and M.G. Abrol vs M/S. 
Shantilal Chhotalal & Co on 27 July, 1965, 1965 AIR 197 1966 SCR (1) 284 and the Calcutta High 
Order in Tarka Nath Sen and Others vs Union of India and Others on 14 March, 1975, AIR 1975 Cal 
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quota Raj”55 granted only to those industries and firms that relied on imports of 
essential goods deemed necessary for boosting production within the domestic 
industrial sector and subsequently expanding India's export capabilities.  The Sea 
Customs Act of 1878 which provided for the confiscation of any goods, the 
importation of which was prohibited or restricted and the Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act of 194756 barring the bringing into India of gold from outside except 
with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank of India, were the key 
legal enactments that customs authorities and judicial magistrates called on to 
prosecute those individuals found in possession of substantial quantities of the metal.  
However, these were cases where the focus of the law was on 'smuggled goods' 
rather than the act of smuggling itself and which demanded that the individual 
against whom charges were pressed prove that the gold or whatever prohibited 
articles found belonging to him were not 'smuggled.'  On the other hand, where the 
whole sequence activities that could be clubbed under smuggling or the conspiracy to 
undertake such acts in an organized manner was concerned, the Indian Penal Code 
(IPC) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPC) provided for prosecution along 
criminal lines.57
Lost, not surprisingly, in the official stories on smuggling whether in the Political 
Agency's documentation, the reports of the Indian press or the judgements on legal 
cases of smuggling are the social and the political dynamics of the phenomenon in 
Dubai.  India may have gained independence from colonial rule in 1947, but Dubai 
was until the formation of the federation of the Emirates in 1971, part of the residual 
337.
55 The term was first used by C. S. Rajagopalachari, a fierce critic of Nehru's economic policies.  See 
Seetha, “The Lost Heroes of Economic Freedom,” Forbes India, August 23, 2013, 
http://www.forbesindia.com/printcontent/35915 (accessed November 15, 2013).  
56 For details on the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947, see Collection of The Acts of The 
Central Legislature and Ordinances of the Governor General for the Year 1947, (New Delhi, Manager 
of Publications, Government of India Press), 1948.
57 The Supreme Court judgements in the Mohammed Hussain Umar Kochra etc., vs K.S. Dalipsinghji 
& Anr., etc. case (1969) 1970 AIR 45, 1969 SCR (3) 130 and Jagannath Sonu Parkar vs The State of 
Maharashtra (1962) 1963 AIR 728, 1963 SCR Supl. (1) 573 for the legal approach to conspiracy in the 
case of smuggling. Also see, “Secret Document, Coded Letters, Maps Seized: Disclosure by CBI in 
Walcott Case,” The Times of India, 23 February, 1966, 1 and “Gaokar gets 7 years R.I: gold 
smuggling,” The Times of India, February 19, 1970, 7 for a discussion of the financial and operational 
geographies of smuggling rackets and the nature of the conspiracy that makes these geographies and 
networks meaningful in the movement of contraband gold and other goods into India. 
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geography of the now defunct British Raj in India.  Its external affairs, including 
those of trade continued to be administered by the Political Residency system, 
although under the aegis of Her Majesty's Government in Britain.  Viewing it from 
the other side, the chapter argues for smuggling as both politics and economy in 
Dubai rather than simply as a series of cross border transactions from and to India.  It 
expands the geographical scope and scale of the phenomenon beyond the local and 
the regional to the global and analyzes the ways in which the city's regime as well as 
its mercantile and migrant constituencies placed themselves at the intersection of 
these to trigger off urban development in the emirate.  It also locates it in the history 
of the post-pearl economic crisis and examines the ways in which both local and 
imperial politics colluded to produce and reinforce smuggling as a lucrative 
economic activity and a significant commercial pursuit in Dubai. 
Smuggling, A Political Counterweight to Dubai's Post Pearl Economic Crisis
By the closing years of the 1920s, there were colonial reports of the collapse of the 
pearl industry on the Trucial Coast owing to the falling demand for pearls in the 
world market and the financial difficulties it posed for merchants and financiers who 
were now unable to invest in pearling fleets that made their seasonal expeditions 
along the Arabian Gulf.58 Many Dubai-based pearl merchants like Muhammad Bin 
Bayat and Ahmad Bin Dalmuk were rendered bankrupt and had to borrow heavily 
and at 'exorbitant rates' from Hindu merchants in Bombay and Dubai whom they 
often found difficult to pay back.  The risks incurred by the latter during times of 
crises were duly emphasized by the Political Resident who nevertheless and like the 
British Government of India remained biased towards them as British subjects.  This 
was evident in the Political Resident using his authority to persuade the ruler to exert 
pressure on his merchant subjects for the immediate repayment of debts.59 Although 
not unprecedented, the particularly adverse circumstances surrounding the pearl 
industry including plummeting prices and dull markets in the 1930s made the 
58 See Chapter VIII, Administrative Report of the Persian Gulf for the Year 1929 (Simla: Government 
of India Press) in File No. 192-S of 1930 in Vol. 158-N (1930), Secret Department, NAI.
59 Al-Sayegh, “Merchants' Role,” 94 and Abdullah Morsy, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern 
History (London: Croon Helm, 1978), 104. 
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Political Resident's coercion more objectionable than ever to the pearl merchants of 
Dubai who, in protest, began to enter into conflicts with the ruler.  
Given the rather turbulent political situation, it would have made sense had the ruler 
whose exchequer drew substantially from pearl revenues and customs duties on trade 
intervened on behalf of the merchants and pushed for a waiver on the part of the 
Indian financiers, both for his own sake and as a pacificatory gesture towards the 
latter.  That it did not happen had to do with new sources of revenue accruing to the 
ruler in the form of ground rents on air routes and concessions on oil that diminished 
his stakes in the pearl trade and set him free of any obligations to the merchants 
within and outside the majilis.60 In the new monies accruing on a regular basis to the 
ruler from sources other than private forms of commerce lay the future of the 
Maktoums as a dynastic regime at the helm of a tribal polity which following the 
formation of the federation of the UAE came to be known as the emirate of Dubai.  
However, the process by which the ruler consolidated his economic base and 
political authority over the merchants was gradual and far from complete even in the 
1970s, a state of affairs to which the British themselves contributed in significant 
ways.  The British recognized that any independence that the ruler may have been 
able to attain from the merchants would be short-lived and fatal to the status not only 
of the ruler but of the empire as well, particularly since keeping the Maktoum line 
intact was crucial for the latter.  A letter written by Sir Trenchard Fowle, Political 
Resident in the Gulf to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External 
Affairs Department on British Policy on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf sheds light 
on British fears and anxieties:
Briefly then, the old patriarchal traditions of life in the Arab states are being broken up, as 
they have been in so many other Asiatic countries, but even more rapidly, and with this 
break up will come the inevitable consequences already indicated.  Some of the local 
agitations and movements will be directed against the local Rulers, but some will certainly 
be directed against us.  Hardly a fortnight passes without an attack being made in the Arab 
Press of Iraq, Palestine, Syria or Egypt, against His Majesty's Government and its policy 
towards the Arab States of the Gulf.  Under the convenient term of “colonization” 
accusations are sometimes brought that it is our policy to disunite the Arab States, and on 
other occasions to unite them; in each case for our own nefarious ends; that we undermine 
the independence of the States, and use our influence to favour our subjects and foreigners 
60 For more details on the majilis, see page 75 of chapter 2.
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generally to the detriment of the local Arab: and so forth and so on.61
This view of the Political Resident's emphasizing the threat that a dissatisfied 
population posed to empire makes clear why the ruler was asked to pay off in 
installments and over a long stretch what the merchants owed the Indians, form an 
executive council and undertake some of the political and social reforms pressed for 
by the merchants and the opposition in the majilis, including the organization of 
customs, law and order and education.  
The onset of the Second World War in 1939 brought with it greater difficulties for 
Dubai whose existing conduits of commercial revenues, particularly the carrying 
trade to and from the Persian Gulf, were further choked by formal restrictions 
imposed on it by the British.  The geopolitical conditions in Persia had changed 
drastically in the years following the First World War and the rise to power of Reza 
Shah who sought to bring about an end to foreign meddling in the affairs of Iran and 
the long run of political instability engendered by it.  In his ambition to carve out a 
modern  independent state in Iran, Reza with the active assistance of the Germans 
launched a new industrialization campaign aimed at economic reconstruction and the 
general advancement of society.  The Germans in the inter-war years built textile 
mills, roads, railways and other infrastructure that helped connect parts of Iran, 
particularly the north and south, and extend Tehran's reach over them.62 Russia and 
Britain whose vested interests in the north and south of Iran respectively and imperial 
rivalries over the region as a whole could be traced back to as early as the 17th 
century viewed German presence in Iran as a serious threat to their commercial and 
political ambitions.  Subsequently, and in view of the potential danger that lay ahead, 
the British brought pressure on Tehran to hand over its finances and the control of its 
newly formed national army to Britain.63 Despite these, Germany's trade with Iran 
continued to flourish, often exceeding that of Britain's and Russia's until the Anglo-
61 “Policy on the Arab Side of the Persian Gulf,” File No.194-N/39 Serial No. (1) of External Affairs 
Department, Secret Department (1939), NAI.
62 Kristen Blake, The US-Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945-1962: A Case in the Annals of the Cold 
War (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2009) 12-13 and Kaveh Farrokh, Iran at 
War:1500-1988 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011). 
63 See Michael P. Zirinsky, “Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Reza Shah 
1921-1926,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 24, no. 4 (1992): 640-641. 
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Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 and the subsequent enemy blockade of Germany 
diminished it considerably.  The blockade struck a severe blow to the trade of the 
ports of the Arab Gulf whose economic lifeline, given the long span of recession in 
these parts, was almost singularly the carrying trade to the southern coasts of the 
Persian Gulf littoral.64
Interestingly and insofar as Dubai was concerned, the new policy measures adopted 
by the British including the creation of a War Trade Bureau65 the same year, 
contained within them prospects for survival, even better economic returns and a 
more manageable political situation.  The Bureau's functions were to streamline 
trade, control exports from the Allied ports and colonies, introduce and implement 
licensing and collect intelligence on specific traders or consignments shipped to the 
Persian Gulf.  Apart from sanctions imposed on the export of gold, silver, currency, 
particularly Indian rupees, and petroleum products66 it also rationed provisions and 
foodstuff entering the Gulf, so as to completely cut off southern Iran's supplies and 
“prevent commodities useful from the economic warfare point of view from reaching 
enemy countries.” What this meant for Dubai, Sharjah and the other sheikhdoms on 
the Trucial Coast was that each of them was allotted quotas of staples such as wheat, 
rice, sugar and tea which on a weekly basis was delivered to the ruler who was held 
responsible for the distribution of these to his subjects.67 Given the particularly 
turbulent conditions in which Dubai found itself and realizing that they were equally 
threatening to imperial interests, the sheikh could use his influence to press for more 
supplies of each of these commodities citing that the bedouins were not rightly 
accounted for in the Bureau's numbers.  He could then clandestinely pass on the 
surplus to his merchant subjects who embarked on a scheme to 'smuggle' them at 
inflated prices to the southern coast of Persia.
64 Graeme Wilson, Rashid's Legacy: The Genesis of the Maktoum Family and the History of Dubai 
(London: Media Prima, 2006), 90-91. 
65 For details see, No. 20 (6)--E.T/41 of July 4, 1941, Department of Commerce, Government of 
India, in File No. 15 (94) -W of 1941 (Secret), Near Eastern Department, NAI. 
66 See “Exchange Control in Bahrain,” File No. 409-N/41 of 1941, “Export of Sovereigns by the 
Saudi government against payment in US Dollars,” File No. 402-N/41 of 1941, and “Shipment of 
Kerosene, Petrol and Petroleum products to ports in the Persian Gulf,” in File No.620-N/41 of (1941), 
Near Eastern Department, NAI.  
67 Wilson, Rashid's Legacy, 91. 
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Looking the other way at smuggling in Dubai, the British helped restore the city-
state's political edifice and balance it in terms of its dual constituencies of power—
the one tribal, symbolic and embodied in the ruler and the other mercantile, real and 
distributed across a wide spectrum of economic players.  Smuggling and the urban 
economy it gave rise to, the chapter argues, can only be understood against this dual 
constituency, the ways in which they intersect with and mediate, as also challenge 
each other in the day to day affairs of Dubai.  The discussion in chapter one on the 
nature and dynamics of the commercial consensus, had illustrated the ways in which 
this dual constituency worked using the example of Al Tajir.68 The dual constituency 
of power however, required more than the social category that the Al Tajirs 
represented for effective translation into an urban economy.  Indian merchants, 
traders, entrepreneurs and others creating, consolidating and integrating into the 
urban economy in Dubai in diverse capacities and at multiple levels become 
important precisely because of their contributions to the dual constituency as an 
efficacious political and economic model.  What follows is a discussion of migration, 
smuggling and the related ways in which they created and were made part of urban 
history in Dubai.
The creation of Dubai's urban history is also the history of the production of a 
specific geography of commerce linking India with the city.  In spatial terms it is a 
continuation of the earlier pearl geography in which mercantile capital flowed from 
India to Dubai and pearl from Dubai to Bombay.  However, in social, economic and 
political terms it meant much more than a conduit of migratory and capital flows.  
This evolving geography can only be understood in the historical contexts of 
decolonization and the Partition of India in 1947, events defining the other side of a 
new territorial, political and economic entity as the maritime border drawn between 
the western Indian Ocean and the coasts of the Arabian Gulf.  Decolonization and 
partition had splintered communities and their shared histories, among other things, 
of trade, capital and mobility.  The idea and reality of a border between what had 
hitherto been common territory introduced dimensions of illegality and criminality to 
commercial transactions that violated it.  Nevertheless, cross border trading even as it 
68 For details see, page 19-20 of chapter one.  
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brought in enormous challenges and risks to those who pursued it also created plenty 
of opportunities for those who were willing to confront challenges and take risks.  
Smuggling thus became an extensive activity characterized by shifts, tensions and 
power relations between different ethnicities and communities.  These power 
relations and their dynamics  are in many ways symptomatic of the social hierarchies 
and relations of ethnicities living, working and trading in Dubai as a whole.
Partition, Refugee Migration and the Pioneers of Dubai's Gold Trade 
Maghanmal Jethanand Pancholia arrived in Sharjah in the year 1942.69  Born in 
Thatta, a village in the province of Sind lying on the northwestern part of undivided 
India, he was all of eighteen years when he reached the shores of the Gulf, following 
in the trails of his father and the other elders of the Bhatia community from which his 
family hails.  Today as a gentleman in his late eighties, he is revered by younger 
generations of both Indians and Arabs as a Dubai veteran much like Sheikh Rashid 
himself, the father of the present ruler Sheikh Mohammed and the architect of 
modern Dubai.  Affectionately called Magabha, he is the last surviving Bhatia of a 
generation of merchants that set out to be a part of the mercantile pursuits associated 
with the early 20th century pearl boom along the coast of the Arabian Gulf.  I met him 
at a book release function of the Thattai Bhatias in Dubai in the December of 2011 to 
which I was invited by one of the authors of the book himself.  Bharat Chachara and 
his wife Deepa had co-authored and co-published Pancha Reeti Rivaj: Our Rites and 
Rituals, A Glimpse into Thathai Bhatia Traditions to help the younger generations of 
the Thattai Bhatias living in Dubai and elsewhere in the world as diasporic 
communities, observe the customs and keep alive the traditions of their past defined 
by their homeland in Thatta. 
Despite his failing health he visits his office, The Arabian Trading Agency, which is 
one among the many trading companies he owns with his sons and grandsons in the 
city, on an almost daily basis.  When I met him at the Agency office, in one of the 
buildings just across the Dubai Museum in Bur Dubai, in the middle of December 
69 I conducted interviews with Maghanmal Pancholia between December 9th and 26th 2011.
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2011, he spoke to me at some length as the author of Footprints: Memoirs of an 
Indian Patriarch (2009) about his 70 year old relationship with Dubai.  He recounted 
in a language and style not so different to that of the narrative in the book, how the 
history of his life as an entrepreneur and an Indian was intertwined with that of the 
city's and how the community of Thattai Bhatias have since the 1940s made Dubai 
their home, contributing to its urban institutions and character in a multiplicity of 
ways.  Magabha's personal history frames Dubai within a certain dynamic of trade 
that necessarily highlights its social and urban dimensions through the transition 
times of the forties and the fifties.  It draws together the receding commercial world 
of the pearl merchants, the crisis-ridden society of debtors and impoverished 
townsmen, and the emerging order of a migrant economy in the aftermath of the 
political upheavals of Partition and the subsequent territorial re-organization of the 
subcontinent.  In the methodology that the chapter uses to address questions related 
to smuggling as looked at from the other side of the border, his narrative becomes the 
encasing layer that mediates and binds together other narratives and counter-
narratives around the phenomenon as well as its later phases in the seventies and the 
eighties.  His account of the transition phase from the pearl to gold trades and 
preceding the smuggling boom of the 1960s bridges gaps in our understanding of 
Dubai's history, while giving us valuable insights into the many uncatalogued 
economic intersections defining the rapidly changing political geographies in the 
Indian Ocean.  It also lays bare the contexts in which the project of modernization 
and the institutions of urbanity evolved in the city amidst 'other' economic activities 
and in which he and other migrants were shareholding participants.
Magabha's ties with Dubai which he refers to as 'my adopted homeland' in his 
memoirs70 began when he was sent away to work with his elder brother Parmanand.  
The year was 1944, a time of war almost everywhere in Europe and one of severe 
economic crisis in the rest of the world.  The collapse of the pearl industry a decade 
ago had brought his family a great deal of misfortune since the major part of finances 
they had made towards merchants and pearling crews remained unpaid.  They had 
embarked on many alternatives as strategies to survival in the unforgiving climate 
70 Maghanmal Pancholia, Footprints (Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2009), 53.  
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and harsh economic and political environment on the coast, one among which was 
Parmanand's modest gold and currency exchange business.
The switch to the new business was not very difficult.  We were merchants who had 
arranged cash for all kinds of purchases in the Gulf, remitted proceeds from the pearl sales 
to Bombay and Karachi and did safekeeping for Arab and Iranian merchants.  Because of 
all these we were fairly well known and had a firm reputation in both Dubai and Sharjah. 
We offered banking services to the pearl merchants traveling to or based in Dubai during 
the pearling season, but there were also divers, haulers and bedouins who approached us 
for cash.  The latter often in debt, sold their meagre holdings of gold jewelry in exchange 
for cash to buy food, cloth and other basic necessities of life. We bought up their used gold 
jewelry, melted them and sent them over as tola71 bars to merchants in Bombay.  
Parmanand knew how to melt gold, in a while I learned the process too. We had a local 
Arab to help with melting gold especially when it was far too much for the two of us to do.  
Today, his son, he is probably my son's age, is a billionaire in the city.  We made 4 annas 
in profit for every tola that we melted and sent to Bombay. Sometimes we made as much 
as 500 rupees a month. 
In Bombay, import restrictions on the metal were far less rigid than in Bahrain, Kuwait 
and parts of the Middle East. With word spreading of our business, people from as far as 
the Persian Coast came in to Dubai with their possessions in gold and took foodstuff, cloth 
and currency back. The Indian rupee offered in return for gold was used to buy provisions 
and other goods in Dubai, but there were those traveling from and to Iran that also took 
back Iranian tomans for their travel fare to and other expenses in Iran. This business later 
became The Oriental Exchange Co., it is today run by Parmanand's sons.
While gold and currency helped wind a new financial circuit in an economy on the 
verge of collapse in Dubai, on the subcontinent, they became the drivers of the 
migration of refugees from Thatta, Karachi and parts of upper Sind in the newly 
formed Pakistan to Bombay in India.  As a result and the imminent takeover of the 
province of Sindh by the state of Pakistan, the Bhatias and other communities of 
Sindhi Hindus were forced to sell their stocks of gold jewelry which constituted their 
only movable assets to pay for their journey to and settlement in India.  Parmanand 
who had gone to Karachi to help the family living in Thatta move to India, 
continued, alongside a few others, to buy off the gold of Sindhis and pay them the 
money for their travel and maintenance, thus facilitating the actual physical 
movement of their compatriots to India.  Magabha reminisced how the whole 
exercise was only a temporary measure and lasted for no longer than six months at 
71 A tola is a unit in which gold is weighed. A tola is normally found as a bar of gold weighing 10 
grams.  One would find two tola bars, five tola bars, ten tola bars etc.  Magabha and a Dubai-based 
Arab, whose family he still keeps in touch with, helped Parmanand test the purity of gold which was 
often found in the form of 21, 22 and 24 carats.  
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the end of which all Bhatia and Sindhi businesses in Karachi were wound up, since 
Karachi was going over to Pakistan.  In Bombay, where the post-independence 
temper was one of public sector industrialization and domestic manufacturing, the 
Bhatias could not find an economic niche for themselves.  Nonetheless, they built 
homes and community institutions on government grants of land, settling their 
women, children and elders there even as younger Bhatia men migrated to Dubai 
where, in the commercial freedom and political leeway granted them by the ruling 
regime, were to be found new economic opportunities and avenues for growth.  
The Thattai Bhatias, following partition, spearheaded an influx into Dubai that was to 
define the city's commercial temper and spirit in many ways.  The gold trade, an 
already existing niche that they had created, became a realm of opportunities for yet 
other communities who magnified its scale and volume several times over and 
transformed it into an economy with global scope and dimensions.  Of the many 
Indian migrants to take advantage of the possibilities offered by gold in Dubai, the 
Sonis among others from Sindh were, as we are given to understand from Magabha's 
narrative, vitally important.  We learn from Vohra's account the significance of 
Sonis,72 as agents within the now receding framework of a maritime network of 're-
exports' that was both central to Dubai's evolution as a golden frontier of the 
subcontinent and its metamorphosis into a global city in the latter half of the 20th 
century.73 Magabha, though, speaks of the community as in many ways his customers 
in the late forties when Sonis started migrating in large numbers from Sindh. 
The Sonis are basically a community of goldsmiths.  They came to Dubai mostly after 
partition, although there were quite a few of them here even in the early forties.  They 
came from Kathiawar, Gujarat, Mandvi and other parts of Sindh, including Thatta.  In the 
fifties, there were hundreds of them here in Dubai, but you could also find them in other 
parts of the Gulf.  Today, most of them are very successful businessmen particularly in the 
jewelry and precious metals trade and figure among the wealthiest of Indians based in the 
Gulf.  Just walk through Gold Souk and you will see that many of the Indian shops there 
are owned by Sonis.
Magabha recalled that his idea of starting a gold import business in the early 1950s 
72 The term Soni derives from sona, the Hindi word which means gold.  
73 Neha Vohra, “From Golden Frontier to Global City: Shifting Forms of Belonging, “Freedom” and 
Governance among Indian Businessmen in Dubai,” American Anthropologist 113, no. 2 (2011): 306-
318.  
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was provoked by an unprecedented demand for the metal among the newly migrating 
groups of Sonis and other Sindhis.  The London gold market had reopened in 1954 
after a fifteen year period of adjournment and the IMF's restrictions on the purchase 
of gold for non-monetary purposes had been lifted.  What this meant was that bullion 
firms in London were at liberty to sell gold to licensed dealers trading in sterling or 
the US dollar at fairly stable prices with the metal remaining in constant demand in 
the Near and Far East quarters for the major part of the fifties and the sixties.74 The 
price of gold had remained stable at 35 dollars an ounce from at least 1934 to 1968 
when the two-tier pricing system of gold came into being and non-monetary gold 
was left to find its own price in the international market.75  It was when gold was 
priced at 35 dollars that Indians apparently were willing to pay up to double the 
amount to possess an ounce of the metal.76  He also remembers buying from Johnson 
Matthey and Samuel Montagu, two among the six prominent bullion firms registered 
with the London gold market at the time,  24 carat bars weighing 5 or 10 grammes 
for the market in Dubai.  Known better as biscuits and tola bars, these 5 and 10 gm 
wafers stamped with their dealers' names or 'foreign markings' as was described by 
the Indian press, were the preferred and most sought after forms of gold during the 
time here.  
The uses of gold when Magabha started his import business in the Dubai of the early 
fifties were not many, although he admitted that by the time he had given up on it 
which was not much later than a year or two, they had proliferated beyond what he 
could imagine then.  The new found oil wealth in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
translating into consumer demand for gold among the indigenous population was, as 
testified by Magabha and some other early migrants, what defined some of them.  
The Sonis undertook orders for ornaments from rich Arab households in these 
74 “First Anniversary of the London Gold Market,” The Economic Weekly, April 1955, 419-420. 
75 With the two tier pricing system coming into existence, a distinction was made between gold for 
monetary and non-monetary purposes.  While the former was still priced at 35 dollars an ounce and 
was a transactional agreement between Central banks, the latter was tied to market conditions and 
subjected to the fluctuations of price vis-a-vis the dollar.  For details, see I.S. Gulati and Ashoka 
Mody, “International Gold Price Movements, 1972-1982,” Economic and Political Weekly 17, no. 
46/47 (November 13-20, 1982): 1861-1870. Also see I.S. Gulati, “Changing Role of Gold,” Economic 
and Political Weekly 5, no.3/5 (January 1970): 87-92. 
76 Kumud Khanna, “Smugglers' Paradise,” The Times of India, January 7, 1968, 8.
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countries while buying up the gold required for them in Dubai, a trend that continued 
well into the seventies and despite their entry into the retailing trade.  This was not an 
activity that brought in huge margins to begin with.  However, with a floating 
population in the emirate drawn from among groups in the subcontinent, Iran, the 
Near East and the Arabian Gulf and its previous history of transit and the movement 
of goods between these parts, new and more prospective uses for the metal were in 
the offing.  Indeed, no sooner had the possibility of buying gold in the Gulf been 
sighted than immigrants working for oil companies in these countries and going back 
to India on leave or at the end of their labour contracts started to take advantage of it.  
Many of those now settled in Kerala with their families comprising two generations 
or more and who I interviewed told me how they often stopped by at Dubai where 
small retail shops selling gold and silver jewelry and owned by the immigrant Sonis 
could be spotted in the present Gold Souk area of Dubai by the late fifties.77  It was 
here that they bought gifts in gold for their wives, sisters and cousins back home or 
as personal assets for themselves.  Dubai gold, they reminded me, had a particular 
appeal for Indians since not only were the designs crafted by the Sonis unmistakably 
Indian but the gold content in them was much greater than that of jewelry made in 
India and was therefore certain, in the event of a sale, to fetch better prices there.
A particular facet of history that calls for attention here and which puts many of these 
developments in perspective is the post-war shipping line of the British India Steam 
Navigation Company, the migration regime it helped trigger off and the ways in 
which these fed urban development in Dubai.  Revived in 1947 to facilitate the 
movement of employees and goods for oil companies in Iran, the Near East and the 
Arabian Gulf, the Bombay-Gulf line had by the early fifties also begun to carry 
several new migrants looking for entrepreneurial opportunities to and from Dubai.  
Fyere writing in 1962 for the Residency and in connection with the issue of 
smuggling refers to the presence of significant numbers of the latter as deck 
passengers on ships that called at Dubai on a weekly basis.78  
At one time, most goods were smuggled by deck passengers, Indians from Bombay or 
77 These interviews were conducted in Adoor and Thrissur in Kerala between 2011 and 2013. 
78 “External Relations,” Annual Records of the Gulf, UAE, 1962 (Archive Editions 1993); 514-518.
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Pakistan who came from Karachi via Gwadur.  They would stay in Dubai for a month or 
six weeks, buying small quantities of whatever was then cheapest in Dubai and dearest in 
India and Pakistan—it might be radios, candles or irons.  Each man would spend up to 
£300 and the weekly ships brought as many as 40 a trip.  This trade has almost stopped in 
the last year because changes in customs regulations in India and Pakistan have made it 
more expensive for the traveller to get his goods through customs and also because the 
stricter regulation of migrants in Dubai has made lending more difficult; nonetheless 
goods still find their way into India and Pakistan.  
Interviews with migrants and that were passengers on some of these ships in the 
1950s add details to Fyere's remarks, highlighting the activities of these self-
enterprising deck passengers on the voyage from to Bombay.  George and Molly 
Thomas, now 88 and 81 respectively, were one of the earliest couples to have 
migrated to Saudi Arabia from Adoor, a small town in Southern Kerala.79  George 
Thomas travelled from Bombay where he was employed with the Indian Railways 
and recruited to work as an accountant for The Arabian American Oil Company, 
popularly known as Aramco, in 1951.  Molly whom he married in 1953 on one of his 
annual visits to India joined him in Dhahran where Aramco is based in 1954.  They 
returned to Bombay at the end of George's contract in 1958 when he rejoined the 
railways never to travel to the Gulf again.  George's cousin, Abraham was with the 
Bahrain Petroleum Company (BPC) and was one among the many Indians employed 
on its clerical staff during the fifties.  Abraham and his wife lived in the family 
quarters of the BPC where the Thomases often stayed during long weekends or when 
stopping by on their way to India for vacations.  It was during these voyages that the 
couple encountered other variants of deck passengers shuttling between Bahrain, 
Dubai and Bombay on BI liners.
79 Interview with the author in April 2009. 
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Figure 3.1: Map of Kerala  (Courtesy: www.mapsofindia.com )
Molly in particular, vividly remembered how the Sindhi women, most of them 
boarding from Dubai, would plonk down on the floor of the ship around piles of 
merchandise that they were carrying to India working on them through the heat of 
the day.  Images of them sitting around Persian carpets and rugs hemming them in 
the sun and getting them ready for sale in Bombay while their menfolk packed dates, 
piece goods, candles, chinaware and even English crockery, she said, were fresh in 
her memory as though they only happened yesterday.   George added that they also 
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carried carried cigarettes, perfumes and other forms of expensive toiletry with them, 
say Nivea, Cream 21 and Brut which were huge hits among foreign goods in India.  
A part of their baggage heaped onto the very deck space they sat and slept in were 
refrigerators and semi-automatic washing machines, the insides of which were 
possibly stuffed with more of these cosmetics and toiletries.  When asked if these 
people were 'smuggling' these goods, he commented that every individual act of 
overseas trade post-independence in India was smuggling.  Nonetheless, to have 
looked at the activities of these people who were clearly struggling to make a living 
or perhaps only continuing in the trails of the past, with the unconditional view of 
post-colonial law would have been so unfair.  It was only obvious in the course of the 
conversation that George's view of smuggling, refracted through about five decades 
of the history of the phenomenon was tainted by its other and more persistent images 
of the dhow traffic and the adventures around gold trafficking along the west coast in 
the seventies and the eighties.80  
It is important, having said that of George's take on smuggling, to highlight the ways 
in which the politics of British shipping and other forms of private capital in the post-
imperial Indian Ocean world intersected with that of urbanization in Dubai to 
catalyze these early practices of smuggling into its territorial waters.  The 'D' class 
passenger-cargo liners dedicated exclusively to the India-Gulf service shipped such 
essentials as wheat, grain, coffee, sugar, oil and cloth besides construction and 
building material required for company towns and new building sites in the oil rich 
Gulf.  As for passengers, there were apart from those migrants with renewable 
employment contracts and recruited by BI shipping agents,81 only a handful of 
British officers on each of the voyages.  Unlike in colonial times, there were no mail 
subsidies to share the cost of a voyage and the company had to look to other ways of 
making profits.  Interestingly, these were the years when Britain's trade with Dubai 
was beginning to show a great deal of promise, a very welcome sign of revival in a 
post-war economy.  While sales of sterling for the purchase of British goods by 
merchants in Dubai were reported to have been to the order of about £100,000 in 
80 See the last section of the current chapter. 
81 Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Pvt Ltd. were the shipping agents for BISN in Bombay.  
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1948, the figure trebled the following year and with an upward trend continuing the 
following year.82 Dubai by then had “a business-like air about the place, thanks to the 
post office, the bank, a branch of Messrs. Gray Mackenzie and the offices of the 
Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited,” but with with no successful oil 
concessions as yet and a resident population not exceeding 30,000, it certainly had no 
use for its own consumption of the kind of manufactured goods that were traded.  
Clearly evident that a vast majority of these goods made their way to Dubai only to 
be shipped to India as consignments or by migrant workers and itinerant merchants 
that shuttled between Bombay and other ports in the Indian Ocean, the need to keep 
alive the BI services at large and the India-Gulf line in particular was as much 
Dubai's as it was Britain's.  The ruler who earned 4 per cent on the value of goods 
imported into Dubai as customs duty was quick to sense it and tap into the economic 
opportunities and prospects emerging in the cracks of British commercial shipping as 
well as the new oil politics of the Gulf states.  The Political Agency's pressure on the 
ruler of  Dubai for some kind of administrative reform had begun to bear fruit in the 
mid-fifties and steps were taken towards the re-organization of customs and the 
establishment of a legal system, a police force and a municipality with the help of 
British consultants and expatriate functionaries from Iran, Iraq and India.83  At the 
level of organization of city space, “the vegetable market was completed, the roofing 
of the suq with asbestos was continued, some new roads were opened, existing roads 
were well maintained and work was begun on fencing cemeteries.”84 While 
instrumental to and symptomatic of a nascent form of urban development hard to 
come across elsewhere in the lower Gulf, an exception perhaps being Sharjah, it was 
evident that these alone could not have ensured Dubai the commercial traffic it had 
begun to witness with the opening of the BI shipping line.  
It was the increasing awareness of such a state of affairs that led to the initiation of 
82 See the 1950 entry by H.J. Evans, “A Note on the Wealth of Dubai,” in Arabian Gulf Cities: Doha, 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah, ed. Richard Trench (Slough, UK: Archive Editions 1994), 309.   
83 See  B.A.B. Burrowe's letter of October 17, 1956 in “Municipality of Dubai, 1015/3/20/56,” 
Arabian Gulf Cities: Doha, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah, ed. Richard Trench (Slough, UK: Archive 
Editions, 1994),  325-326. 
84 “Municipality of Dubai,” 330.  Also see Dubai, BT 1102/39,  331-333. 
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infrastructural projects undertaken in the 1950s, including the dredging of the creek 
and the building of a modern port and warehousing facilities and the novel and 
interesting kinds of financial arrangements at the core of these.  The capital 
development projects in the earlier part of the fifties were all implemented with funds 
from the British Government channelled through the Trucial States Council that 
came into being in 1952.  However, with Dubai becoming increasingly significant to 
the newly emerging oil economies in the Gulf as a regional capital of trade, the latter 
began to step in with loans and grants that were over the course of the sixties and the 
seventies replicated in the Northern emirates of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah and 
their dependent territories.  Kuwait advanced a loan of 400,000 dinars in 1958 
towards the development of the port, following which Qatar provided funds towards 
the bridging of the creek.85 Private mercantile capital also began to define 
development at this stage in the city with influential merchants like Magabha and 
others becoming shareholders in such ventures as the Dubai electricity86 and 
telephone companies.  Yet another financial source fueling Dubai's urbanization was 
overseas banks, the first of which to be set up in Dubai was the Imperial Bank of 
Iran.  The Imperial Bank had started its operations in the 1940s in Kuwait, Dubai and 
Oman and was for a long time the only bank in them.87  However, unlike in Iran 
where it served as a state bank with a range of obligations including the issue of 
currency, in the Arabian Gulf it functioned more or less as an agency dealing in 
foreign exchange.  Its involvement in Dubai's development started only after 1952 
when it was re-christened as the British Bank of the Middle East following the 
winding up of its operations in Iran.  Looking at it in the particular case of Dubai it 
was a move that was necessitated by the prospects of its gold trade for private British 
banking capital as much of the changing political scenario in Iran, a factor that is 
discussed in greater detail in the following section.    
85 For details see Extract on Communications, Public Utilities, Health and Education from 'An 
Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States' Vol. II, July 1969: 98-101. 
86 For a history of the Dubai Electricity Company to which Magabha was invited to be a founder 
shareholder, along with a few local and Indian merchants, see Footprints, 79-81. 
87 Geoffrey Jones, “The Imperial bank of Iran and Iranian Economic Development, 1890-1952,” 
Business and Economic History, II Series, Volume 16, (1987): 73.
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Figure 3.2: Dubai in 1959 (Courtesy NCDR Abu Dhabi)
An Urban Economy and Sociology of Smuggling    
What all these point to, among other aspects of smuggling, is Dubai as the transit 
point for gold, silver, currency and other smuggled goods into and out of India.  Was 
Dubai called the gold smuggling capital of the world simply because of its laissez-
faire policies and its hands off approach to whatever passed through its territory and 
as claimed by its officials? Or was there more to the plot than travelers, migrants and 
an advantageous geography?  Investigative reports and features ran by international 
dailies as well as testimonies of Indian migrants reveal that Dubai's was certainly a 
much greater role than is often made out to be.  The transfer of gold in Land Rovers 
to banks and the packaging of illicit cargoes in dhows along the creek may have been 
the visible side of smuggling in the city.88  However, what was masked by these 
visible and everyday signs of smuggling in Dubai were closed syndicates of 
merchants or oil barons that invested in and financed these activities and insurance 
88 Willaim Tuohy, “Dubai's Golden Fleece,” The Guardian, January 13, 1971, 11. 
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companies that protected smuggled goods against confiscation.89  At the topmost 
rung was the syndicate, transnational in its operation although mostly physically 
based in Dubai, some levels down in the structural hierarchy of what was called a 
smuggling racket was the agent based in Dubai, often with a counterpart in Bombay 
and further below was the gangster come to be identified in the popular imagination 
as 'the smuggler.'  With a complex social organization in which the smuggler was 
separated by a chain of command that could be traced down to fourteen rings in 
Dubai, smuggling worked more or less as an industry and a highly lucrative one 
particularly for investors and financiers at the higher end of the chain.90  
The mode of operation in which investors bought up gold directly from banks in 
Dubai—the British Bank of the Middle East (BBME) and the First National Bank of 
New York were reported to have been key players in the import business—were the 
primary forces upscaling smuggling to a global trade worth billions of dollars in the 
emirate.91 The established practice until the banks took over the import business in 
gold from Magabha and other relatively smaller merchants like him was of sending 
cash in advance, a week or sometimes even a month earlier, for the consignments.  
Although the risks involved in the deal and the physical transfer of the bars were 
minimal, there was no certainty that the imported gold would all have been sold 
quickly in Dubai, particularly since the firms in question did not operate on the basis 
of orders from clients.  Magabha told me how individuals often approached him for 
no more than a 5 or 10 tola bar at a time.  This meant that business, whether at the 
importation or the exchange phase was far from stable, hence it was not unexpected 
that they would close down soon after the banks arrived on the scene.92  With the 
entry of banks into the circuit, the terms defining the transaction in gold underwent a 
radical change, incorporating wealthier and better organized players and thereby 
strengthening Dubai's position in the international market.  The London based 
bullion dealers and Zurich bankers sent the metal in boxes each containing 100 or 
89 For details on the insurance premium see, B. R. Shenoy, “A Close at Foreign Aid: II-Need to Stop 
Leakages,” The Times of India, August 28, 1970, 10.  
90 Kumud Khanna, “Smugglers' Paradise,” The Times of India, January 7, 1968, 8. 
91 See H.R.Vohra, “Gold Fleet Traced to Dubai,” The Times of India, February 27, 1968. 
92 As reported to the author. 
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200 bars of gold, each stamped 999 to indicate 99.9% purity and each weighing 
about 10 tolas, as air freight to these banks which only had to remit payments after 
the consignments were sold out.93  A major move in which international banks were 
beginning to act as warehouses, intermediaries and facilitators in the interests of 
private western capital, it helped ground Dubai and consolidate itself in remarkably 
innovative ways as the centre of the global trade in gold.  
Agents working for syndicates took charge of the consignments from these banks and 
engineered, even supervised their physical transfer, the sequence beginning in Dubai, 
continuing in the other emirates like Ras Al Khaimah and terminating along the 
coastline in Bombay and Karachi. Some of these agents themselves ran businesses in 
Dubai but given the risks that the transfer of gold in Indian waters entailed and the 
prices that it fetched in the country, the latter was preferred to their other pursuits as a 
more profitable enterprise.  The gangster who was often the agent's counterpart in 
Bombay was to oversee the penetration of gold into Indian territory and keep vigil 
over its transfer to clients who had them melted at private refineries in the city.94  The 
process of melting erased the foreign markings found on bullion and bars and 
watered down their purity to meet the retail standards prescribed by the government 
for the market in India, thus blotting out any signs of their smuggled history.  It was 
primarily within the gangster's territory in India, more precisely Bombay, that 
smuggling crossed over into the domain of the underworld, competitive, nefarious, 
criminal and violent to its last rung.  The social organization however, was not 
always rigid and it was not unusual for the agents and gangsters who took reasonably 
good cuts in transfer deals to rise to the ranks of syndicates and partnerships 
themselves.  These syndicates and partnerships though never enjoyed the anonymity 
and abstract identity of the syndicates they may have started off working off.  On the 
contrary they have been in the half a century of India's history of smuggling its most 
93 As reported to the author by an Indian migrant who worked as an informant with diplomats sent on 
detective duties by the Indira Gandhi regime in the 1970s into Dubai and Sharjah. He now lives in 
Dubai and is a businessman of repute; hence revealing his personal identity would jeopardize his 
security in the Emirates. 
94 For a description of smuggling arrangements within Bombay and other territories of India, see B. 
R. Shenoy, “A Close at Foreign Aid: II-Need to Stop Leakages,” The Times of India, August 28, 1970, 
10 and Anjali Chanda, “India—Paradise for Smugglers,” The Times of India, May 23, 1971, 5. 
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visible and targeted figures, and the pioneers of Bombay's mafia raj.  Newspapers, 
Indian cinema and even popular accounts begin and end with gangsters, 
romanticizing their lives, adventures and lives of glamour and glory while remaining 
remarkably silent on the upper echelons of financiers and investors operating within 
the diverse yet intermeshed commercial geographies of and across the Indian Ocean, 
straddling multiple legal systems and political orders in different countries in South 
and Southeast Asia as well as Europe and the Middle East.95  
The lowest rung in the circuit of smuggling, the courier who was often the one 
caught in the act of smuggling by enforcement authorities and therefore branded as 
the law breaker in the popular imagination constitute an interesting category in 
themselves.  Although couriers hailed from everywhere in India, I was repeatedly 
told by my informants from among Malayalis, particularly the Malabar Muslims, that
they were in the majority when it came to the question of couriers operating for 
smuggling rings in the seventies and eighties.  Most of these men were illegal 
migrants, meaning they had no authorization to travel outside of the country.  They 
had no visas, no jobs or business interests in Dubai and often made it to the city 
clandestinely on dhows or launches sailing from Kathiawar, Kutch and Calicut.  Mr. 
Ahmed Koya, a sixty-two year old gentleman I met at Beypore in Calicut in 2011 
during the course of my ethnographic research in town, recounted his experiences of 
the voyage to Dubai aboard a launch owned by a Gujarati merchant from Kathiawar 
in in 1971.96 
My father had friends among many Gujarati merchants who came into Calicut to buy 
timber, and coir for export to Dubai, Kuwait and other Arab ports.  When my father fell ill 
and the burden of a whole family fell on my shoulders as a twenty one year old, I decided 
95 For details on the transnational geographies of smugglers see “Smuggling Ring in Pakistan 
Smashed,” The Times of India, June 11, 1969, 11.  Transnational geography of smuggling constituted 
a key theme in major Bollywood films of the 1970s and 1980s.  The most popular of these were 
Deewaar (1975) directed by Yash Chopra and starring Amitabh Bachchan and Don (1978) directed by 
Chandra Barot also starring Amitabh Bachchan.  Also see S. Hussain Zaidi, Dongri to Dubai: Six 
Decades of the Mumbai Mafia, New Delhi: Roli Books, 2012; Suketu Mehta, Maximum City: Bombay 
Lost and Found, New Delhi: Penguin, 2004, 201-270.
96 The interview was conducted and recorded in October, 2011 in Malayalam.  Mr. Koya lives by the 
sea shore in Beypore, a small town in Calicut with his wife, children and grandchildren.  His sons are 
now in Dubai and run the stationery business that their father started in the late eighties in Dubai.  The 
two brothers and their cousins take turns overseeing business in Dubai.  The translation of the excerpt 
from the interview is mine.  
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to make the best use of his contacts among these Gujaratis and go to Dubai with them.  For 
me and many others like me in Beypore, it was a dilemma that pushed us to take the 
extreme step of embarking on a voyage that perhaps would not have seen us back with our 
families and friends.  But when there's grinding poverty, even death in front of you, you do 
not care...you might as well die on board and be cast into the sea rather than have your 
family pay for your funeral.  That way your family could not have reminded you of the 
futility of your existence as a young man without a job and with no money to feed them.  
The Arabian sea we grew up with could only mean two things for us...it was either death 
or life, we stood in fact, between life and death on its shores.  Fortunately for me it 
brought life, money, happiness and a standing in the society resting on a whole foundation 
called Dubai.  Several others perished on board and died without leaving a penny behind 
for their families.  
The voyage was long, it took me about 21 days to reach the shores of Khor Fakkan, a port 
more than a hundred miles from Dubai.  I ate once or twice in a week, a plate of rice was 
food and a small tumbler was water for the week.  It was hot and dreadful, I could have 
died.  On top of it all I had to hide among huge coir stacks when customs officials came 
aboard to look for traces of human smuggling.  It was smuggling since I paid 200 rupees 
for the voyage at my on peril to the chief sailor whom we called the nakhuda...sometimes 
the proceeds of the business were shared between the ship owner and the nakhuda, while 
at other times the nakhuda secretly took on board a couple of men and made some pocket 
money from their fares.  It was smuggling again because these launches were not 
authorized to carry passengers which happened to be the prerogative of the steamers and 
the airplanes.  
The launches started at Kathiawar or some other port in Gujarat, where they loaded goods 
like wheat, coffee and other staples.  They came down to Calicut from where they loaded 
rice, timber, bamboo poles and coir.  You could never board a launch at Calicut.  You often 
had to board from close to a deserted beach at midnight or in the early hours of morning.  
Ferries of fishermen that worked in concert with these Gujaratis as agents and for a 
commission took you to the launch anchored far away from the coast.  You could never 
take the risk of a launch voyage if you didn't know swimming.  The fisherfolk could 
simply ask you to jump off  or throw you out into the sea in the event of a patrolling vessel 
approaching the ferry.  At Khor Fakkan and Ras al Khaimah, where these launches often 
anchored before setting sail to Kuwait or Doha, you were asked to jump off at points 
sometimes 2 or 4 miles away from the coast.  So many men have died during that last 
phase, for even if they were good swimmers, 21 or more days of starvation, dehydration 
and fatigue would simply drain them of all energy.  
Koya's narrative forms the larger canvas of the tale of the illegal migrants of the 
seventies, the tale of smuggling of human resources and of labour.  For most of them 
it was poverty and the urge to make it big, the spirit of adventure animating both 
these aspects of their lives that led them to Dubai.  The city when these bands of men 
arrived was still in its infancy as far as industry was concerned.  The oil industry, the 
banks, the airport, the municipality, all needed men, but men of a different genre, and 
not those of the credentials of Koya who could not keep accounts, plan and execute 
infrastructural projects, work in technical capacities and more important of all, read 
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and write English.  Some of them had to find work as construction labour and dock 
workers or porters at the creek that did not pay them more than what they needed for 
their upkeep in Dubai or the other emirates.  Some others did what Koya refers to as 
allara chillara panikkal, literally translated as odd jobs, for Indian, Iranian and 
Pakistani traders.  That these odd jobs formed a major affiliate of the gold smuggling 
network and included the actual act of carrying gold in launches was something I 
learnt through several conversations with several informants in Dubai and Kerala 
over two years of field work. When asked what these were, he was quick to point out 
that they helped in businesses in textiles, cosmetics and other consumer goods like 
radios, stereos that were in huge demand in India, thus preempting my questions on 
smuggling and the involvement of men like him in it.  He did tell me in few words 
that he was part of the dhow crew that transferred textiles for a seth97 he was 
employed by in Dubai and who had his men at their ports of landing in Bombay but 
gold was never once mentioned.  
Conclusion
This chapter has addressed Dubai's post-pearl history of smuggling and the ways in 
which it has  contributed to the evolution and consolidation of a mercantile economy 
based predominantly on gold.  It has offered a nuanced notion of smuggling and 
examined the differential approaches espoused by imperial authorities, the post-
colonial Indian state and the city-state in Dubai towards addressing and intercepting 
the phenomenon.  The chapter has addressed the multiple social and historical 
dimensions of the phenomenon locating it in the context of the illegal arms trade in 
the Persian Gulf in the 19th century, the war time restrictions in the 1940s and 
eventually the import substitution phase in India's post-colonial history.  In 
addressing all these it has argued for smuggling as a significant factor in creating a 
geography of commerce around gold and other contraband commodities as well as 
around specific communities, a geography that continues to be at the heart of Dubai's 
multiple urban processes and practices in current times.  What needs to be addressed 
97 Seth is a term that is often used in India to refer to Gujarati, Sindhi and Marwari bosses and 
merchants.   
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further in providing a more textured picture of smuggling and its commercial 
geography is the role of consumption and the cultural and social contexts that defined 
and fueled smuggling on both sides of the border.  This is taken up for discussion in 
the following chapter which expands further on the theme of smuggling as 
entrenched in an economy of re-exports enabled by specific forms and geographies 
of migration and the social meanings of commodities in these migrant communities. 
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Chapter Four
Mobility, Commodity Cultures and the 
Origins of Dubai's Urban Branding
On December 26, 1969, India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, addressing a 
convention organized by the women's wing of the Indian National Congress at 
Azadnagar in Bombay urged her women listeners to “refrain from using foreign-
made goods,” and “to participate in the war against poverty by leading an austere 
life.”1  The audience, a vast majority of which were men, also heard a plea by Mrs. 
Gandhi “not to spend money on gold ornaments.”  The Prime Minister's statements 
were arguably made with a view to reinforcing India's socialist line, with its 
emphasis on agriculture, public sector, co-operatives and cottage industry, against 
rising conservative tendencies within the party.2  However what was implicit in the 
appeal to women to exercise restraint on their part were signs of an impending 
political threat to the party, the state and the nation.  This threat came in the form of 
smuggling and the loss to India of foreign exchange that she desperately needed to 
import fertilizers, raw materials, oil and machinery with which to produce for a 
domestic as well as an export economy.3
The trope of the woman as abetting smuggling, even legitimizing it, through her 
consumer appetite and her naivete was a dominant one in the Indian press during the 
major part of the 1960s and the 1970s.  A commentary featured in The Times of India 
on January 7, 1968, that responds to state officials' portrayal of India as a “smugglers' 
1 “PM asks women to avoid foreign goods,” The Times of India, December 27, 196, 9.  
2 For details, see Sudipta Kaviraj, “Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics,” Economic and Political 
Weekly 21, no. 38/39 (September 1986), 1697-1708; Stanley A. Kochanek, “Briefcase Politics in 
India: The Congress Party and the Business Elite,” Asian Survey 27, no.12 (December 1987), 1278-
1301; Sol W. Sanders, “India: Ending the Permit License Raj,” Asian Affairs 5, no.2 (1977): 88-96. 
Rajini Kothari. Politics in India (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970). 
3 Walter Schwarz, “Running Fasters,” The Guardian, August 24, 1974, 11.  
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paradise” makes this clear, “The affluent Indian housewife who pays through the 
nose for her favorite make of contraband lipstick, face cream or shampoo at the street 
corner kiosk usually concurs, cribs and goes on buying.”4  Although it was the rich 
and the upper crust of Indian society that had the means to purchase these consumer 
goods, the lower strata, the author was quick to add, were emulating the elite in their 
materialistic instincts and fast acquiring what they could afford.
Smuggled goods, a vast majority of which were sourced from and brought into the 
country via Dubai as we have seen in the preceding chapter, were to be found 
literally everywhere in the country.  Bombay with the greatest untaxed wealth in the 
country and large local markets set the precedent for both bootlegging as well as 
perfectly legitimate trades in smuggled goods that arrived at its ports or at other 
secure spots along its vast and serrated coastline.5  By the late 1970s, it was reported 
that even pavement vendors in the busy thoroughfares of such cities as Delhi and 
Calcutta, besides Bombay were openly selling smuggled radios, tape recorders, 
perfumes, “goggles” etc., thus giving us a fair sense of the scope of consumer 
demand for these foreign goods.6  In Kerala too, an informal trade and an economy of 
gifts in foreign goods including gold wafers and jewelry besides other consumer 
novelties as stereo sets, fabric, cigarettes and liquor was in vogue at least from the 
early 1970s when migration to Dubai and other parts of the Gulf was beginning to 
become a pronounced feature of social life in its many villages and towns.7
This chapter analyses consumer desire for particular commodities, say, gold, 
consumer electronics, fabric and cosmetics, and the distinctive social meanings these 
held for Indians, particularly the Malayalis within the larger context of the migration 
of the 1970s and thereafter to Dubai.  It maps the ways in which such desire 
converged with smuggling as well as legitimate forms of commerce to create a 
specific kind of mercantile economy driving the course of Dubai's urban 
4 Khanna, “Smuggler's Paradise,” 8.
5 “The anatomy of smuggling,” The Times of India, May 14, 1969, 5. 
6 “Earmarking Zones for Hawkers Urged,” The Times of India, January 16, 1970, 10; Khanna K.C., 
“Coping with the Smuggler: Why the Law is still an Ass,” The Times of India, April 26, 1977, 8. 
7 Insights on the trade in smuggled goods within migrant households were offered by several 
interlocutors, some of them migrants themselves, over several conversations held in small towns and 
villages in Calicut, Kerala and Dubai. 
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development in the 1970s and the 1980s.  The chapter approaches 'smuggling' as it 
were from the vantage point of social relations and cultural practices within the 
Malayali community as against that of the political and legal imaginaries of the 
Indian state.  The 1970s and the 1980s in the urban history of Dubai—sandwiched 
between its existence as an entrepôt and a re-export portal, and its rise to prominence 
as a global city—is vital to mapping Dubai's incipient phase of globalization and the 
uncharted course of its 21st century urban capital.  This was the phase in which Dubai 
established itself as a place in the imagination of many different migrant 
communities of Indians, particularly those from Kerala which to this day constitute 
the largest ethnic majority of the Emirates' foreign population.8  It was a spatial entity 
that imbued many different kinds of commodities formally barred from sale and 
consumption in India with cultural meanings around the categories of class, 
individual success, family prestige etc., with these mapped back onto the urban 
landscape of Dubai in the form of a distinctive economy and culture of trade.
The chapter takes off from Jeremy Prestholdt's argument that an analysis of 
consumer interests provides insights into "shifting social relationships" as well as 
"processes of global interrelation," using it to study the emergence of Dubai as a 
global market place and a land of opportunity for Indians during the period.9  
However, as vantage points for an analysis of the logic and changing course of 
Dubai's urban development, consumer desire and demand are not approached in a 
typological fashion as culturally static or historically given features of Indian 
society.10  Instead they are engaged with, following Georg Simmel and Arjun 
Appadurai,11 as shifting responses to value—economic, social and political—created 
8 Vicky Kapur, “A Gulf without Keralites could soon be a reality,” Emirates 24/7, October 18, 2012 
http://www.emirates247.com/news/a-gulf-without-keralites-could-soon-be-a-reality-2012-10-18-
1.479297 (accessed March 15, 2013), “UAE has 2.2 m Indians: 40% from Kerala,” Emirates 24/7, 
May 13, 2013 http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-has-2-2m-indians-40-from-kerala-
2013-05-13-1.506273 (accessed October 10, 2013). 
9 Jeremy Prestholdt, Domesticating the World: African Consumerism and the Genealogies of 
Globalization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 85. 
10 For instance, a vast majority of commodities that were in huge demand in India were electronic 
goods, manufactured in industrial societies in the West and Japan and had no precedents in the Indian 
context.  To attribute to them a blind consumer preference would be to drop one's analytical guard.  A 
case must be made for gold too, which despite its religious and cultural uses dating back to antiquity, 
was, as the chapter illustrates, no exception.  
11 See Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, ed. David Frisby and trans. Tom Bottomore and 
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in the act of exchange.  Exchange is the key word here, exchange meaning the 
historical context and the social situation of migration and the concomitant influx of 
commodities, rather than exchange as pragmatic activity in its individual instances.  
This is not to say that exchange, or more specifically flows of people and transfer of 
commodities as they were negotiated by Dubai, is to be looked at as the sole basis of 
commoditization or as the only catalyst for consumer demand in India.  I take 
recourse to Appadurai again and his reading of Marx and Mauss, as also the works of 
Keith Hart and James Ferguson, to incorporate culture into the commoditization 
argument, and inflect it as a temporal practice defining imaginaries and practices of 
consumption in relation to Dubai.12  Consumption thus set within the interrelated 
frames of capital and culture helps address the ways in which the circulation of 
commodities and gifts and the hegemonies underwriting their presence in the social 
lives of communities laid the foundations for the city's emergence as an urban brand. 
The chapter complicates the notion of Dubai as an urban brand by foregrounding 
migrant understandings and experiences of the city refracted through commodities in 
transit on the one hand and its peculiar cultures of trade, capital and labour on the 
other.  It problematizes brand building as a structural project and a marketing 
strategy undertaken by the Maktoums in the context of a ubiquitous globalization in 
the 1990s while introducing a social and cultural dimension to its trajectory 
beginning in the latter half of the 20th century.  It is not, as it is argued here, in the 
tallest, the largest and the most exotic of thematic contradictions as indoor ski 
resorts, water theme parks and ice bars that we must locate the origins of brand 
Dubai, but in the social consciousness of communities defined by processes of 
migration, smuggling and the trade in specific commodities and consumer brands 
spurred by these.  Brand Dubai may be projected in political and corporate discourse 
as an urban utopia with umpteen possibilities for investment, leisure and "supreme 
lifestyles," however, this remains an abstract notion, an image rather, of the city that 
David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2004); Arjun Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities 
in Cultural Perspective (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
12 James Ferguson, “The Bovine Mystique: Power, Property and Livestock in Rural Lesotho,” Man, 
New Series 20, no.4 (December 1985): 647-674; Keith Hart, “On Commoditization,” in From Craft to 
Industry: The Ethnography of Proto-Industrial Cloth Production, ed. Esther Goody (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 38-49.
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we call Dubai.  This image, the "deterritorialized logo" of the city as Andrew Harris, 
writing of Hoxton in post-industrial London, calls it,13 conceals the texture and 
character of the place it represents, more so and for obvious political reasons in 
Dubai.  It is important therefore to unravel the much longer and rather complex 
history of social imaginaries and meanings attached to Dubai emerging out of 
migration, smuggling and other flows if we are to come to terms with Dubai as a 
place and a city grounded in life.  The intent is not in the least to downplay the 
significance of the regime's urban ambition or efforts at the level both of urban 
infrastructure and symbolic discourse to elevate Dubai to the status of a global city.  
On the contrary it is to understand how such ambition and effort on the part of the 
Maktoums borrowed from and built on a popular base, a social premise and a 
genealogy in a distinct geography of commerce informed by a multiplicity of 
processes and flows, most importantly of cultural practices and signs around gold as 
also other manufactured commodities.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the changing trajectory of migration in the 
1970s to Dubai and the Persian Gulf using the particular case of Malayalis, the 
evolving structures of migration and the actual processes of movement of migrants 
and commodities between these locales.  It then examines the emerging economy of 
trade in Dubai in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s through these structures of mobility 
and processes of movement as well as the transplantation of the cultural effects of the 
two onto the commercial landscape of the city.  The later part of the chapter 
foregrounds gold and its changing commercial practices as markers of the transitions 
defining Malayali society at large with these transitions resulting in the creation of 
global brands in gold and the evolution of a global city in Dubai. 
Methods and Sources
The argument made in the chapter rests on insights drawn from ethnographic 
research conducted in Dubai, Sharjah, Abu Dhabi and Fujairah in the Emirates and 
the towns of Thrissur, Calicut, Nadapuram, Vadakara and Adoor in Kerala, India, 
13 Andrew Harris, “Branding Hoxton: Cultural Landscapes of Post-Industrial London,” in Brands and 
Branding Geographies, ed. Any Pike (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 187-199. 
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between 2010 and 2012.  The interviews were predominantly in Malayalam and 
conducted among Muslim, Hindu and Syrian Christian migrants and their families 
working and living in these spaces.  Of the latter two communities, a good number 
are return migrants who have settled in their hometowns in Thrissur and Adoor in 
central and south Kerala respectively.  Almost all of them were professionals 
migrating to Dubai in the late and early and mid 1970s to work in petroleum 
companies, telecommunications and other nascent government sectors, hospitals, 
banks and engineering firms.  Their children, many of whom form part of my 
generation or slightly older, continue to live in the Emirates, or are now based in the 
US or UK as professionals, mostly software engineers and business analysts.
The Muslim community or Malabar Muslims as I have referred to them in the 
previous chapter contributed ethnographic subjects and life histories for the study 
extensively and at various levels.  This was partly since unlike the other two 
communities where there was hardly more than one male or sometimes female (in 
the case of nurses) migrating from a household,14 the Muslims particularly those 
from Malabar, followed a pattern of migration in which all the males in a generation 
or two migrated during various periods.  Interviews, therefore, were conducted 
among extended families of migrants in Malabar as well as their relatives and friends 
in Dubai and the other Emirates.  The ability of Muslim men to permeate diverse 
realms of a mercantile economy in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, their more intimate 
connections with other trading communities, particularly Sindhis for whom they 
worked in diverse capacities and the extent to which they have become a structural 
aspect of trade and commerce not just in Dubai, but the whole of the Persian Gulf 
have been instrumental to reconstructing the social milieu in question.  These 
peculiar traits of the group were also tapped into by officers of the Indian state with 
secret diplomatic missions in the Emirates and other parts of the Gulf who used them 
as informants on smuggling rings and projects in the 1970s and the 1980s.  I had 
opportunities to interview some of the Dubai based family members of these Indian 
14 For a discussion of female migration from Kerala, see Marie Percot and S Irudaya Rajan, “Female 
Emigration from India: Case Study of Nurses,” Economic and Political Weekly 42, no.4 (January 27-
February 2, 2007): 318-325. 
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diplomats whose personal memories of their parents' interactions with informants 
and the household repertoire of smuggling narratives have significantly shaped the 
argument of the chapter.  Customs officers who had worked at various airports in 
India offered insights on the actual processes of movement of migrants and couriers 
as well as transit of goods.  These included the quotas permitted by the state and 
violated in acts of 'smuggling,' as well as strategies of negotiation and terms of the 
mutual consensus between migrants, couriers and agents of the state underlying such 
violations. 
Other sources that have been used for the discussion in the chapter, particularly for 
its sections on gold, are articles and features in newspapers published from India and 
advertisements of jewellery groups in the Malayalam media.  The latter were sourced 
from private collections of video cassette recordings of Malayalam films in the 1980s 
and the 1990s; a few of these advertisements and publicity campaigns have been 
uploaded on You tube.  These cassettes are retained as personal archives and 
repositories of memories of life in Dubai in the drawing rooms of mostly Hindu and 
Syrian Christian return migrants in Thrissur and Adoor.  I was given access to these 
during the course of my interviews conducted in their drawing rooms on the 
condition that I would return them undamaged after viewing them at my parents' 
house in Adoor.  Interviews with shop assistants and senior executives in jewellery 
stores in Dubai have also been instrumental in terms of mapping the shifts in 
commercial practices around gold and the ways in which such shifts have contributed 
to the city's discursive formations as a global urban space.
Labour Migration in the 1970s and 80s: Malayali and the Mobility Complex
With the consolidation of the federation of the emirates in 1971 and the oil economy 
beginning to define the political and administrative spheres of the sheikhly regime, 
the terms of migration changed, and along with them, the scope and channels of 
commodity transfer.  The fluid nature of the late 1940s' and 1950s' migration in 
which Sonis and Sindhis moved on a periodic basis between Dubai and Bombay or 
Daman etc., had by the mid-1970s given way to more regulated and tenured practices 
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of what now became international migration facilitated by the acquisition of 
passports and the provision of employment and visitors' visas.  It was at this juncture 
that men and some women from different parts of Kerala began to migrate in large 
numbers to Dubai and other parts of the Gulf,15 to take up employment in oil 
companies, hospitals, banks and private commercial enterprises, besides construction 
firms and as the personal staff of ruling and other elite families.16  Scholars have 
studied the phenomenon, a predominant feature of social life in Kerala primarily as 
economic migration, focusing on remittances and the ways in which the latter have 
altered the course of social development in the state.17  Changing identities, gender 
relations and family structures effected by the phenomenon have also been addressed 
in significant ways by anthropologists, as also cycles of consumption and social 
mobility among particular communities and castes.18  Migration in this study is not a 
master category under which can be made subsumed the flow of goods, consumption 
and other related social practices.  The approach taken rather is one in which 
migration is embedded as part of a larger matrix of flows in which people, 
commodities, signs, discourses and practices merge creating specific kinds of urban 
practices and formations in Dubai.  It is in that sense a reverse gaze on the 
phenomenon which focuses on the actual processes of mobility rather than on 
migration as a framework in itself. 
The temporary and contractual nature of labour migration institutionalized in the visa 
regime and the financial success it brought the vast majority of migrants, produced, I 
argue, a cultural motif of relentless movement and a sense of disquiet around 
15 State publications on migration data from Kerala are virtually non-existent. The number of 
passports issued by each of the regional passport offices in Kerala serves instead as a rough index.  In 
1977, two passport offices in Kerala issued 170,000 passports whereas the following year it doubled 
to almost 300,000.  For details, see The Hindu (Overseas Edition), February 9, 1980, 7. 
16 Myron Weiner, “International Migration and Development: Indians in the Persian Gulf,” 
Population and Development Review 8, no.1 (1982): 8-9.
17 K.C. Zachariah, E.T. Mathew and S. Irudaya Rajan, Dynamics of Migration in Kerala: 
Dimensions, Differentials and Consequences (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003); T.V. Sekher, 
Migration and Social Change (New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 1997).
18 Fillippo Osella and Caroline Osella, Social Mobility in Kerala: Modernity and Identity in Conflict 
(London: Pluto Press, 2000); “Migration, Money and Masculinity in Kerala,” The Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute 6, no.1 (2000): 115-131; “From Transience to Immanence: 
Consumption, Life-Cycle and Social Mobility in Kerala, South India,” Modern Asian Studies 33, no.4 
(October 1999): 989-1020. 
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immobility in Malayali society, regardless of whatever may have contributed to such 
immobility.  This obsession with movement and the anxiety provoked by the ever 
present reality of having to return for good at some time is nowhere more apparent 
than in the volume of remittances migrants have sent home to Kerala and the circuits 
and social networks of mobility they have managed to establish since the 1970s.  
This was a different order of mobility to the one that the Sonis and the Sindhis were 
implicated in.  It not only encompassed men and a few women moving in search of 
work or entrepreneurial opportunities but inaugurated a regime of commodity 
circulation along the lines of a gift economy as against the commercial transactions 
of the Sindhis.  I do not read these networks of people and circuits of commodity 
flows, oriented in reverse directions, as distinct realms of migrant activity.  Instead, I 
take recourse to Mauss' theory of the gift to engage with these as part of complete 
system, a complex of social, cultural and political practices, transactions and 
imaginaries defining the Malayali society at a distinctive phase of its developmental 
history.19  It was this complex system as the rest of the chapter shows that was at the 
heart of a distinct social and cultural geography linking Kerala and Dubai in the 
1970s and the 1980s with material and symbolic gains for the latter in its 'globalizing' 
phase in the 1990s.
An employment visa, said Mr. Vishwanathan, a fifty five year old gentleman, who 
has lived in Dubai for thirty years and works with Etisalat, the federal government 
owned telecommunications corporation in the UAE, meant that you had a job in 
Dubai or elsewhere in the emirates even before you left India while with the visitors' 
visa, you only had possibilities of finding a job on landing there.  There were “Arab, 
Iranian and Indian traders who were waiting to grab any young man who could 
speak, write and keep accounts in English, especially in the 1970s,” he added.20  With 
an employment visa or work permit, known as the pataaka in Arabic, you could stay 
on in the emirates for a term of three or five years—three if you were employed by a 
private firm and five, if you were with the Municipality, the Shaikh's personal office, 
19 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, Trans. W. D. 
Halls, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1990).
20 Interview with the author January 12, 2012. 
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the electricity board, the telecommunications board, government run hospitals and 
other state owned institutions.  A visitor's visa on the other hand was, in principle, 
meant for businessmen visiting from different parts of the world and was a short-
term permit not exceeding 90 days of residence.  It may have meant in the 
institutional sense of the term in the Emirates, a means to facilitate the movement of 
businessmen.  However, among Malayalis, and others, particularly Malabar Muslims, 
who took advantage of it to bring in their friends, relatives and acquaintances into the 
Emirates, the system worked as a conduit for linked or chain migration.
A Briefcase, A Deal, Vacationing and Gold
A salaried job in the Gulf in the 1970s and 1980s paying several times more than 
what one could expect out of any job in India, meant a switch to a new middle class 
particularly among the Malayalis.  Referred to as Gulfkkar or Persiakkar21 in 
Malayalam, this class was not so much an economic strata as an imagined social 
profile bracketing all those who migrated to Dubai and the Persian Gulf, regardless 
of the degree of financial success that ensued in the act of migration or even the lack 
of it. The fragility of the category that I, taking cues from my informants, term the 
"foreign made middle class", was evident in the fact that one could qualify for 
inclusion in it by playing on the aspiration, or more precisely the obsession rampant 
during the times, to dress, look, even smell "foreign."  A number of early migrants in 
Nadapuram and Vadakara were quick to point out how it was not difficult to 
convince their families and others in the village that they were truly Gulfkkar, even 
when being in Dubai or anywhere else in the Gulf had actually not had any impact on 
their financial standing. What helped pull off the whole theatrics of the display of 
migratory success, many of them shyly confided, were a set of commodities and a 
package of consumerist practices and styles, if not money itself and the 
'magnanimity'22 to gift these commodities and money to an entire circle of family, 
21 Gulfkkaran, the plural form of which is Gulfkkar can be literally translated as someone who hails 
from the Gulf.  The same is the case with Persiakkaran, its plural form being Persiakkar.  The former 
was used in Thrissur, Malabar and the other northern districts of Kerala whereas the latter was used in 
the southern parts.  
22 Magnanimity is the literal translation of the word udaaramaskata in Malayalam, a word that many 
of them used during the course of interviews.  
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friends, distant relatives and remote acquaintances.  The commodities that defined 
their status as middle class migrants were "foreign shirts," often tailored out of 
synthetic material, trousers or bell bottoms as they were popularly called, expensive 
gold or silver plated watches say for instance Rado, Seiko, Citizen etc., heavy 
bracelets and chains of gold, cigarettes, strong perfumes or "scents," Johnnie Walker 
whisky, heavy framed sunglasses and Japanese made plastic slippers.  These were 
articles and brands, they reminded me, that the salaried class of Hindus and 
Christians hailing from the south of Kerala bought and set trends around on their 
flight back home, which was as often as once every two years.
As part of his hand baggage on flight—this baggage, a Diplomat briefcase was a 
mark of his identity as a Gulfkkaran—could be carried a certain set of goods and in a 
certain quota as stipulated by import laws in independent India.  James, a customs 
officer who had worked at the international airport in Trivandrum for a while recalled 
how prior to the 1990s, a passenger could only carry 2 litres of Johnnie Walker 
whisky, which he invariably bought at the Dubai Duty Free Shop.23  With no 
technical gadgets to their aid, unlike their successors today who sit beside high 
resolution cameras and X-ray machines, customs officers of the day were required to 
physically check the contents of the briefcase, lest there be anything that the 
passenger evaded duties on.24  The very first article one set eyes on as the treasure 
chest was opened, says James, was the whisky or what was popular in their lingo as 
foreign liquor, its golden hues beckoning you from within the two mighty glass 
bottles.  Underneath the bottles would be placed a set of shirts and trousers, inner 
wear, an Old Spice After Shave and a Brut Fragrance For Men.  Everybody simulated 
everybody else and brought home the same kind of stuff in the same kind of 
briefcase so much so that an officer always knew what the contents of the briefcase 
inevitably were.  Apart from the suitcase, there was a radio or a compact cassette 
23 James is a pseudonym. I met him at a family gathering in Cochin, Kerala in December 2012 when I 
was on my field trip. He insisted that he remained anonymous in the work with no details of his rank 
or the locations in which he was posted revealed other than those mentioned in the text. 
24 It was only in the 1980s that the use of metal detectors, X-ray equipment and fluoroscopes became 
commonplace in airports in India.  Even with those gadgets surveillance of passengers and random 
checking of baggage on suspicion that they could carry smuggled goods continued. For details see, 
N.B Sonawane, “Anti-Smuggling Steps,” The Times of India, January 29, 1983, 3.
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player, lugged much like a laptop and without the case on.  Forming part of their 
cargo or check-in baggage were bigger suitcases into which were crammed bundles 
of fine cotton cloth and suiting material exported from Bombay, an iron box, three or 
four pairs of socks and Japanese manufactured synthetic sarees that could drape an 
entire village of women.  The cotton cloth was often a whole taka or two, taka being 
an Indian unit of measurement for broad cloth.  A taka could have twenty or fifty 
yards of cloth that was primarily used for shirts, trousers and suits. Shirting often 
came in fifty yards and the others in twenty.25  Other complementary goods were 
watches, often four or five, alarm clocks, flashlights, video cassette players and 
cassettes besides talcum powder, bathing bars, body cremes, deodorants and other 
forms of toiletries.
A whole set of stores specializing in these "vacationing" or status goods, as they were 
referred to in parts of Kerala, began to establish themselves on the urban stage of 
Dubai, contributing to the Gulf migrant's flight to the country a customary ritual and 
a public spectacle.  Most of them were an extension of those that had been in 
existence from at least the mid 1960s as we are given to understand from 
advertisements and publicity campaigns figuring in trade directories of the times.  
The sale too continued to be around sarees, readymade and children's garments, and 
fabrics in silk, nylon and tissue besides such brands as Diplomat, Brut, Yardley, Ray 
Ban, Nivea, Sony, Sharp, National etc., that Dubai and the rest of the Arab Gulf 
became synonymous with.  The rites of purchasing endemic to the trip to India in the 
1970s and 1980s, as some of my Syrian Christian and Hindu informants humorously 
recollected them, were akin to bureaucratic procedures in India and were often a year 
long, depending on the money they could pool in and the variations in the price of 
particular commodities available in stores in Dubai.  The compulsion to offer these 
articles packed into suitcases in a communal ceremony of sorts over a couple of 
weekends, they said, far outweighed all the struggles, financial and physical, they 
may have had to undergo in the process.  When asked why they had to buy and carry 
25 Taka is a term used among Indian traders in Dubai to this day. Irshad, a trader in a textile shop in 
Deira, Dasan a tailor specialized in shirts and employed in a readymade unit in the same area, 
Magabha and many others among my informants repeatedly used the term in their conversations and 
educated me on the measures in yards for different categories of fabric. 
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so much as gifts, they attributed their 'magnanimity' again to a kind of moral 
obligation and social conscience on their part as financially successful individuals 
towards those less fortunate than they were at the time.
For the Indian diplomatic mission in Dubai though, practices of shopping and 
transfer that migrants seemed to have institutionalized around particular categories of 
goods and their stocks in the city's stores could only be made sense of against the 
insatiable consumer appetites for them in India.  Much more significantly, these 
articles and their modes of transfer were indices of the new channels and paradigms 
of smuggling gold and currency into and from India.  Store assistants selling to 
passengers and potential smugglers were the sources, and as Vaidya,26 the son of a 
diplomat posted in Dubai in the early 1980s, points out, the only sources, of 
information for consignments of gold that made it to India, since it was through and 
around the goods they stocked that gold and currency could enter legal channels of 
transfer, if only to circumvent them.  Further, the impeccable order as they lay 
stacked within the suitcase and the degree of familiarity customs officials in India 
had with the scripted situation (the genre of goods, the number, often multiples of 
two and the order in which they were often arranged) helped investors, agents and 
couriers identify loopholes within the law and customs procedures that made the 
passage of gold and currency an often undetected everyday affair at airports in the 
country.  For instance, an individual would carry 6 litres of Johnnie Walker, that is to 
say, 6 bottles in his briefcase.  He would buy off the customs officer with two bottles 
since not more than two bottles were permitted to be carried into country by an 
individual—the act seemingly being an attempt to evade duties on the two extra 
bottles.  This negotiation entered into with the officer would put the latter at a 
disadvantage to probe further for gold bars that may have been concealed amidst the 
'takas' or within the cavities of goods in the suitcases checked in at the airline counter 
or in layers beneath the false bottom of his briefcase.  Using these socially sanctioned 
bargaining techniques, the passenger would often cart into the country 6 or even 12 
bottles of whisky packed between his hand and checked-in baggage.  The power of 
these so called luxury goods to set off a negotiation and clinch a deal between an 
26 Interview with the author in Dubai on December 22, 2011. 
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officer of the state and a migrant in possession of these to the personal advantage of 
both parties, and in gross violation of the statutes of the state against the illegal 
transfer of gold cannot be overlooked if we are to make sense of Dubai's rise to 
prominence as an urban brand in itself.
The double deck audio cassette players particularly the National Panasonic ones had 
cavities within them (the battery space for 8 AA batteries) that could easily hold and 
in a completely clandestine manner a kilo or more of gold ingots.  Additionally, they 
were sturdy, heavy, yet compact and easily portable.  The company's iron box, the 
first of its kind available in Dubai shared the very same features as the compact 
cassette player and to this day continues to be a preferred model among middle class 
Indians in Dubai, the rest of the Arab Gulf and the Indian subcontinent.  Heavy as 
they were by themselves, 500 grams or more of gold stuffed into their cavity did not 
make a difference as to be taken note of.  Sturdy as these two articles were, they 
could be reassembled with much the same ease as they were dismantled, to play 
music and press clothes with no impact whatsoever on their use and exchange values.  
An extra advantage with the two-in-ones was that they were hand baggage and would 
not generally draw the immediate attention of the officials who worked with the logic 
that passengers always concealed illegal commodities where they were least prone to 
frisking.
The association in Kerala, particularly in the Malabar region, between one's being 
based in Dubai and one's social standing was rather flawed, even lopsided.  It thrust 
onto the shoulders of the migrant who could not make it big, the burden of having to 
live up to the image of a successful, even wealthy individual, who could afford to gift 
the range of goods that qualified the Gulfkkaran.  The social, familial and self-
induced pressures of having to perform one's identity as a Gulfkkaran27 through 
marked goods and brands began to implicate them into networks and outfits of 
smuggling as couriers.  Those men, most of them Muslims, that could not be 
27 Gulfkkaran has been referred to by Osella and Osella as the “gulfan” migrant in a reading of 
migration as linked to changing masculine identities in Kerala.  Filippo Osella and Caroline Osella, 
“Migration, Money and Masculinity in Kerala,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 6, 
no 1 (2000): 117-133.
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employed in petroleum companies, banks and other nascent institutions in the 
Emirates for lack of accounting or technical skills or even the ability to read and 
write English on the lookout for other avenues to fund their flight as well as 
accumulate their gift reserves made the best choice as couriers.  They began to carry 
briefcases packed in the formulaic pattern described earlier in return for airfares paid 
to see them through the flight to Bombay or in rather rare cases, Calicut.28  The 
greater the risk incurred, or to be more precise, the larger the quantity of gold carried, 
the greater were the returns accruing to the courier.  A briefcase or two with goods 
and gold carried in multiple proportions meant more money and a return ticket as 
well.  Men willing to incur still greater risks put in an extra component, say an iron 
box with gold concealed in it and became little entrepreneurs in their own right. 
Some of them used the payment for such assignments made by Hawala29 agents in 
India, to settle debts they had incurred for their first voyage to Dubai, more often not 
by launches and dhows.30  Some of the articles in the briefcase was sold to generate 
cash for their personal expenses and for the finances required to meet family 
obligations while at home.  There were any number of men in the 1970s and 1980s, 
some of the now settled return migrants in Kerala recalled, who would have their 
debts paid off in Malabar by Hawala agents as remuneration for carrying the gold-
stuffed briefcase safely to landing agents in Bombay.  These Hawala agents would 
carry the cash in rupees to moneylenders and family members of the courier in 
Malabar before the latter himself often reached home.  The return trip to Dubai with 
the profits made in the deal, was always by flight and with a valid visa stamped from 
India.  The courier deal in smuggling was thus a means to legalizing the status of 
these individuals as authorized migrants in Dubai and the other emirates.31 
28 Calicut International Airport started its flight services only in 1987. Until then, migrants mostly 
from Malabar flew to Dubai and the rest of the Persian Gulf from Bombay.  
29 The term Hawala in Arabic means transfer.  It is the term used to refer to the informal funds 
transfer system between South Asia, the Middle East and South-East Asia.  In India it is also called the
hundi system and exists alongside the formal banking sector. For details refer Mohammed El Qorchi, 
Samuel Munzele Maimbo and John F Wilson, Informal Funds Transfer System: An Analysis of the 
Informal Hawala System (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003), 4-6.
30 For details on illegal modes of migration by launches and dhows, see chapter 3, page 25. 
31 As reported to the author by Vishwanathan and other informants who insisted that they remain 
anonymous in the work. 
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Others' Liberalization, Dubai's Urbanization
The cultural semiotics and the social sign-value of Dubai in relation to the 
commodities that were legitimately transferred or smuggled in by migrant groups 
cannot be grasped in their entirety unless, gold, the epic commodity defining 
economic life in the emirate is brought into the picture.  Scholars have studied the 
very specific roles that gold as commodity has played in the social and cultural lives 
of specific communities in India, including its ritual uses, its aesthetic and symbolic 
values, and its status as forms of property that women possess within patriarchal 
regimes and dowry systems.32  Historians have also highlighted circuits in the Indian 
Ocean into which gold was inserted as a commodity at the centre of Europe's trade 
with Asia, particularly India, since the times of the Romans, thus giving us historical 
reasons with which to explain social and cultural  attitudes around gold in Kerala.33  
Recent studies like those of Varghese's have also analyzed gold trade in its complex 
trajectory in Kerala (among the four south Indian states remains the largest 
consumer) constituted by players across the spectrum including diplomats, priests, 
artists traveling from the Persian Gulf, and the impact of its structures and practices 
on artisanal communities in the state's globalization context.34  While borrowing 
heavily from these writings, I have tried to understand the cultural, social and 
economic dimensions of gold in Kerala as they were redefined through migration and 
smuggling.  I have also mapped out how these were re-inscribed onto the commercial 
landscape of Dubai with significant political and economic repercussions for its 
state-led project of globalization and urbanity in the twenty-first century.
32 Nilika Mehrotra, “Cultural value of Gold,” Eastern Anthropologist 51, no.4 (1998): 333-349 and 
“Gold and Gender in India: Some Observations from South Orissa,” Indian Anthropologist 34, no.1 
(2004): 27-39. 
33 Pius Malekandathil, Maritime India: Trade, Religion and Polity in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: 
Primus Books, 2010). Also see, “Indian Ocean in the Shaping of Late Medieval India,” (Presidential 
Address, 74th Session of Medieval Indian History, Indian History Congress, Cuttack, India, December 
28-30, 2013. 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/32696103/My_Presidential_Address_as_sectional
_President_of_74th_Session_of_Medieval_Indian_History_of_Indian_History_Congress__Cuttack__
Orissa__.docx?
AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1393610577&Signature=zMYxulV0XZ
ih%2BUiEilDa8SWNrpU%3D. (accessed January 30, 2014)
34 George Varghese, K. “Skewed Trajectories: Gold and Globalization in Kerala,” Labour and 
Development 9, no.1 (2003): 11-43 and “Globalization Traumas and New Social Imaginary: 
Vishwakarma Community of Kerala,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no.45 (2003): 4794-4802. 
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The phenomenal increase in and the renewed structures of the trade in gold sparked 
off by India's liberalization policy in the early 1990s provided Dubai with the much 
needed discursive and symbolic ground that marked its foray into its contemporary 
phase of hyper-urbanity as among other things the "city of gold" and the "jewelry 
destination of the world."35  Gold became global Dubai's legitimate signifier besides 
one of its fundamental economic constituencies,36 reinforcing its existing geographies
of commerce and re-inventing its social and financial relations with such geographies
along new lines of cultural domination and commercial hegemony.  Nowhere was it 
more apparent in the 1990s than perhaps in Kerala, the fledgling urban spaces of 
which began to nurture an imagination of Dubai as worthy of being emulated 
economically, spatially and culturally.  This imagination was best reflected in what I 
call the dual base system of the trade in gold jewellery that came into being during 
the times—the dual base meant a financial base in Dubai and a control and 
managerial centre in Kerala, sourcing staff, managing public relations and facilitating 
brand campaigning.  Gold jewellery stores like Alukkas, Chemmannur etc., that 
started on a rather modest scale in parts of Kerala and had established themselves as 
strong businesses in the 1980s in Dubai began to look back to Kerala and cities in 
other regions in India in the late 1990s as commercial sites.  In less than two decades, 
some of them have to their credit, chain stores across the oceanic space of the 
Arabian Sea, even the Atlantic, more or less along the lines of department stores in 
the West, say for instance, Walmart and Tesco.
With the liberalization of India's gold import regime in the 1990s, an epoch in 
Dubai's economic history as the smuggling capital of the world came to an end.  The 
decriminalizing of imports, the slashing of domestic rates to tally with the 
international price of gold and the issue of licenses more liberally to dealers of gold 
within India meant that smuggling was no longer a lucrative activity for the 
35 These two epithets of Dubai have been consistently used in official policy documents, 
advertisements, street hoardings and other forms of business correspondence since the mid-1990s 
within Dubai and abroad. I have taken the term from the web pages and press releases of the Dubai 
Gold and Jewelry Group. For details go to http://www.dubaicityofgold.com/Facts-about-gold.pdf 
(accessed May 5, 2012). 
36 For details and figures on the place of gold in Dubai's economy go to 
http://www.dubaicityofgold.com/amazing.htm, (accessed May 5, 2012). 
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opportunistic.  This however did not mean that Dubai lost its foothold in the global 
trade in gold.  A set of schemes within the order of the gold import policy regime 
introduced specifically with the NRI or the Non-Resident Indian in view indeed 
worked to the commercial advantage of the city and helped it evolve a long-term 
strategy for urban growth on a global scale.  The schemes in question launched in 
1992 and revised once between 1992 and 1994 permitted NRIs returning to India 
every six months to bring in up to 10 kilograms of gold on payment of duties 
amounting to a meagre 220 rupees per 10 grams in foreign exchange.37  Set forth as 
an immediate step to increase the flow of gold through official channels and to curb 
smuggling, these schemes only had to be juxtaposed alongside the revoked Gold 
Control Act, 196238 and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA)39 to 
formulate a business recipe hinged on and navigating multiple spaces, polities, 
economies and legal regimes.  Gold bullion, previously outlawed, could now be 
imported into India at a modest tariff of 6 per cent and as a substitute for private 
holdings in foreign currency meaning that a vast majority of the citizenry, including 
migrants preferred to store their private capital reserves in the form of gold.
The Non-Resident Indian as the new privileged agency in the 1990s' gold import 
scheme became a convenient category for the Maktoums and their policy advisors 
whose programmatic response to the whole political drama of liberalization in India 
as a blueprint for Dubai's urban growth, deserves some attention.  Many of my 
informants including Vishwanathan were quick to draw my attention to the genesis 
overnight of a concept as the Dubai Shopping Festival, popularly known as the DSF 
and the politics of it as tied in unequivocal terms to the onset of liberalization and 
privatization policies in India.  Vishwanathan in particular was quite articulate about 
the role of gold in all of the spaces and events that summarily defined it in 199640 
37 For details see, MoonJoong Tcha, Gold and the Modern World Economy (London: Routledge, 
2003), 84-85 and Himadri Bhattacharya, Deregulation of Gold in India: A Case Study in Deregulation 
of the Gold Market (World Gold Council, Research Study No. 27, 2003), 
http://www.thebulliondesk.com/content/reports/temp/india1.pdf (accessed April 23, 2012). 
38 The Gold Control Act was repealed in 1990, enabling the import of gold bullion into the country at 
a modest tariff of 6 per cent of the value of imports.
39 The repeal of the provisions of FERA, 1973 was a major policy reversal that was passed in 1993.
40 Noor Nazzal, “19 Years of DSF through the Eyes of an Employee,” Gulf News, January 22, 2014, 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/tourism/19-years-of-dsf-through-the-eyes-of-an-employee-
1.1280559 (accessed January 16, 2014. 
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when the event was first launched,
If there was any way smuggling could have continued, I am convinced, there would have 
been no DSF, in fact there would have been no need for it.  DSF was not in the beginning 
what you see of it today.  In those days, and you probably remember it yourself, you may 
have been thirteen then, the Gold Souk was the quarter where the intended effects of DSF 
were most visible.  Come Thursday evenings, Indians, mostly Malayalis, flocked to the 
Gold Souk41 like bees to a flower.  All of us did, none of us were exceptions.  Wives 
bought gold while we husbands waited around with you children playing, called in to the 
counter only when it was time to pay, or if the women were undecided, to confirm their 
choice of designs.  Those of us who were going home on vacation bought quite a bit of 
jewellery.  In the beginning and up until 2000, it was mostly held at the end of March or 
beginning of April, just before summer vacations for schools started and when the weather 
was still tolerable.  It was in June that schools were closed and most families travelled to 
India, either to come back by mid-August or to have their children admitted to high school 
in Kerala.  DSF, whose biggest sponsors were Malayali jewellers was well timed for NRI 
purchases of gold in those days.  There were very few malls then in Dubai, so the whole 
DSF hype that you see around shopping malls and department stores today was in fact 
non-existent then.
To be honest, I really don't think anything much has changed since then, and I am talking 
about what happens in terms of actual sales that the festival is intended to promote. You 
might see lots of foreigners, what I mean to say is whites, around, but it is still gold that 
sells like hot cakes with Indians, especially Malayalis continuing to be the biggest 
buyers.42 
To my question as to whether it was only the regime that benefitted from the 
category of the NRI and the privileges it entailed with respect to gold, apart from 
those individuals and groups that fell within it, his response was intriguing.  For me, 
it put into perspective the Gulf War of 1991 which I had lived through as a child in 
the Emirates and its significance in altering the mindsets of Indian  businessmen 
based in Dubai and the rest of the Gulf.  That the liberalization schemes of the Indian 
state purpose-built for the NRI were a blessing in disguise for those Gulf-based 
traders affected by the post war state of economic insecurity and suspicion was not 
something I was ready to articulate until Vishwanathan affirmed it himself.  An 
allowance of 10 kilograms of gold per passenger every six months not only meant 
that gold flowed liberally to Kerala on an everyday basis but that there were now 
more NRIs than ever before in the history of migration from the state.  Additionally, 
an overwhelming majority of them were made so singularly in relationship to gold 
and the dynamics of its flow towards Kerala where a dual base jewellery trade was 
41 For a detailed description of Gold Souk, go to the next section.
42 Interview with the author on 26 January, 2012 at Al Shaab in Deira.
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emerging and gaining ground by the mid-1990s.  On the part of the administration 
and bureaucracy in Dubai, a relaxed visitor visa regime facilitating shopper tourism, 
more of which is discussed in the following chapter43 ensured that such was the case.
Global Dubai, A View from the Gold Souk
Figure 4.1. Baniyas Road leading to the Gold Souk, Deira Dubai (photographed by 
author, December 2011)
The first of my efforts to trace the marginal pasts and other histories of the 
globalization project in Dubai took me to the Gold Souk, a retail quarter dedicated in 
principle to the sale and exchange of gold, and located in Deira just across the Creek 
at Bani Yas Road.  The site where the Gold Souk stands today was in many ways 
where the commercial history of modern Dubai began in the 1950s and the 1960s.  
The Gold Souk is in fact, part of an earlier spatial and temporal order of urban Dubai, 
the median site of which was the Creek, arterially splitting the city's trade into 
wholesale and retail quarters or a Sindhi Bur Dubai and an ethnically assorted Deira.  
43 The reference here is to the Russian shuttle trade that dominated the trade in Dubai in the 1990s.
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The division, quite stark and graphic in the accounts of my Bhatia informants seemed 
to me, an outsider to the spatial politics of trade in Dubai, quite arbitrary, if not far-
fetched.  For one, the temporal sense of a city that the Bhatias had was lacking in my 
case.  My view of Dubai, on the contrary, was sifted through the perceptions of 
various other categories of traders and social groups of migrants, including Malayalis 
and North Indians who worked with very different sets of criteria for the given 
division of the city into Bur Dubai and Deira, a point discussed in the following 
chapter.44  The invisibility of a scalar difference that the Bhatias were so vocal about, 
in a commercial landscape where wholesale trades often overlapped with retailing, 
signposted more the claims that the community made to history and space in Dubai 
than to the actual commercial geography of the city.45
Figure 4.2. Map of the City of Dubai, UAE (Courtesy: Google Maps)
The Bhatias were some of those "foreigners" first offered land for commercial and 
residential purposes by Shaikh Rashid in Bur Dubai in the 1950s and 60s and 
perhaps, according to many of them, the only ones to have acquired such privilege at 
his royal pleasure. Today many of them own private buildings and apartments in Bur 
44 See Shafeeq's account, Chapter 5. 
45 It remains to be said that wholesale trade even in the case of Bhatias did not mean more than 
offices of trading establishments and licensed dealers in Bur Dubai where deals were made and 
contracts signed, a case in point being Magabha's Arabian Agency that we came across in the previous 
chapter. 
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Dubai, just across the creek and in the Meena Bazaar quarters as well as in the Bur 
Juman and Oud Mehta areas.  A vast majority of these properties have been leased 
out to "newcomers" as they refer to traders and merchants who came in to Dubai 
much later than they did, while the community itself lives in Jumeirah and other high 
end areas of New Dubai.  Bur Dubai is also the site of many of their community 
institutions including the Indian Association, the India Club, the Indian High School 
and the Hindu Temple that the Bhatias refer to as the Shrinathji Haveli.  Looked at 
from this perspective, one can only interpret the Bhatia definition of a wholesale Bur 
Dubai as one belonging to an earlier social order in which the distinction between 
residential and commercial properties and the terms of their ownership and use were 
rather blurred.
The distinction between wholesale and retail trades in gold however, seems relatively 
more apparent to the lay person or a novice in Dubai.  The dynamics of space, scale 
and visibility were rather different with gold and remain tied to a distinct history and 
the social and spatial hierarchies of smuggling in the city, much of which we have 
seen in the earlier chapter.  The present site in Deira where the Gold souk stands was 
where a distinct strand in Dubai's urban history, manifest in dhows laden with gold 
and sailing out to the west coast of India from the waters of the Creek, began.   It was 
yet again where Sonis sat at their little shops with minimal displays of jewellery 
waiting for orders for bangles, chains, necklaces and bracelets, from Arab 
businessmen and rulers in the 1960s and Indian families traveling home on vacation 
in the 1970s and 1980s.  The Gold Souk is important, not merely for these historical 
reasons, but because the contemporary geography of gold retailing in Dubai has not 
in any real sense extended beyond the borders of the Gold Souk.46  To be sure, there 
are branded jewellery outlets in malls and kiosks in supermarkets and department 
stores, nevertheless they do not serve except as marketing niches and advertisement 
tableaus for many of the chains stores and dual base jewellery systems referred to in 
the preceding section.
46 There are gold retailing stores in Bur Dubai too; nonetheless, most of my informants were 
convinced that they are actually wholesalers and used to be once active in the smuggling trade. 
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I took a public bus one evening in December that took me on a 45 minute drive in a 
southern and later a southwestern direction from the Abu Hail metro station in Al 
Shabab to the Gold Souk.  What I witnessed as I got off at the Gold Souk Bus station 
was a long corridor lined on the two sides by gold stores that could be readily 
distinguished in terms of the ethnicity of their owners and customers by the jewelry 
designs displayed on their windows and the scripts in which the names of the stores 
were embellished.  The shops I saw in my immediate vicinity did not seem to greet 
me except as a tourist who should be looking at the exotic ethnic designs displayed in 
shop windows, feeling at one with the many white, Russian, Indian, Chinese and 
African tourists taking a stroll of the street at dusk.  Nevertheless, tourist as I was, I 
was Indian, a woman and all by myself.  “You could have been Indian from India, 
from the UK, the USA, Australia or even Singapore, but your merely being Indian 
and moving about the Gold Souk at seven on a December night could only have 
meant that you were on a buying spree preceding a vacation in India or elsewhere,” 
said Joseph George, a senior reporter at Emirates 24/7 and who covers the themes 
that constituted the India-Dubai mediascape, ranging from law and diplomacy to 
commerce and entertainment47.  Joseph has had a serious interest in gold smuggling 
and the changing legal practices informing the transfer of the metal via the NRI 
channel into India ever since he moved to Dubai which was not longer than five 
years ago.48  The topography of Dubai's gold retailing instantly placed me within its 
contours along ethnic lines which apparently translated into my personal choice and 
social propensities of consumption of the metal for those around me.  The absolute 
resistance of the social and ethnic landscape of Dubai's retail trade to incorporate me 
as anybody but a researcher and an Indian researcher, meant that even nascent 
ethnographic advances at the site were out of the question.
47 Interview with the author in Dubai, November 30, 2011.
48 Two of Joseph's recent articles include “NRIs facing special gold scans at major Indian airports,” 
Emirates 24/7, May 02, 2012, http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/nris-facing-special-gold-
scans-at-major-indian-airports-2012-05-02-1.456769, and “Rising gold prices reopen India smuggling 
route,” Emirates 24/7, October 19, 2011., http://www.emirates247.com/crime/local/rising-gold-prices-
reopen-india-smuggling-route-2011-10-19-1.424205 (accessed October 23, 2012).
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Figure 4.3. Alley within the Gold Souk (photographed by the author, December 
2011)
“If you want to buy gold, go to the furthest end of the street,” advised a Hindi 
speaking cart puller and a Bangladeshi citizen who noticed the perplexed look on my 
face and my very contemporary Indian combination of a kurta49 paired with jeans.  
Now that he was convinced of my Indian-ness and therefore my status exclusively as 
a buyer what he presumed I should be doing was heading towards the latter end of 
the corridor where was based the Indian or more precisely the Sindhi/Gujarati 
contingent of jewelers.  With my addressing him as "bhaiya" which literally means 
brother and thanking him in a Hindi that could only have been learnt in a classroom 
somewhere in South India, he reconsidered his suggestion for a moment adding 
“Madam, you must check out the Gold Centre too, you have Alukkas and Malabar 
Gold there.  Lots of Indians buy gold there.”  We parted after he gave me directions 
to turn back, keep to my left and to enter a large four storied mall of gold leading to 
49 A kurta is a long stitched garment worn like a shirt and over leggings, jeans or the traditional 
shalwars.  
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the main road, paying no heed to my curious query on his whereabouts in the Indian 
subcontinent, the nature of his work in Dubai, what he carried in his cart and the like.  
The smiles he flashed as I walked alongside him and the probing looks of other 
Bangladeshi, and Pakistani cart pullers, easily distinguished by their lungis and their 
shalwar khameez50 respectively, and the hushed whispers of young Indian men with 
cell phones in their hands vanishing into dark alleys joining the street as they 
discreetly chanted “Want ladies bags, watches, perfumes? Duplicates available of all 
brands,” warned me against getting too far with my curiosity.  It was not a woman's 
fear of strange working class South Asian men bundled in ethnic bands with each 
conversing in their own dialects, mostly making stray comments at their own, that 
stopped me from asking questions to people I reckoned would have the answers.  
Everybody, whether cart puller, fake dealer or shop assistant seemed to be harboring 
a certain anxiety, a fear that pulsed through the entire space.  It was a fear, I had seen 
and felt elsewhere in the city51 and corners in highly vibrant commercial streets in 
Meena Bazaar where dealers in fake goods had stakes in.  My very 'innocuous' 
attempts at friendly chats with the young Malayali boys who walked about eyeing 
potential customers and chanting the same lines as those in the Gold Souk convinced 
them that I was a reporter for some regional news channel and on a mission of 
espionage.  I could, if not a tourist or a buyer, have only been a journalist or an agent 
for the Dubai government who could report on dealers in fake goods and the nature 
of their stocks which could result in a big haul of illegal stuff for the Police.  My 
supposed identity as a journalist was precarious not only for these fake dealers but 
also for the state that could only interpret my interest in the activities of the Souk as 
part of the conspiracy of international media to tarnish Dubai's otherwise enviable 
image of success.  It was evident in the two hours I spent in the Gold Souk that 
everybody perceived everybody else through lenses colored in terms of ethnicity, 
professional identity, gender, whether one travelled as an individual or as part of a 
50 A lungi is a piece of cloth draped around the lower part of the body with a twist or a knot at the 
waist.  Sometimes it is also sewn into the shape of a skirt. It is a piece of clothing popular among both 
men and women in Bngladesh.  
51 The “elsewhere” I am referring to here is the Meena Bazaar in Bur Dubai which was where I had 
my first encounter with a transnational racket dealing in fake goods, mostly leather goods, perfumes 
and watches. More of this is discussed alongside the question of fakes and brands in the following 
chapter. 
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family with children etc., and built up an atmosphere charged with suspicion 
operating at multiple levels.  The refusal of the gold quarter of the city to accord any 
kind of legitimate identity to an individual except that of a consumer, I argue, is 
symptomatic of other quarters within the city and of the urban entity that Dubai is at 
large.
I left the Bangladeshi man besides whom I was walking and his cart behind me at the 
beginning of the Indian segment which housed shops with Sindhi/Gujarati names.  
They were shops with very little display of jewelry, old and unattractive signboards 
and had names that gave one little sense of them as brands quite unlike the groups 
that my cart puller acquaintance had referred to.  I was not very welcome even as the 
men in these shops saw me peering intently at their windows from outside.  My 
cultural sense of traditional business spaces, communities and practices in India, 
particularly of jewelers instantly told me that they were the Sonis and their 
descendants referred to in the previous chapter.52  With not many customers in them, 
their contrast to the gold brand shops and their indifference to any kind of marketing 
it was difficult to understand their current position in the commercial map of Dubai's 
many retail trades.  Walking back from where the gold street branched into a 
readymade and accessories street I entered the Gold Centre, stopping at the entrance 
to most shops but refusing to make my way into them through the thronging crowds 
of mostly Indian shoppers.  A vast majority of the shops in Gold Centre were retail 
units owned by businessmen from Kerala.  Some of them, say Atlas and Malabar 
Gold were not more than twenty years old,53 while others like Alukkas had 
established themselves in Dubai in the mid-1980s.
52 I immediately called to mind the insights Magabha had given me on the Sonis which helped me 
place them rightly in the spatial and social settings of the Gold Souk.
53 The group Atlas, located on the second story, moved to Dubai from Kuwait after the war (1991) 
while Malabar Gold is a quite recent entrant and does not have a base older than 4 years in Dubai.
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Figure 4.4.  A Gujarati owned jewelry store in the Gold Souk (photographed by the 
author, December, 2011)
The quest for the history of Dubai's gold trade in occasional visits to the Gold Souk 
gave me a vague and punctuated sense of its ethnic and social dimensions.  
Nonetheless it was easier to lose focus than to gain it with a bazaar54 like 
environment closing in on you, with your ethnicity slotting and overshadowing your 
personal interest in gold and with policemen hovering around you in civilian clothes, 
just in case your curiosity for fake stuff and your entering into a bargain with dealers 
in them led these officers of the state on to an exercise in busting these illegal 
rackets.  It was necessary to have a more precise temporal sense of gold in Dubai's 
history and the shifts in its commercial practices over the decades.  Conversations 
with acquaintances and friends in the media on the nature and objectives of my 
research on Dubai helped me surmount quite a few hurdles in my path.  The barriers 
that my ethnicity posed to any such endeavor at the sites of history could now, I 
began to believe, possibly be tapped to actually break ground with potential 
54 I have used the term bazaar here quite loosely to indicate the physical organization of different 
retail units within the quarter of Deira dedicated to the trade in gold. 
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informants outside them.
Commodity, Gift, Brand: Gold and a Society in Transition
Suggestions, recommendations and a couple of phone calls later, I was at the 
marketing and corporate headquarters of the Joyalukkas Group55 and in conversation 
with its Chairman and Managing Director Joy Alukka.  Joyalukkas, which calls itself 
the "world's favourite jeweller," had its humble beginnings in an umbrella mart and a 
jewellery store in Thrissur, Kerala, more than sixty years ago.  It is now an 
international retail chain of gold and diamond jewellery with more than 80 outlets 
and showrooms in cities in India, the Middle East, USA, UK and the Far East and 
has collections and designs in jewellery from across the world.  Alukka had a casual 
air about him as he began talking about himself, rather the entrepreneur in him and 
the commercial empire that he helped build in less than three decades, demystifying 
Joyalukkas as a brand, and in the process, the very concept of brands itself.  
“Joyalukkas is no big or global brand as you may take it to be, nor am I a big 
business magnate.  This is all plain marketing, a strategy to survive, you see, in a 
highly competitive global marketplace,” were the words with which Alukka opened 
the first of the two conversations I had with him in January, 2011 in Dubai. 
I was introduced to Alukka by Albert Alex, a senior media professional based in 
Dubai and an alumnus of the college I went to in Kerala in the late 1990s.  Mar 
Ivanios, a Syrian Catholic arts and sciences college based in Trivandrum, Kerala, 
with its alumni chapters across the globe has a noted presence among the Malayali 
professional and business elite in Dubai.  The remarkable inroads that the alumni 
community called Amicos had made into the public domains of Dubai's social and 
cultural life translated into access for me as a researcher into some of the exemplary 
realms of Malayali diasporic life and activity in Dubai.  The story of my meeting 
with Joy Alukkas was no different.  With Alex having put me through to him, Alukka 
was evidently expecting a routine set of very formal questions and a very different 
tone to the interview than the one I had taken on with him in his office chamber.  It 
55 Joyalukkas Group of establishments are broadly grouped under two major holdings—Joyalukkas 
India Limited and Joyalukkas LLC, Dubai.
145
was evident that he was quite unprepared to meet a young scholar who had gone all 
the way from Mar Ivanios to a university in Johannesburg and was stopping by in 
Dubai to study the life histories of Malayali capitalists like him.  However, having 
narrated my own Syrian Christian background and revealing my academic interest in 
Dubai as having evolved from a personal history of migration, he seemed more at 
ease and suggested we continue the conversation in the drawing room of his house in 
Karama,56 where I could meet his family and where there would be no calls from his 
secretary or clients.  At the Alukkases' home, I set the context for the rest of the 
evening's conversation by mapping the the trajectory of gold trade in the two and a 
half decades of Malayali involvement in Dubai's retail history, duly emphasizing the 
transition from the traditional artisanal shop to the jewelry store, the gold 
supermarket, and mall to an international brand store and showroom, and the part 
played by Joyalukkas in all of these. 
My decision to start off on the gold trek with the Joyalukkas group was not in the 
least bit arbitrary.  It was its pioneer status in many aspects of gold retailing and 
branding and the role played by Dubai in according it such status that was of interest 
to the researcher in me.  For instance, it was the first jewellery group in Kerala that 
based itself on the principle of economies of scale as a factor of growth setting up 
multiple jewellery stores in Thrissur, Calicut, Abu Dhabi and Dubai.  It was called 
Alukkas Jewellery then.  It was also the group, according to Alukka himself, that first 
used the family name of Alukkas as a marketing strategy and as a cultural signifier of 
gold jewellery in Kerala and Dubai.  This he reminded me, was a Syrian Christian 
tradition of doing business and in vogue in Thrissur and other parts of the Christian 
dominated pockets in Central Kerala at least from the early 20th century and that they 
had only exported it to Dubai, like Chemmanur for instance.  A range of 
advertisements in the late 1980s and early 1990s of Alukkas Jewellery appearing in 
video cassette recordings of Malayalam films exported to markets in Dubai and the 
Persian Gulf—these catering to a Malayali viewership based in the region, Kerala or 
56 Karama is a part of Bur Dubai where the richer South Asians and other foreign migrants have lived 
for the major part of Dubai's urban history.  It is home to many South Asian businesses and 
commercial enterprises as well as social clubs and community institutions. 
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other parts of India—were what translated Alukkas into a distinct cultural signifier of 
gold among Malayalis.57  These advertisements projected gold as a commodity 
central to defining Malayali social identity or more precisely Malayali femininity by 
virtue of the wedding ceremony and the institution of marriage.  They depicted the 
bride, the bridesmaids and the women attending the wedding as decked up in gold 
and sharing moments of playfulness thus circumscribing the limits of social 
performance of their femininity around the jewellery collection.  Men were present 
only as fathers, uncles or the groom.  Their relationship with and affection for the 
bride were defined by the act of gifting her with a gold bangle or chain, which was 
an auspicious act, a blessing and in the case of the groom, a vow symbolizing 
protection, honor and commitment to his wife to be.58 
Joyalukkas became the brand that it is today, in 2001 when Alukkas Jewellery, the 
store established by Alukka. J. Varghese in 1956 in Thrissur, the commercial capital 
of Kerala and the district with the third largest number of Gulf migrants,59 split into 4 
business groups with each group carrying the name of the sibling that owned it.60 
Alukkas Jewelry was one among many jewelry stores in Thrissur that helped mould 
the cultural imaginary of a people around the yellow metal in the 1960s and the 
57 These video cassettes which can hardly be found outside the private collections of mostly Gulf 
returnees now living in Kerala, have formed a valuable source for the work.  Access to this category of 
sources has been restricted not merely by their being held as private possessions and the difficulty of 
procuring them.  The technology of the video cassette has long become part of history and interests in 
its continuity as a medium of home entertainment are practically non-existent. What this means is that 
most of the video collections held by individuals in the 1980s and the 1990s have now degenerated 
through lack of usage and services and the digitization of cinema.  My access to these video cassettes 
were mediated by my informal contacts with the family of Gulf returnees and my own social location 
as a Malayalee growing up in Dubai in the 1980s.
58 Go to http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p8s_XaAzkF8&feature=related,  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uVm9FdmRC6k&feature=related, (accessed  July22, 2011) to 
watch some of these advertisements that I have used to make the argument.  Advertisements in the 
wedding genre were a significant break from those in the mid 1980s of jewelers like Atlas and Elite  
which portrayed ornaments and designs that formed part of their collections or included moving 
images of the display of jewelry in their shop windows.  
59 K.C.Zachariah, E.T. Mathew and S. Irudaya Rajan, “Impact of Migration on Kerala's Economy and 
Society,” Working paper No. 297, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvanathapuram. 
http://www.cds.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/wp297.pdf, (accessed January 11, 2011). 
60 The other three groups are Jos Alukkas, Paul Alukkas and Francis Alukkas.  They have their own 
jewelry stores in Kerala and have expanded into other states in India but still lack a global presence 
and a brand name unlike Joy Alukkas.  The Alukkases have diversified into many other businesses, 
including currency exchange and real estate over the last decade and are a visible force to reckon with 
in Kerala and the Middle East. 
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1970s, when the increased availability of 22 carat gold and the increasing number of 
Gulf migrants within the state began to endow gold with newer and more intense 
social values and meanings.  With Gulfkkar, most of them unmarried and in their 
twenties coming home in considerable numbers after a 'successful' stint in Dubai, a 
gift economy based on the institution and set of rites constitutive of marriage and 
defined predominantly in terms of the exchange of gold began to evolve.  Alukkas 
recalls his days as a young lad in his father's shop in Thrissur in the late 1970s when 
he witnessed the sharp rise in the number of customers all of whom were Gulf based, 
Gulf bound or both. 
I have a shop now in every GCC country, in Qatar, I have three, in Muscat 5, in Saudi 3 
and a shop or more in every emirate.  When we had a shop in Thrissur, we had lots of 
customers from the Gulf coming over.  The Gulfkkar in those days, were men who would 
come to Kerala to get married, after which they would go back.  It was contact with them 
that gave me an opportunity to come to the Gulf. That's how I got to see lots of these 
things. These Gulf men would come to our shop to sell gold—I was witness to this at least 
from 1979 on.  I only got a chance to come here in 1986. These men would come and 
exchange gold in our shops. People who would come to get married, eh, the groom who 
was a Gulf-man wearing bell bottom trousers and sunglasses would come to the shop, to 
do this.
Even as Alukka talked about Gulfkkar buying up gold on the occasion of their 
wedding, the hints at their doing so for that of their sisters, cousins and nieces were 
rather glaring.  These were in fact cues that could have easily been lost had not a 
shared background in culture and social history annotated his unwitting silence on 
such practices and impelled me to look 'elsewhere' for affirmation.  I had been told of 
practices of exchange and consumption of gold, cash, sarees and other articles 
centered around marrying off the women these men had blood and kinship ties with 
during the first round of my fieldwork in Malabar which preceded the ethnographic 
research in Dubai itself.  The standard conversation in the village around a marital 
alliance with a Gulfkkaran, his sister, niece, or even a cousin for that matter were 
primarily appraisals of the volume of gold that would be exchanged, which depended 
on the prospective bride's proximity by blood to the Gulfkkaran himself.  For 
instance, in the late 1970s the sister's dowry could go up to 35 sovereigns61 or more 
61 A sovereign weighs 8 grammes and is a standard measure used in gold stores and other informal 
transactions in India. It does not actually relate to the purity of gold although in principle it ought to be 
22 carats.
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while he was often expected to give a cousin at least 10 sovereigns depending upon 
the class and caste they hailed from and the worth of the assets back home the 
migrant himself could lay claim to.  In return he could claim from the family of his 
bride an equal or even greater number of sovereigns as part of the many exchanges 
and transfers constituting the marriage.  Today the "going rate" as they call it is a 
hundred and ten sovereigns besides cash and  other gifts which could include a car or 
a flat as well.  
The moral obligation and social practice of gifting gold insofar as it applied to the 
migrant did not end with the wedding.  An entire series of life-cycle rituals 
continuing through baby showers, christening, ear piercing, baptism, bangles and 
house warming ceremonies and carried it through to the betrothal and marriage of the 
next generation.  It was a lifetime of giving away, as the wives of many of these men 
recalled, and the burdensome obligations borne by their husbands towards many of 
their extended families that badly affected their financial situation as a nuclear unit, 
no matter whether they lived in Dubai or Kerala.  The force of these obligations and 
exchanges around gold, cash and other commodities, they pointed out to me, was so 
intense that weddings in many villages had been strategically timed in those days to 
coincide with the arrival of the brother, cousin or uncle from the Gulf.  
What we see emerge in the course of the discussion is in fact a whole system of 
contractual exchanges involving men, women, gold and cash that defined a Malayali 
society hinged largely on Gulf migration in the 1970s and 1980s.  This regime of 
gifting and exchange resembles in many ways that of Mauss' Polynesian societies 
except that it was characteristic not of a 'primitive' society but one that development 
theorists in the 1970s including Amartya Sen had termed "modern."62  The gift 
economy must not be construed as an anomaly in an otherwise "modern" society 
remarkable for its performance in education, health and other aspects of social life 
and for its phenomenal political consciousness (including high rates of participation 
in public life as citizens) owing to which Kerala was hailed as a model of 
62 See Amartya Sen, Economic Development and Social Change: India and China in Comparative 
Perspectives (London: London School of Economics, 1995). 
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development.63  On the contrary, it must be perceived as a fallout and a significant 
facet of the very modernity that made public individuals and in many ways suitable 
citizens of Malayalis in the wake of such developments as Colonialism, Christianity 
and Communism in the late 19th and early part of the 20th centuries in Kerala.64  I do 
not wish to elaborate on these intertwined pathways to modernity in Kerala which 
scholars have addressed at some length.  However what I do wish to accentuate here 
is the project of the formation and casting of the self in modernity, the incorporation 
of the individual self into a secular order of society and politics and the significance 
that both individuals and societies attached to its possible conduits in everyday 
living.  The "reciprocal conception" of the individual and society that Norbert Elias65 
calls for and the “needing to become what one is” that Zygmunt Bauman reminds us 
of,66 are the foundations on which the gift economy in question can be argued for.  
The greater the public visibility of the individual, the more intense had to be his/her 
investment in the private self.  This was enabled by among other things, say the 
political and religious discourses of reform, commodities and their consumption. The 
gift economy, reviled by the developmental state as rooted in undesirable practices in 
a modern nation is, I argue, modernity's most palpable material form.
Gold, Commercial Modernity and the Route to Global Urbanity
The notion of the modern in the latter decades of 20th century in Kerala, as Prestholdt 
writing about consumer imports and cultural domestication in 19th century Zanzibar 
asserts, “was no longer simply temporal but had become comparative, cultural and 
63 Robin Jeffrey, Politics, Women and Well-being: How Kerala became a 'Model' (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1993); Govindan Parayil and T.T. Sreekumar, “Kerala's Experience of Development 
and Social Change,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 33, no.4 (2003): 465-492; Gemma Cairo, “State 
and Society Relationships in India: Explaining the Kerala Experience,” Asian Survey 41, no.4 (2001): 
669-692.
64 Historians and critics have offered modernity and its multiple facets in Kerala genealogies in 
colonialism, the onslaught of Christianity and the birth of Communism.  Dilip M. Menon, “Religion 
and Colonial Modernity: Rethinking Belief and Identity,” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no.17 
( 2002): 1662-1667; J. Devika, “Egalitarian Developmentalism, Communist Mobilization and the 
Question of Caste in Kerala State, India, The Journal of Asian Studies 69, no.3 (2010): 799-820. 
65 The reciprocal conception of society and individual is a perspective that foregrounds society as 
shaping individuals even as individuals constitute societies through their everyday actions the 
contours and limits of which are determined by the interlocking of the two.  For details refer, The 
Society of Individuals, ed. Michael Schröter and trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Continuum, 
2001). 
66 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 32. 
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exclusive.”67  The temporal, comparative, cultural and exclusive dimensions of the 
modern as it was mediated by Gulf migration and its practices of social mobility, 
commodity circulation and gift transactions in Kerala was nowhere more 
institutionalized for Malayalis than in the Dubai of the 1980s and the 1990s.  To 
understand Dubai and its commercial arena in gold as the site of such 
institutionalization, I turn to the personal memories of Joy Alukka who had pioneered 
its many concepts and strategies as well as some of his staff in Dubai who through 
their own interactions with customers implement and sustain them on a daily basis.
Alukka's account of Dubai's gold trade prior to his entry into it in the latter half of the 
1980s is marked by a sense of a long and stretched out temporality (although the 
period he alludes to is not longer than three decades) in the course of which nothing 
as it pertained to commercial practices changed.  His repeated use of the term 
"unprofessional" to qualify pre-Alukkasian practices in the retailing of gold in Dubai 
and parts of India through the conversation testifies to his understanding of them as 
situated within the institution of the bazaar, although he does not explicitly use the 
term bazaar.  The bazaar, as I deploy it here and to qualify the milieu prior to the 
Alukkases is premised on Geertz's concept of it—a "distinctive system of social 
relationships" the specificities of which include poor, scarce and unevenly distributed 
information on pricing and quality of goods, the trader's monopoly over information 
as the basis of his profit and the success of business, the physical agglomeration of 
the trading houses within a quarter of the city and the heterogenous and non-
standardized nature of the commodities of trade and signals an epoch that 
underscored Dubai as not yet within the fold of modernity.68  What Alukka's 
intervention meant for Dubai's gold trade in the 1990s and for the global trade of the 
metal in the post-1990s can only be made sense of against this backdrop of a 
commercial past ascribed to it.
67 Prestholdt, Domesticating the World, 89. 
68 Clifford Geertz, Peddlers and Princes: Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two 
Indonesian Towns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 28; “Suq: The Bazaar Economy in 
Seffrou,” in Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society: Three Essays in Cultural Analysis, ed. Clifford 
Geertz, Hildred Geertz and Lawrence Rosen (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 214. Also 
see Rajat Kanta Ray, “Asian Capital in the Age of European Domination: the Rise of the Bazaar, 
1800-1914,” Modern Asian Studies 29, no.3 (1995): 449-554. 
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I came here, introduced a billing system and came up with what was called a gold price, 
making charges, stone charges etc.  That helped me quite a bit.  It was during that times 
that Chemmannur jewelry, Vijaya jewelry and the likes of them were started.  I opened a 
shop in Dubai in 1987. They had only started but began following the billing and pricing 
systems I set up.  I was the one who first introduced the concept of the uniform, both in 
Dubai and India.  There were no uniforms before that.  The salespeople wore different 
colored shirts then, plus in my shop nobody could have a mustache.  That is part of Joy 
Alukkas' identity.
When I started with uniforms, some seemingly big gold businesses and shops ridiculed 
me, “why, are they cabbies?” I brought in a certain discipline within the entire business.  
The practice of setting up a 100 sq ft shop gave way to big shops.  All the shops I started 
were big shops.  Many people began to follow my example.  A big shop in India, when we 
were still undivided, we started in Thrissur.  People were taken aback, because they had 
not seen such a thing before and so they nicknamed it the gold supermarket.  I brought 
about a change in gold business that way.
When I introduced uniforms my brothers in India were against it.  Then I went to India and 
started a shop there in 2002.  Now in all shops in Kerala and India you find men and 
women in uniforms.  The practice of shop owners sitting at the cash counter does not exist 
anymore.  Earlier, it was the owner of the shop who was the cashier.  I started an office for 
my shop in India and got my eldest brother to inaugurate it.  My brother kept telling others 
“look at the Gulfkkaran, the parishkaari,69 he is sitting in an office. The jewelry was where 
the owner sits and at the cash counter, receiving customers.  But today in Kerala, I have 
showed others, my competitors how one can have multiple shops.  Otherwise, it was a 
single shop, with the owner.  In Kerala, South India, and to some extent even in India, I 
showed people how they can have multiple shops.  I started a textiles shop, and followed it 
up with 4 or 5 shops.  So even textile shops that talk about a 100 years of commercial 
history have only now begun to acquire the techniques and technology required for 
multiple businesses. That's a big change. That's a different history altogether.
The history in Dubai is different.  Here, I paid attention to the interior of the shop, 
developed new designs, many people followed it, implemented new patterns in jewelry, 
came up with new brands.  I conducted many experiments.  All these have yielded results.  
After partition, I changed the name to Joyalukkas, I have managed to make it a household 
name.  It was Dubai that helped me do all this, the growth I achieved here has been huge.  
Even though I do not have an MBA, I spotted the good things here, adapted and 
implemented them. That's an achievement.
The shift in commercial practices Alukka effected around gold in Dubai gave way to 
a larger transition that was both structural and perceptual—structural because these 
changing practices extricated gold from the bazaar economy and implanted it within 
a modern economic system of standardized commodity markets; perceptual because, 
gold was now a commodity entering and shaping the realm of consumption via new 
experiences and constituencies of the phenomenon. The modernization of retailing 
consisted of a series of steps, primary among which was the standardization and
69 Parishkari is a word in Malayalam the literal meaning of which is reformer.  
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break up of prices.  Alukka's efforts at standardizing the price of gold culminated in a 
uniform gold rate per gram of the metal across the UAE.  The gold rate which was 
calibrated on a daily basis reflected in Dirhams, the Emirati currency, the 
international market price of gold as declared by the open market in London.  The 
gold rate began to be displayed in jewelry shops for the benefit of the customers. The 
price of jewelry was obviously more than the standard market price of gold and 
included labour or making charges as it was called and other hidden costs.  Labour 
charges were contingent on a number of factors including the design, wastage and the 
mode of manufacture of the ornament and varied from jeweler to jeweler.  For 
instance, a piece of jewelry carved out and worked on by an artisan was often valued 
at a higher price than that cut by machines resulting in higher making charges for it.  
These began to be listed alongside the price of the metal thereby giving the customer 
the option to make purchases of the metal on the basis of price differentials in 
different stores and redefining him or her as a standalone entity rescued from the 
predatory instincts of pre-modern traders.
Figure 4.5. A salesperson at the Joyalukkas outlet in the Gold centre (photographed 
by the author, December 2011)
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Redefining the customer also called for the transformation of the experience of 
buying which now happened in well managed and comfortable shops.  Paul Manjila, 
the Area Manager of Joyalukkas for the Emirates emphasized the premium that their 
brand placed on service and communication which boosted customer confidence in 
the quality and purity of the gold that they offered as well as their sales practices and 
pricing.  The informality involved in pricing and the casual offer of discounts in 
earlier times now gave way to other kinds of informality around the actual process of 
sale.  Abin,70 a 23 year old salesperson at one of the Joyalukkas stores in Gold Land, 
who was quite amused by my interest in his tactics at selling, quickly gave away the 
secrets.  He said that it was well-dressed executives, mostly men, who could talk 
people, particularly older women into buying, drop a hint or two of higher prices 
charged in other stores and subsequently maneuver the husband's decision to buy 
from them and distract the children with jokes that constituted what is called service 
and communication in businesses like theirs. 
Having captured a customer base in business, the next level was commercial 
campaigning around gold through advertisements and event sponsorships, and 
gearing it to became a part of Dubai's official brand image and urban identity.  
Cultural events and festivals sponsored by Joyalukkas and other jewellery groups 
included celebrity evenings and star nights in which popular actors were flown in 
from India to perform for the several expatriate communities living in the Arab Gulf. 
70 Abin is a pseudonym for the person. 
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Figure 4.6. The entrance leading to the Gold Souk (photographed by the author, 
December 2011)
What began as Indian, mostly Hindi and Malayali celebrity evenings in the late 
1980s, is now a major urban convention with the city becoming a venue for all kinds 
of international events from cultural performances to award ceremonies and sporting 
events, some of which are staged as part of its larger festival and spectacle seasons, 
say the Dubai Shopping Festival, Sumer Surprises71 etc.  Partnering with the state 
and its ministerial departments, Alukka joined other retailers, wholesalers and bullion 
dealers to establish the Dubai Gold and Jewellery Group (DGJG) in 1996, the year 
that the Dubai Shopping festival (DSF) was launched for the first time.  The state-
private partnership in the marketing of gold and Dubai, increasingly becoming 
synonymous with each other, was institutionalized in the raffle draw organized as 
part of the 1996 DSF when 50 kilograms of gold worth 2.5 million dirhams were 
given away as prizes to winners on a daily basis.  A report in the Times of India 
71 Summer Surprises is an annual shopping event more or less like the DSF but conducted on a much 
smaller scale during the summer months of June and July. For more details see 
http://www.summerisdubai.com/en/festival/festivals/dubai-summer-surprises.html (accessed January 
2, 2013).
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published in 1998 on Dubai's status as the gold corridor of the world and the 
correlation between the metal and the city neatly sums it up for us:72 
Dubai's gold trade launched the slogan of “Dubai City of Gold” during the first shopping 
festival.  Today that slogan has become a branding message for the city. The first sign that 
one encounters on entering Dubai city from the airport is: Welcome to Dubai City of Gold.  
Car stickers with the slogan are popular and advertisements for anything from real estate 
to shopping malls describe Dubai as the City of Gold. 
The equation to gold is now being made not only from Dubai's affinity and historical ties 
with the precious metal but more metaphorically. Dubai offers the ultimate package in 
everything: Lifestyle, leisure and business environment.  What began as a simple headline 
to attract people to buy more gold during the shopping festival is now a brand statement 
for a city.73 
Today nineteen years into the launch of the DSF, the practice of giving away gold as 
prizes continues and is a huge factor in pulling shoppers from all parts of the world.  
It has been estimated that “four million more shoppers find their way to the retail and 
jewellery shops of Dubai in every edition of the DSF” and is the most sold 
commodity during the festival.74  Joyalukkas' strategy of marketing itself as a global 
brand by acquiring a stake in the urban project called Dubai and through the cultural 
dividends and symbolic gains accruing to the city has taken both Dubai and the 
group a long way in their trajectories as commercial entities in the 21st century. 
Conclusion
Dubai's beginnings as an urban brand, the chapter illustrates, goes back to the 
Malayali migration of the 1970s when the city became associated in the popular 
imagination of the community among others in India, with gold, electronics, textiles 
and other consumer goods.  The implications of these social imaginaries for the 
urban history of the city have included the development of a commercial economy 
specialized in particular kinds of commodities, sometimes legitimately transferred 
and otherwise smuggled to India.  The transitions at a structural and perceptual level 
in the commercial domain of gold that we have seen in the chapter, I argue, stand as 
72 “Dubai gearing up for the gala mall,” in The Times of India, 19 October, 1995.
73 “The Gold Corridor,” The Times of India, March 14, 1998. 
74 Lily B. Libo-on, “Gold is the most sold commodity during DSF,” Khaleej Times, January 30, 2014,
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?
xfile=data/todayevent/2014/January/todayevent_January.  (accessed January 31, 2014).  
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metaphors for the transition of the city in and of Dubai. They were the fledgling signs 
of Dubai's mutation from a city predominantly defined by the incessant circulation of 
commodities, money and people to one in which these began to permeate in the form 
of establishments that looked to the city for commercial legitimacy as much as for 
brand identities. 
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Chapter Five
Contraband then, Counterfeit Now: 
Dubai and the Fake Arts of Globalization 
The 1990s in Dubai was marked by a new wave of migration of Russians into the 
city following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of new post-socialist 
economies in Russia and parts of Central Asia and Eastern Europe. The Russian 
migration differed significantly from the earlier waves of commercial and labour 
migration of South Asians in that the vast majority of Russians were shopper-tourists 
who made short and frequent visits to the city in search exclusively of merchandise 
such as clothing, electronics, footwear and other consumer goods.  These itinerant 
traders, better known by the Russian term chelnoki, were of the very same league of 
suitcase traders that frequented markets in Turkey, Poland, South Korea1 around the 
same time and are referred to in official papers of international trade and financial 
institutions as shuttle traders.2  This chapter examines the effects of the Russian 
shuttle trade of the 1990s on Dubai and the ways in which it fed into and impacted on 
the city's existing geographies of commerce in the post-imperial Indian Ocean.  The 
key argument of the chapter is that it was these reinforced geographies of commerce 
that triggered off specific forms and processes of globalization in Dubai, primary 
among which was the culture of counterfeit and its spatially dispersed practices of 
production, retailing and consumption.
Counterfeiting involves a variety of practices, and degrees of imitation of a 
commodity, an established product or brand which over time may have come to 
1 See Boris Rumer, ed., Central Asia: The Challenges of Independence (New Delhi: Aakar Books, 
2003) and Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack, ed., Transnational Communities: Shaping Global 
Economic Governance (London: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
2 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Measuring the Non-Observed 
Economy: A Handbook (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002), 
225. 
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represent an abstract notion of quality for the consumer and a certain monopoly of 
profits for the producer.  It could be at the level of appropriation or adaptation of 
technology or worse, it could be the outright hijacking of the brand name.  The brand 
name or its (brand's) surfeit as Constantine Nakassis refers to it carries “the 
immaterial excess of social meaning that emerges out of engagements with branded 
goods.”3  It is this excess of social and symbolic meanings of success and classy 
lifestyles that consumers buy into when they buy counterfeits of brands without 
having to pay the cost of brand names and meanings associated with such names.4  It 
is not unusual that we think of counterfeit commodities from the perspective of their 
production rather than from one of exchange or consumption, thus giving it a 
unidimensional meaning of outright illegality and therefore criminality.5  When we 
do take into account the latter two processes it is often as part of the itinerary of a 
transnational criminal network and not as a social contract between geographically 
dispersed populations motivated by economics, cultures of consumption, and the role 
of categories of commodities, counterfeited or otherwise, in the social lives of their 
communities.
This chapter views counterfeiting from the other side, acknowledges the agency and 
complicity of traders as well as consumers in bracing it and provides a contextualized 
understanding of the phenomenon as a set of concrete processes in and defined by 
Dubai in the 1990s, rather than look at it as sheer imitations of existing products and 
brand labels.  It begins with a discussion of the method deployed to study practices 
and processes of counterfeiting, followed by narratives of retailers that catered to 
shuttle traders and others that sought cheap brands and counterfeits offered by Dubai 
3 Constantine V. Nakassis, “Brands and Their Surfeits,” Cultural Anthropology 28, no.1 (2013): 111-
126. 
4 Yi-Chieh Jessica Lin, Fake Stuff: China and the Rise of Counterfeit Goods (New York: Routledge, 
2011), 3. 
5 Willem Van Schendel and Itty Abraham warns us against the analytic dangers of subsuming all 
illegal transnational networks under the rubric of criminality.  They espouse a more subtle view of 
illegality which moves away from the state as its point of reference.  What the state considers 
illegitimate is illegal while what people involved in transnational networks consider illegitimate is 
illicit.  It is far too simplistic to collapse the two categories since what may be considered illegal by 
states may be perfectly licit in the eyes of people who are involved in it.  For details see Willem Van 
Schendel and Itty Abraham, ed., Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders and the Other Side 
of Globalization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 4-5. 
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during the times.  Counterfeiting is also analyzed through the changing dynamics of 
migration and the processes of consumption inflected by class, ethnicity and cultural 
contexts as well as the politics of the market in Dubai.  I have, owing to the 
complexity of the theme which revolves around two inter-referencing waves of 
migration and their associated practices of trade and consumption, resorted to a 
structure for the chapter quite different to that of the earlier chapters.  Within this 
structure, issues overlap and fold into each other in ways that reflect and help 
articulate the connectedness of the processes in question. 
Russian Shuttle Traders, Malayali Entrepreneurs and the Retail Boom in Dubai
Reports of international trade and financial institutions define shuttle traders as 
travelers who make repeated visits abroad and return with huge volumes of goods in 
their accompanied baggage  intended primarily for resale in their home countries or 
elsewhere.6  Shuttle trade surfaced as a widespread phenomenon in the post-Soviet 
milieu, although nascent and scaled down forms of it existed even as early as the 
1960s within the black markets of Soviet economies.7  Its having become rampant in 
the 1990s is often attributed to the structural transformation in Eastern Europe,8 the 
changing national economic and political contexts under globalization and its recipe 
of market-oriented growth both within the Communist Bloc and elsewhere.
The scale, pace, reach and nature of Russian shuttle trade in the post Soviet milieu 
has had repercussions for international trade in general and evoked considerable 
attention in academic and policy circles.  International financial institutions and trade 
organizations have documented the significance of shuttle trade, its variant forms, 
besides trying to propose methods for measuring the volume of and incorporating 
data pertaining to such trade in the balance of payment accounts of countries engaged
in it.9  Scholars have analyzed the factors that impelled its rapid growth and the 
6 Statistics Department International Monetary Fund. Shuttle Trade: Report to the IMF Committee on 
Balance of Payment Statistics (Washington, D.C.: Statistics Department IMF, 1998). 
7 Afsin Sahin, Yilmaz Akdi and Cemal Atakan, “An Investigation on the Shuttle Trade Dynamics of a 
Small Open Economy,” International Journal of Economic Sciences and Applied Research 1, no.2 
(2001): 1-12.
8 Sahin, Akdi and Atakan, “An Investigation on the Shuttle Trade Dynamics,” 2. 
9  Statistics Department IMF, Shuttle Trade, 13-20. 
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contexts of administrative and legal stalemate on the one hand and issues of border 
uncertainty and porosity on the other within which it flourished in the CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) countries as also the coalescence of the 
phenomenon and criminal activities.10  There have been studies like those undertaken
by Deniz Yukseker and based on ethnographic research conducted among shuttle 
traders and shopkeepers in Istanbul and Moscow which formed the nuclei of the 
phenomenon, on the modes of operation of market exchange in these largely 
unregulated and informal practices of transnational trade and the gendered and often 
equally personal nature of these business relations.11
Russian shuttle trade, as we are given to understand by critics who have studied the 
phenomenon in the light of the Soviet crisis, was short-lived  and did not stretch 
beyond the closing years of the twentieth century.  When I went to do my fieldwork 
in Dubai in 2011, Russians12 had no conspicuous presence in the city's retail districts 
as they did in the 1990s when they were often found moving in groups of five or six 
men and women around streets in Deira,13 haggling with shopkeepers and carting 
bags of purchases made in the process. In a little over a decade they have dispersed 
or merged into a larger foreign contingent within the city comprising tourists, 
technocrats, investors and real estate agents, leaving behind little trace of their 
nascent entrepreneurial activity as suitcase traders.  When in the city, their social 
relations were defined and limited by the nature of their business, the illegality 
implicit in its logistics and the networks that informed these, rendering it necessary 
for the researcher to begin any sort of an enquiry on the phenomenon within these 
networks.
The arguments made in the chapter are based on insights drawn from ethnographic 
10 Yuliya Zabyelina, “Costs and Benefits of Informal Economy: Shuttle Trade and Crime at 
Cherkizovsky Market,” in Global Crime 13, no.2 ( 2012): 95-108.  
11 Denis Yukseker, “Economy and Gender in the Urban Borderland: The Public Culture of Laleli, 
Istanbul,” in Urban Imaginaries: Locating the Modern City, ed. Alev Cinar and Thomas Bender 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 17-36.
12 Russians is the term commonly used in Dubai and other parts of the Arab Gulf to denote traders 
and citizens from the ex-Soviet republics.  A Russian could, by this logic, be from Azerbaijan or 
Kazakhstan as much as he or she could be from Moscow.
13 Deira, the part of Dubai on the eastern side of the creek is the quarter of the city where one finds 
several retail markets for cheap consumer goods and electronics.
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research conducted among groups of travel agents, hotel staff and retailers in Deira.  
Most of my informants, officially retailers but informally travel agents, real estate 
brokers and intermediaries in the money business were Muslims from Malabar.  They 
were, in the years of the Russian boom, at the helm of the city's trade in electronics 
and personal consumer goods and.  Their narratives are memories of their personal 
and collective experiences of the Russian suitcase trade in Dubai as well as accounts 
of their own lives and careers besides that of their compatriots as these were defined 
by and in relation to Dubai.  A significant factor worth noting is that Dubai is at the 
centre of their narratives, the fulcrum around which life, community, livelihoods and 
personal skills and capacities revolve.  Their investments in Dubai, financial, social 
and affective, mirror their commitment to a city which they and other migrants like 
them both helped create and sustain in many ways.  The ethnographic accounts of 
men whose positioning as traders within the markets of Dubai coincided with the 
entry of the Russian chelnoki frame the thematics of the chapter and lay out the 
counterfeit economy argument.  I have also drawn on the insights of two generations 
of consumers among Malayali men and women in Dubai and Kerala to offer a 
textured account of the counterfeit through personal experiences of consumption.
Ethnic Enclaves, Global Corridors: A Trader's Tale of Retailing in Dubai 
Riyas Karoo moved to Dubai in 1994 at the peak of the Russian influx into the city, 
forsaking at the insistence of his father, the one opportunity he had to graduate as a 
bachelor in English Literature and undertake a teaching career in Kerala.  When I 
met him for the interview, which was less than a year ago,14 he was the sales manager 
of a brand of consumer electronics called Nikura based at its wholesale outlet in 
Murshid Bazaar, Deira, and a very successful individual in his professional and 
personal life.  I was referred to him by his brother Najeem and a couple of other 
traders from the brothers' village in Vadakara, Kerala, who I met on one of the many 
trips to the Al Sabkha and Naif localities in Deira.  Best known among the lower 
middle and lower classes of resident consumers and traders for cheap retail consumer 
goods, these localities were once the heart of the city and the centre of the Russian 
14 Interview on January 23, 2012, at Al Shaab in Deira, Dubai. 
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trade.  Riyas was somebody many of them looked up to and hailed as the icon of 
success in a community operating within a limited range of capital and belonging to 
a class as theirs, the basis of both capital and class for them being Dubai itself.  He 
was cited as the perfect example of what Dubai could bring an individual with their 
kind of a social background inflected along the co-ordinates of ethnicity and class, 
and reined in by the limitations imposed by the two. 
It is interesting to note that despite many Dubai-based Malayalis having risen to 
prominence as global, regional and national icons of business, say for instance Joy 
Alukkas of the Joyalukkas Jewellery group, Yusuf Ali of the LuLu Group 
International etc., the Malayalis, generally speaking, believe that their mobility as an 
ethnic/linguistic group was limited vis-a-vis that of Europeans or Arabs or even north 
Indians for that matter.  As for state and private employees they could only earn 
salaries much lower than that of Arabs or Europeans even if their managerial and 
technical skills far exceeded those of the latter.  Glamorous jobs like crew on aircraft 
and cruises which fetched enormous salaries were ruled out because they did not 
have the right looks or the tastes required to impress a globally elite clientele.  
Traders like the informants that spoke to me often hailed from lower classes and 
backward regions in Kerala and could only be placed in businesses operating within 
a specific range of capital.  They could make a lot of money in business, and some of 
them certainly did, particularly during the peak of the Russian shuttle trade but could 
not transcend the class that they formed a part of in Dubai.
Within the circumscribed range of mobility Riyaz in their view had made it to the top 
through sheer hard work, his ability to adapt to the changing circumstances and 
practices of business, his educational qualification and most importantly by 
following what they call nervazhi.  Nervazhi is a compound word in Malayalam 
made of the components ner and vazhi meaning straight or right (in an ethical and 
moral sense) and way, path or trajectory respectively.  It is deployed in contexts 
where the economic and social means or the trajectory as it may be, by which an 
individual has reached his/her goal is significant to accord legitimacy to his/her 
accomplishments and contemporary station in life.  Literally translated as the right 
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path, I heard the term echo through descriptions that Malayalis across the class 
spectrum offered me of themselves as well as of others in both formal interviews and 
casual conversations as they attempted to make sense of class mobility in and 
through Dubai.
A host of differences is suggested by the prepositions 'in' and 'through' qualifying 
Dubai here. Whereas 'in Dubai' essentially meant living, working and trading in 
Dubai, the latter signified ways of making profits on the foreign exchange that 
flowed from Dubai or the larger Arab Gulf into Kerala or other parts of India.  One of 
the methods was to cater to the remittance, investment and now residential needs of 
migrants in India even as they were based in Dubai for work or business.  Hawala 
networks, finance companies, property development and real estate ventures (at the 
forefront of these are non-migrants) established in Kerala and now extending to other 
parts of India are classic examples of enterprises that have become via managing the 
remittances and investments of migrants, little business empires in their own right.  
The specific moral, social and political dimensions that accrue to nervazhi in present 
times have much to do with the dominant role that Dubai plays in the social lives of 
the Malayalis at large.  The particular history of the city as the principal artery of the 
Hawala network and the managerial core of smuggling and other contemporary 
practices of illegality and the implication of several Malayalis in these—mostly 
traders and those that are part of the informal economy—have been factored in to 
accord the term its added metaphorical sense.  Nervazhi in many ways also becomes 
a trope to delineate the city's own trajectory of growth and encompasses within its 
conceptual scope the illegitimate routes, unethical moves and illicit structures that 
have contributed to such exponential urban growth over a short span of time.
Despite its underlying notion of licitness as was manifested in their conversations 
there seemed to be no shared perspective among them on what constituted illicitness.  
While for some of them particularly the Hindus and Christians (most of them hailing 
from the south of Kerala), illicitness was synonymous with illegality, for the lower 
classes of Hindus and the Muslims (mostly shop assistants and retailers) of Malabar 
there was a marked difference between the two.  This stark contrast in perceptions of 
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nervazhi or illicitness stemmed from a variety of factors including the national 
socialist apathy to trade in general exhibited by the first category, their understanding 
of legality shaped by the nationalist paradigms of foreign exchange and import 
restrictions frequently violated in activities of smuggling and their middle class 
sensibilities of ethics and culture.  Added to these were the Muslims' historical and 
cultural traditions of trade, their social and ethical consciousness fashioned by these 
as against having evolved from the nationalist modern sensibilities of their 
counterparts and most significantly of all, their view of Dubai as a geographical 
continuum of a historically and socially entrenched commercial culture.  Nervazhi 
then encompasses within it perceptions of geography and the trajectories of social 
mobility permitted by geographies that are legitimate and those that are not.  In that 
sense Dubai itself is outside the moral and spatial realm of nervazhi or licitness, a 
point made by many of my Hindu upper caste informants and echoed by some of 
their Syrian Christian counterparts during several interviews I conducted in Kerala in 
2011 and 2012.  For them any money made and remitted from outside the borders of 
the state bore the imprint of illicitness despite the glitz and glamour entailed by the 
global nature of the enterprise in current times.  Dubai as the very source of money 
was illicit by their logic since it was by all means outside the legitimate geography of 
the post-colonial Indian state challenging the latter's ideology and structural 
framework of socialism.  For the Hindu and Christian residents in Dubai who were 
predominantly salaried employees, it was not Dubai, rather it was what one did there 
that had to be factored in when considering the nature and degree of illicitness.  
Working for the state ministries in the emirates scored high in terms of social 
acceptance, salary earners with multinational firms were on par, those employed with 
small scale private firms did not fare very well but it was the small scale retailers 
themselves and shuttlers that completed the picture of illicitness for them.  For 
Riyas's social circle that comprised the latter groups illicitness was much more 
constricted in its scope and often times did not mean more than overt implication in 
activities listed under smuggling.  Interestingly, smuggling itself was not illicit unless 
it was smuggling of some illicit commodity like drugs or arms.
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Riyas did not seem to echo the sentiments of his compatriots on Dubai or their view 
of individual success as he spoke to me at length in my apartment about retail trade 
in the city and his existence as defined by the perpetually changing contours and 
dimensions of the latter.  His account of the family's decision to have him sent to 
Dubai to take advantage of the opportunities to be found there (as was made out by 
his compatriots who had flown to Dubai to cash in on the new retail boom spurred by 
the Russians) and memories of a trader's life in the city over the past eighteen years 
betrayed a sense of unease that was at odds with the financial success and social 
mobility he had accomplished.  He admitted he was happy to speak to somebody 
'educated and sensitive,' 'an outsider to Dubai' or to quote him “share moments of 
retrospection” in which he assessed, often with disillusionment, his career and 
individuality as they were tied in irrevocable ways to Dubai.  He felt he was among 
people who did not understand 'our middle-class sensibilities and aspirations' which I 
discerned was what instilled in him a feeling of talking at cross-purposes during the 
interview.
When he first came to Dubai to work in a readymade garments shop along with a 
couple of other young men, all of them brought in by a compatriot who owned the 
shop, he wasn't sure he would stay on for so long.  His complete lack of interest in 
assisting customers with clothes landed him only two months later in yet another 
undertaking by a fellow compatriot except that the new store sold electronic goods.15  
The switch, he remembers was never difficult, since what mattered was not whether 
he knew product specifications, brand quality or the mechanical aspects of the 
device, all of which I arrogantly assumed were what helped the customer reach a 
decision on whether or not, or better still, what to buy.  The challenge was of a 
different kind altogether. He had to prove himself at selling, and selling in a hitherto 
unprecedented ways to a novel category of customers—the Russians.
It was at the electronics store, Riyas remembers, that he had his first serious 
encounter with the Russians, whom he had only read about in World History classes 
15 This shop called Dimple Trading owned by a Malayali who was also a relative of his, shut down 
many years ago.
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in high school and whose images for him were tainted by the local communists' 
myopic understanding of the Soviet socialist system back home.  His attributing their 
initial ventures of purchasing everything they found even when they had not the least 
idea of the kind of goods available or their utility, as well as his added emphasis on 
their ignorance and lack of experience with the social, legal and informal dimensions 
of profit driven trade clearly show that he perceived post-Soviet Russian trade 
practices as marked by the rupture with socialism and its culture of restricted 
consumption, not unlike the stereotypical notions that Europeans themselves had of 
the Russians.16
Russians were in fact emerging out of a straitjacket, a straitjacket of controls and 
restrictions on their urges and efforts to shop, accumulate and consume.  They were simply 
bringing in money, a lot of it and buying big time. They just bought whatever they could 
lay their hands on.  Those who managed to do well despite their initial ignorance held on 
in business.  Others simply lost the game.  For instance, when buying heavy things, one 
has to be prepared to pay for excess baggage at the Dubai airport or wherever else. They 
didn't know that by the time they reached Russia, they would have incurred a lot of money 
on things bought, that is to say, apart from the purchasing cost. They wouldn't have a clue 
of that. Therefore, they would buy in bulk and go. We do not know how many of them 
would have made good of it. Some of them that had a sense of the way things were, did 
survive. They would buy from retailers then, and retailers did pretty well.  I came during 
that phase of the retail boom. Had I come at least two years back, I could have had a 
greater knowledge of the Dubai market and I could have started a shop and that would 
have helped me be part of that retail boom triggered off by the entry of the Russians.  But I 
did all that I was capable of for my employers. 
Ignorance or lack of familiarity as it may be, was in the case of Russians more than 
ignorance of the logistics of business and the terms and conditions of international 
transfer of cargo.  It loomed large at the level of language and therefore 
communication skills.  Almost none of them could speak English just as none of the 
Indian traders could speak Russian or any of the Slavic languages.  Ignorance was 
also ignorance of the nature of the market in Dubai and its peculiar rituals and terms 
of trade which traders like Riyas who came in to Dubai following the Russians were 
also not exempt from.  In his own terms and revealing the ways in which he as a 
young and a novice of a trader tapped into the changing dynamics of such a market 
under a dominant Russian clientele,
16 Raymond Barrett, Dubai Dreams: Inside the Kingdom of Bling (Boston: Nicholas Brearly 
Publishing, 2010), 124.
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It is not really easy, one has to learn to do business in the Dubai market.  One needs good 
experience, familiarity I would say. For that one must be involved while based at a shop. 
One must be thoroughly involved in the process of the sale. If you are a wholesaler on the 
other hand, you must be well informed about and conscious of your competitors.  One 
must also be involved in purchasing.  Let's say a container or two of goods comes for us 
today (as wholesalers), we must not forget the fact that another team can or could have 
gotten the same stuff as us.  In such a situation, would we get a market for the stuff 
quickly? All such things we ought to learn and learn soon. In that sense, we must always 
be alert in Dubai. In other places, wholesalers will receive orders from retailers who in 
turn may receive them from customers, say from Bahrain or Qatar, they will have an 
estimate of customers, although they will keep some extra quantity but there will only be 
some extra quantity. That is not the case in Dubai; it is a question of excess, in fact.
One of the key features of trading in Dubai in personal consumables, he observes, 
has been the predominance of haggling or bargaining as he calls it over other formal 
mechanisms of price determination and the lack consequently of a fixed price or even
a price range for a particular kind of product or its multiple brands.  No limits to 
prices quoted and charged meant no limits to profits made, turning shrewd hagglers 
of traders into rich businessmen in as short a span of time as a year or even less.  The 
persistence of haggling as the principal mode of transacting business coupled with 
the lack of a common language was what ensured Riyas and many others like him a 
footing in Dubai's Russian shuttlers' dominated retail market, something that most of 
my interviewees of a similar profile as Riyas attested to for a fact.  That they were 
young, a whole lot of them were in their teens to be precise, had far less inhibitions 
and were willing to take greater social and economic risks gave them an edge above 
their older compatriots in business who often hired them as shop assistants through 
familial, social and often religious networks that stretched right across the Arabian 
Sea from the creek to the coasts of Malabar.  These young boys, now men in their 
late thirties and early forties, made their way up in business with some of them 
becoming business partners of their previous employers and even individual 
entrepreneurs in their own right after having plodded through difficult, often 
dysfunctional linguistic environments featuring such minimal expressions in English 
as “you take, I take,” and negotiating hitherto unfamiliar cultural codes of 
communication that was seemingly anything but gendered.
Riyas presented me with a hypothetical case of haggling, not unlike a mathematics 
teacher in high school, a case he had come up with in the span of a minute sifting 
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through his many transactional encounters with customers to help a historian grasp 
the essentials of trade as it happened in Dubai.
For instance, a person asks, what is the price, and I say it is 50 dirhams,...and he says, 50! 
what are you saying? And then he would say you must give it to me for 40. Even then, that 
is, if I sell it at 40, I will have a profit of 20 dirhams, because my cost price would be not 
more than 20 dirhams. The thing is you must put on a sad face and say, I have no profit, 
that's going to be a loss for me. This is too low a price for me, give me something more. If 
you take it forward in this manner, the customer would feel, hmm, I got it for ten dirhams 
less; that is their satisfaction.  For those like us, there's some reward for the time and effort 
we put in. 
Yet another key feature of trade in the particular context of Dubai and as Najeem 
observes, is the customer whose attitude and mindset to the commodity, the retailer 
and the price governs the act of exchange.  A customer, we must remember, is an 
ethnically, socially and culturally modulated individual besides being an economic 
entity.  All these extra-economic co-ordinates that define him/her go into the fixing 
of price and the terms of exchange in Dubai even today, an attribute of the retail 
market that has had profound implications for Dubai's urbanity.  The Russians were 
not the first customers that these retailers were interacting with and selling to, nor 
was haggling a novel practice in the retail markets of the city.  There were the Arabs, 
the Emiratis, the Iranians, the Egyptians, Palestinians and the South Asians before the 
Russians.  Nevertheless, they were all of a different social profile with a different set 
of needs and preferences to the Russians.  The Emiratis as recipients on the one hand, 
of the welfare programs of the oil state and on the other, of kafalat17 from migrants 
were rapidly moving upward in terms of their economic and social standing in the 
1970s and the 1980s in the emirates.  The other ethnic categories, some of which 
were allowed to naturalize, were co-opted along with the Emiratis themselves to 
work in the public sector and share in the state's resources.  Among the South Asian 
migrants a conspicuous segment came to stay on in Dubai with their wives and 
17 The kafala is the system that GCC states use to organize and control the lives and movements of 
South Asian workers and traders in their respective territories.  It links individual workers to a specific 
job and to a specific citizen who acts as his sponsor or kafeel.  Although the law in the emirates does 
not stipulate that the kafeel is entitled to remuneration from the guest worker or trader he sponsors, 
cases abound where the former extract huge sums of money in exchange for the passport of the latter 
that they confiscate on arrival.  There have also been instances of sponsors asking traders for 
payments to exercise their power granted them by virtue of their Emirati citizenship and have them 
initiate visa proceedings or fulfill other legal requirements for labour recruitment, transfer of trade 
licenses etc.  For more details on the kafalat system, see Gardner, City of Strangers, 29.
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children as part of the emirate's workforce (although they were numerically 
insignificant when compared to the legions of unskilled male workers who came to 
work on infrastructure projects leaving their families behind) and took home salaries 
that made for a comfortable living.  As these retailers looked at these categories, they 
were conservative customers.  They valued articles, especially electronic and 
electrical goods, for their use value and purchased them mostly for personal 
consumption while in Dubai or as gifts for family or friends back home.  As citizens 
of broadly speaking, a producer society, they opted for articles that stood the test of 
time and lived up to the standards of performance their manufacturers promised.18  
They were aware of product specifications which rated the highest on their priority 
list; the price, many traders reminded me, was only secondary.  Haggling, insofar as 
retailers were concerned, was futile since they were trapped in a milieu where profit 
was not at a premium for consumers and in which there were far fewer customers 
and retailers than there are today.  Besides, the manufacturers and importers, in view 
of consumer behavior typical of a producer society, catered to the consumption needs 
only of a select class of consumers who could afford and were willing to pay and not 
for a mass market. 
The Russian customers came in as traders with a clearly defined objective which was 
to buy as much quantity as possible of a wide range of goods at the cheapest prices.  
They did not care for product specifications, nor was longer shelf life a criterion that 
underlined their choice of products.  Some of them picked the cheapest of the lot; 
others who brought in more cash picked two or three, sometimes even all the brands 
that they could spot at a retailer's.  Whatever they bought, they bought in huge 
numbers, sometimes all the pieces stocked in a shop, sometimes quantities that these 
retailers had to procure from other retailers or wholesalers themselves.  It is not 
surprising then that they formed the quintessential customer for those like Riyas and 
Najeem who readily admit that the Russians by the sheer scale of their numbers and 
18 It needs to be pointed out here that in the case of the categories mentioned here excluding the 
South Asians, longer shelf life for a product also had to do with the South Asian maid who used them 
in the kitchen, laundry and the other spheres of the household.  They were not finicky about the price 
or quality to the extent that South Asian consumers were since the blame for poor performance could 
always be laid on the maid.  It was for the latter that the product had to last since it was one of the 
factors that decided the nature of treatment meted out to her by the family she worked for.
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the range of goods they bought during their visits to Dubai over less than ten years 
changed the commercial, political and social landscape of the city beyond what had 
been done by migrants from South Asia for more than forty years.
Given that the Russians put price at a premium and bargained for the cheapest deals, 
it was important for businesses to procure and stock cheap brands of electronic goods 
and in large volumes.  Coincidentally, this was a time when radical shifts in the 
global order of manufacturing and service industries—manifested in an immediate 
sense, in the rise to prominence of East Asia as the new site of industrial production
—were beginning to pulse through the retail corridors and consumer landscapes of 
urban Dubai.  Dubai began to augment, even displace previously stacked imports of 
Japanese and Western consumer electronic goods19 with those from the new export 
economies in the East.  Although these goods had made their way into Dubai and 
other markets in the GCC region as early as the late 1980s, it was not until the advent 
of the Russians in 1993 that they began to take over these markets completely.  It is 
imperative as we talk of consumer electronics and in the context of the 1990s that we 
have a sense of the phenomenal range and categories of products that were imported 
from East Asia into Dubai.  These included such goods as home appliances, kitchen 
appliances, personal and travel gadgets, cameras, security devices, entertainment 
systems, car accessories etc., all of which were essentials on the shopping lists of the 
Russians that arrived in Dubai.  The growth in world trade and the increased share of 
East Asia that analysts worked out for the decade were perspicuous insofar as the 
trader, the buyer and the layperson were concerned, in the profusion of a broad 
spectrum of products on display in shop windows in the city.
In the course of my interviews with migrant families of Malayalis in and across 
Deira—these interviews were part of an attempt at studying changing consumer 
practices to map the movements in Dubai's electronic retailing—I was given to 
19 There is at this juncture a need to distinguish between the two especially in terms of their range of 
products available in the markets of Dubai.  While the European or more particularly the German, 
Dutch and French brands like Braun, Philips and Moulinex marketed what broadly fell under kitchen 
appliances, the Japanese brands had the monopoly in television sets (Sony), refrigerators (Sanyo, Sony 
etc.) transistors, tape recorders, stereos, iron boxes (National Panasonic), washing machines, cameras 
(Fuji, Yashica) etc.  The Amercian brand GE was dominant only in air conditioning in the seventies 
and eighties. 
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understand how a battery of products much of which were redundant in the cultural 
scheme of their everyday existence started infiltrating the markets simply to cater to 
the Russians.  The latter, they observed, had a relationship with these novel products 
which was unlike anything they had seen before, echoing Riyas' and the other traders' 
views of the Russians as reveling in the freedom of extravagance after years of 
political and economic repression by the communists.  It was perhaps their way of 
catching up with the rest of the world, or the West as it were, the consumerist 
attitudes of which they only seemed to have popular myths about.  Many women 
among the homemakers I had been introduced to remembered how they suddenly 
began to find mixer grinders the complex functions of which they were unaware of 
and could not manage, not because they were ignorant but as a result of the poor 
quality of spare parts used and the flawed nature of the assembly of these parts.  
From out of nowhere there were deep fryers, sandwich makers, personal massagers, 
sauna devices etc., designed for the average home, gadgets that hardly made a 
difference to their everyday life except in the figures on their electricity bills or the 
space in their kitchens.  On asking them about the brands they were referring to they 
plainly admitted that while some of them had names that have disappeared from the 
market now, a majority of them were brands like National, Sharp, Panasonic and 
Aiwa that sold other more conventional kinds of products earlier.  A majority of these 
women were displeased with even these brands themselves as contrary to their 
standards they compromised on quality and were ready for the trash in less than six 
months and a huge drain on their husbands' pockets.
The observations that these women made point to some of the important upheavals in 
the consumer electronics industry worldwide.  Looked at from the singular frame of 
reference that retail Dubai afforded, the industry was perceptibly erratic and riddled 
with its own baggage of chaos and contradictions at least until the turn of the century.  
The first in the series of such contradictions was the alarming rise in the availability 
and distribution of fakes and the gradual setback in the popularity of premium 
brands, particularly Japanese brands in the city (and by extension in the GCC 
region).20  The proliferation of the manufacture and distribution of fakes was broadly 
20 In the beginning were companies like Jumbo Trading and Cosmos ITL in Dubai.  These were the 
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speaking, a direct outcome of multinational companies moving their production 
bases to parts of East Asia.  A strategy espoused by Japanese corporations like 
Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC (National Electronics Corporation) and Toshiba in the context 
of falling domestic demand for their products, it was oriented towards overseas 
export and realized through foreign direct investment in the low cost markets of the 
newly industrializing economies or NIEs in the 1970s and the ASEAN countries in 
the 1980s.21  Low cost markets that provided the cost advantage of one or more 
factors of production, say land, labour etc., helped these multinational firms 
manufacture at very low costs, goods that could be sold at much higher prices, given 
the social value of their brand names among retailers and consumers across the 
world, a trend that continued well into the 1980s and quite visibly in Dubai.  Greater 
cost advantages and higher profit margins coupled with unparalleled brand values 
however came with their own sets of disadvantages.  Some of these disadvantages 
included the ill effects of technology transfer22 and the rising potential for 
reproduction especially of low value-added products and household goods.  Although 
technology transfer has been a vital aspect of foreign direct investment by 
multinationals in developing nations, it was the modes and practices of Japanese 
firms in the East Asian region that eventually resulted in product counterfeiting 
ventures in the latter.  Blair and Freedman's study of  East Asian Multinational firms 
points to how the Japanese apply the same methods of technical training as in Japan 
in the course of its transfer of production technologies to local subsidiaries in their 
new sites.  The enhanced training procedure through individual participation and 
assistance in the process of production as well as unrestricted access to specialized 
information for its new recruits eventually gave way to counterfeiting at multiple 
levels.  With rising demand for consumer electronics,  increased access to 
communication and transport technologies and the booming of intra-industry trade in 
sole distributors of electronic goods across the Middle East and functioned in the capacity both of 
retailers and wholesalers.  
21 ASEAN is the acronym for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the members of which are 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.  
For details see Laura Diaconu, “The Multinational Companies and the Low-cost Markets of South-
East Asia,” Journal of the Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea1, no.1 (2009): 148-152. 
22 For details see, Alex Blair and Craig Freedman, “Are Japanese Multinationals Different? 
Technology Transfer in the Asian Region” in Regional Strategies in a Global Economy: Multinational 
Corporations in East Asia, ed. Rene Haak and Dennis S. Tachiki (IUDICIUM Verlag, 2004): 157-178. 
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the nineties, local companies that were tied to these MNCs as production subsidiaries 
began to replicate international designs and models for overseas export, emerging 
with a competitive edge over the Japanese in low-end product sectors.  This new 
culture of production was to have far-reaching effects on Dubai's markets, inflating 
and changing at a rapid pace, the social, spatial and political dimensions of its 
urbanity.
Brands in the Faking: Producers, Intermediaries and Importers
Until the nineties in Dubai the line that demarcated the wholesale and retail trades in 
consumer electronics was rather blurred.  The buyer, whether retailer or end 
consumer went to the trading establishments23 like Jumbo Electronics or Cosmos ITL 
for their purchases.  The retailers were mostly licensed shop owners or shop 
assistants from the rest of the Emirates or other countries in the GCC for which 
Dubai was the singular point at which to source all kinds of merchandise.  While 
some of these retailers had their own vans and trucks for ferrying their purchases 
from Dubai to their stores, small traders often drove their own private vehicles, hired 
the services of cabs or looked to other informal mechanisms of transportation for the 
purpose.  The latter were often men who worked as chauffeurs and transport agents 
for other establishments or institutions and who availed the mechanisms of 
transportation offered by their employers to clandestinely carry moderate volumes of 
portable goods as iron boxes, stereo sets etc.  Their purchases they then sold to 
buyers at small margins in the drawing rooms of their houses, or had them delivered 
at the consumer's house.  Although small traders, these men operating in the 
interstices between the trading establishment and the end consumer, had their share 
of profit which interestingly rose or fell in tune with the haggling skills of the 
consumer.  The advantage that these lay traders had was that they did not have to 
have pay import duties to the government unlike the trading establishments in Dubai.  
The incentive to trade, hence, was quite high even for a lay person based in the 
emirates and to a certain extent the other GCC states.  An enterprising individual, 
23 Trading establishments in the commercial register of Dubai were licensed traders and authorized 
dealers for specific brands .
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according to most of my informants, only had to tap into the structural orbits that 
connected these spaces to Dubai often with the help of ethnic social networks and 
groups as the Malayalis did.24
Since trade was often embroiled in informal practices and consisted of haggling 
based rituals of exchange, the incentive to provide quality brands or original stuff to 
the consumer was often lacking among these lay traders.  It is important to look at 
stories that traders have of consumer brands, particularly brands in electronics as 
much as it is vital to analyze popular perceptions of quality, price and the country of 
manufacture of these goods.  The term 'original' even as it dominated the narratives 
of the traders and the women consumers lacked any semantic consistency at all.  
Neither could they define what it meant nor could they point out to a brand that they 
would consider as irrevocably original. Traders' narratives highlighted migrant 
preferences for different brands of the same product, say a television, which they 
believe are determined for the most part by their ethnicities, their countries of origin 
and the shared social semantics around the product and its brands, say for instance, 
Sony or National Panasonic.  For the women who were end consumers, it was more 
often than not the brand they first had access to and used that constituted the original.  
Some of the traders were quite vocal about the cultural politics of brands and the 
labeling of new, lower priced and Asian made brands as counterfeit or 'duplicates.' 
Some of them told me how the hype around the original or the first-grade brand was 
generated simply to preserve production and price monopolies over a product by its 
manufacturers in the West and to devalue Asian products.  Second grade products or 
those that come after the original, they remarked are often better than the originals, a 
case in point being Japanese brands which were often accused of replicating German 
technology.  Whether it is the German or the Japanese brand that constitutes the 
original is a matter of serious concern when looked at from the perspective of Dubai 
based retailers and consumers as well as consumers that acquire their goods from 
Dubai through migrant friends or family.  This ambivalence insofar as the original is 
concerned is linked to Dubai's import and re-export trajectories.  In the case of small 
24 Also see, Filippo and Caroline Osella, “Muslim Entrepreneurs Between India and the Gulf,” ISIM 
Review 19 (Spring 2007): 8-9. 
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kitchen appliances, like the food processor for instance, the German brands were 
deemed to be the original whereas the original for the television, the iron box, the 
stereo was always Japanese.  The third grade or the one that comes after the second-
grade is inevitably Asian or more precisely Chinese according to many of them and 
is priced at much lower rates than the original and the second-grade.  One vital 
aspect that was factored in as brands were graded was the ethnicity of the consumer 
for whom it was produced and not his/her economic category or class per se.
Consumers in Dubai and elsewhere and before the Russians had entered the scene 
were more than familiar with individual brands and their respective standards of 
performance, so brand names could not be circumvented quite easily, a fact that was 
well known even to newly emerging manufacturers in East Asia.  Consequently the 
production intermediaries tied to Japanese multinational corporations in East Asia 
among others who functioned more along informal lines, began to launch their own 
counterfeiting operations.25  Some of these operations acquired their supplies from 
production overruns or access to factory seconds taking advantage of the same 
infrastructure as the licensed producers.  There were others that made use of the same 
decentralized approach to counterfeiting as licensed producers, procuring and 
assembling components in the very space of their homes and with friends and family 
as workers.  Many of those that created components that go into the assembly of the 
final product may not have been aware of their being part of an illegal activity or 
network.  Insofar as they were concerned they were only responding to new orders 
for products in an intricately linked open market.
Dubai constituted, besides the entry point for markets in the GCC, a substantive 
market for counterfeit goods as the region at large lacked a comprehensive set of 
laws and regulations that could ensure the protection of intellectual property rights.26  
The greatest benefits accrued to Dubai since in the nineties the UAE did not even 
have a trademark law unlike the rest of the GCC states within which the customs 
25 United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational 
Organized Crime Threat Assessment (United Nations Publication, 2010): 179-180.
26 Office of the United States Trade Representative. National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign 
Trade Barriers 1992. (DIANE Publishing, 2003):105-107.
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formalities among member states were minimal.27  It is difficult to state with any 
precision the means by which these trademark infringed products found their way 
into Dubai—in other words, whether they were sourced as such at throwaway prices 
by distributors/importers who then passed them off as original stuff to traders and 
end consumers in Dubai, or whether these importers themselves were tricked into the 
game by intermediaries who in concert with the manufacturers made a profit out of 
procuring supplies of cheaply produced fakes at the wholesale price of the brand.  
While both these practices can certainly not be ruled out, of equal importance for the 
direction that Dubai's growth took was the emergence of a new category of 
importers.  The new importers on account of Dubai facilitating their direct links to 
counterfeit manufacturers in East Asia and China have kept the global trade in 
counterfeit going and at profits worth billions of dollars.
While representatives of huge trading establishments refused to comment on their 
complicity in the deal shifting the blame on to exporters they sourced their stuff from 
in these countries, small time retailers explained at length how it could not have been 
otherwise since the volume of branded supplies these big names could procure 
lagged way behind customer demand in Dubai especially with the Russians.  It was 
only natural then that they tried to bridge the gap between demand and supply by 
tapping into alternative sources and networks of manufacture and export in the East 
Asian countries.  The gradually rising numbers of importers that could launch 
supplies at reduced costs, regardless of whether the latter was counterfeit or original 
came as a threat to these authorized dealers of brands in the initial days when the 
numbers of conservative customers were dwindling in comparison with newer 
segments that were either unaware of or turned a blind eye to quality.  A vast 
majority of the new customer segment, particularly the Russians, never directly 
approached the trading establishments.  They preferred to shop at retail units in the 
streets of Deira.  It was mostly these retail units run by Malayalis that offered them 
business, but the possibility that they could always switch to newly emerging 
importers and gain supplies at a bargain loomed large.  An individual or two 
associated with the big trading establishments and insisting on condition of 
27 Office of the United States Trade representative, National Trade Estimate, 106.
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anonymity bluntly told me how their new Malayali competitors/importers who had 
no qualms about floating illicit merchandise provided the business fetched them 
quick money, were to be held accountable for corrupting the conscientious 
businessman and the commercial integrity of Dubai at large.
Traders like Riyas and Najeem also made a case for the rising trade in counterfeit 
merchandise against such developments as the widening of the customer base, the 
alteration of customer profiles in terms of class, ethnicity and social mindsets, the 
investment by low profile brands in service and repair and the onslaught of capitalist 
and market values on everyday life.  Riyas in particular emphasized the changing 
social circumstances and attitudes in Kerala or more particularly Malabar over two or 
more decades of its history of migration to the Gulf as contributing in many ways to 
the city's trade in fakes.  On the surface much of it seems as if it were tied to the 
newer class dimensions of migration, with lower class groups of men rushing to 
Dubai and the Emirates at large to capitalize on the commercial boom of the 1990s 
and partaking of the social norms set by their earlier counterparts.  Nevertheless that 
even the classes the premium brands targeted switched to lower grade products if not 
fakes altogether in the context of lack of commitments shown by brands to 
maintenance and repair can only be suggestive of the part that the latter themselves 
played perhaps inadvertently in the rise of fakes.
When I came here, the trend was such that these trading establishments that you are 
talking about would only sell National iron boxes, Sony television sets etc.  These were the 
only brands available in electronics then.  The problem with these brands was that an 
ordinary chap would have had to spend more than half of his income on just any one of 
these articles if at all he were to buy them.  If he bought a watch in addition to these, I 
mean TV and iron box, he would for sure incur a debt.  No wonder then that the ordinary 
folk unlike the earlier generation of mostly well-to-do migrants stopped thinking of the 
long term use of a particular electronic device.  The only sentiment governing them was 'I 
also need everything.' They would be on a budget but they would still need everything that 
others could afford to have.   They would have to gift everybody something or the other 
when they returned home, say a watch.  Gulf returnees were always in the habit of giving 
gifts, but in the earlier days they would only gift the elders in the family.  For instance, our 
relatives in the Gulf always gave my elder brother and sister something, but there was 
never anything for us.  Today you cannot not give everybody something.  Even the 
smallest fellow in the house would have his mind set on some gadget which you had to 
carry from the Gulf.28  
28 For excerpts of the interview see Appendix 1. 
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'Dubai-logic': Markets, Politics and the Popular Fiction of Growth 
Shafeeq hails from Triprayar, a place about 22 kilometers south of Thrissur and 
famous for its Sree Rama temple, one of the few dedicated to the worship of Lord 
Rama in Kerala.  A forty year old gentleman, he is the youngest of nine children in a 
family that is largely scattered around Thrissur, Dubai and parts of the GCC.  On the 
move for generations as religious teachers and traders in and around the eastern 
Indian Ocean, the family eventually settled in Dubai as its ultimate destination in the 
latter half of the twentieth century.  Shafeeq's father along with his twin brother were 
perhaps the first of the first generation Malayalis to have reached Dubai and long 
before the place had shown any sign of a future for itself.  Shafeeq remembers how 
his father and his travels in Persia and Ceylon had become some sort of a legend in 
the immediate vicinity of his house in Triprayar so that much of what he knew of his 
father were stories recounted by his neighbors rather than personal accounts of the 
man himself.  Leaving in the year 1967 on a launch that came to the shores of 
Chavakkad, little did the two men know that their descendants as much as the 
descendants of their neighbors and friends all of whom they had brought over to 
Dubai would make it their home for years to come.29  The most they could have 
expected of the voyage was that it would lead to a brief sojourn not unlike the one 
they had in Ceylon where Shafeeq's father was a religious teacher and his brother a 
plantation worker.  That it turned out to be more of a project of economic promise 
and social mobility can only be understood against the very trajectory of the city's 
transformation, the  testimony to such a project being the roping in of different 
generations and members at different phases in the city's growth.30
Shafeeq arrived in Dubai in 1993, the last among the four brothers to migrate to 
29 Chavakkad is a coastal village in Thrissur and one from which many illegal migrants travelled to 
Dubai in launches in the 1970s.
30 Shafeeq's father and uncle had a tailoring shop, to begin with, in the Deira Souk.  His uncle then 
ran a textiles shop in the vicinity of the first one. The quarter that housed these shops was then called 
the Iranian market.  These shops exist even now and is run by one of his cousins.  In fact most of his 
cousins continue to run the shops they inherited from their father or uncles.  Some of them have textile 
shops, others perfume stores across the length and breadth of the Emirates.  His brothers-in-law 
(sisters' husbands) too have stores in the Naif souk. 
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Dubai.  He began his apprenticeship as a trader in a shoe store in the Naif Souk 
immediately on arrival and as his father had planned well in advance.  What struck 
me as interesting as he spoke about his days of training for a career in trade was that 
he was not taken into any of the many businesses his brothers, brothers-in-law and 
cousins owned in Dubai and the other Emirates.  When I queried him on why that 
never happened striving hard to conceal my ideas of migrant family business 
acquired in the course of my interactions with the Bhatias and the Sindhis, he offered 
me the explanation that the scale and scope of their businesses was not such that 
there was room to accommodate many players, although there was no money lacking 
in the game.  Besides, it was impossible for the larger majority of Malayalis to run 
family partnerships in business, given the peculiar social and financial dynamics of 
the institution of the family.  Each unto his own was the larger philosophy guiding 
the community at large.  It was no different in business either.  The family set him up 
in a store, equipped him with the right connections, provided him accommodation, 
but left him on his own to come to terms with the market, grab the right opportunity 
and raise capital that would see him through his own business.  After two years of 
apprenticeship at the shoe store, Shafeeq could put together everything that was 
needed to start a business of his own.  He leased a shop at the corner of Naif Road 
and began to sell consumer goods, mostly plastics, toys, sports goods and beach 
umbrellas to the Russians.  He identifies himself, though, as an importer rather than 
as a retailer, sourcing for his clients on their trips to Dubai goods from China and 
other East Asian countries which he then shipped to ports in Eastern Europe in 
containers.  Had he not been duped into a deal by a long-term Ukranian client who 
fled without paying he would have continued to remain a successful businessman 
with a transnational base and perhaps a brand name to his credit.
I met Shafeeq in person only in December 2012 at Thrissur31 where I had gone to 
interview a couple of early Gulf migrants, although I had known him for close to a 
year through acquaintances in Kerala.  He now forms part of a group of six young 
men from different districts in Kerala who recently embarked on an import business 
in China.  They take turns to go to China where they source leather goods, digital 
31 The interview was conducted at Thrissur Towers on the 18th of December, 2012.  
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equipment, electrical and plumbing materials and bathroom fittings for markets in 
Saudi Arabia and other states in the GCC region.  China seems like a new beginning 
for Shafeeq after his business in Dubai collapsed in 2005 that left him with no option 
but to return to Thrissur with very little money.  His narrative breaks the monotony of 
and strikes at the centre of the argument, naive as it is, that trade flourished in Dubai 
because of the liberal policies of the government which he questions relentlessly.  A 
longer history of engagement with the city and its administrative domains facilitated 
by the movement of two generations, besides his own experience of state apathy as a 
victim of fraudulence may have been instrumental in extending him an outlook that 
set him apart from most of my interlocutors.  He foregrounds private commerce, the 
varying shades of illegality implicit in its practices and the political dynamics of the 
state and its administrative logic skirting these as fundamental to the burgeoning 
growth of the city.  In his view and what I choose to call the Dubai-logic, 
Dubai became Dubai through others, through extracting from others.  The market was the 
organizing principle of its growth, it was only through the market that this logic of 
extraction could be worked out.  Where Dubai stood to gain, players in the market, never 
mind their ethnicity, migrant status or the nature of their business, did pretty well. 
Nothing could have been illegal in the emirate, not even counterfeiting, by the 
extension of the Dubai-logic. Before the Russians, counterfeiting in Dubai was 
neither an exigency nor a lucrative business, hence it was practically non-existent.  
This is, however, not to say that there were no counterfeit products in the market.  
The emphasis here is on the preposition 'in' qualifying Dubai as the site of 
counterfeiting, an aspect that needs to be examined in the light of the changing 
contours of the Russian trade and the subsequent expansion of import businesses in 
the city.
In the initial days, they would come to the shoe shop, look at the designs and styles, buy 
everything up, every piece that the shop stocked.  They only knew Russian.  They brought 
money, every pie they had, converted into dollars, and spend it all in Dubai. Thanks to 
such behavior, all the retailers in the area, extending from Naif all the way up to Murshid 
Bazaar made it big. It was only later that Murshid Bazaar became devoted exclusively to 
wholesale trade.  The traders in the Iranian market retreated inside, moved inwards to 
settle down at Murshid Bazaar, at its farthest end, eh! it is not even Murshid Bazaar, it is 
much further inside, I mean the wholesale market, if you go from the gold souk, you will 
perhaps reach there, but no, an ordinary person, he could have lived in Dubai for years, but 
will never reach there.  It was there that the wholesalers catering to the Russians 
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established themselves.  That is what we call the new Iranian market.  
The traders in Naif Road used to go up to the new Iranian market to procure goods for the 
Russians in the early days.  The Russians didn't know how to get there. One group would 
come and place an order saying we want these many shoes with us.  As retailers, we would 
ring up wholesalers in the Iranian market, they were mostly Sindhis and Iranians, and ask 
for the order to be delivered at our shops.  We would then deliver the cartons at the hotels 
where the Russians stayed. The hotels had their own storage facilities, warehouses, but 
because there were so many groups staying at the same time, the warehouses overflowed 
to parking lots and lobbies, even corridors leading up to the rooms, all of which were 
stacked to the roof with cartons of varying dimensions. These purchases they sent off as 
freight via air.32
The growth and expansion of Russian business in and via Dubai (as perceptible in 
the shifts outlined in the narrative) also brought in a diverse range of opportunities 
for retailers whose businesses were built on the foundations largely of informal and 
social relations they established with the Russians within the threshold of their 
culture, religion, class and gender.  Like Shafeeq, many became importers of raw, 
unbranded goods concurrently as they were in the retail trade of cheap branded and 
unbranded goods, all imported from China.  One only needs to take a stroll in the 
evening on the Naif Road, moving through its many labyrinthine streets towards the 
Al Sabkha bus station to check out some of these stores selling watches, toys, 
plastics, leather goods, travel and sports goods and readymades staffed and owned by 
men from just about two or three villages in Malabar and frequented now by hordes 
of customers from everywhere in the world.
To speak of imports, nevertheless, as if they could be subsumed under a single 
category is not helpful in explaining how Dubai fit into the cracks of a globalization 
triggered off by shuttlers, importers and retailers trading in the city.  It is necessary to
discriminate between imports and the ways in which imported goods pitched at 
varying scales of illegality were sold within the city in order to unsettle the notion of 
a liberal, protective government.  Nothing seemed wrong for a trader in Naif road or 
anywhere else to sell cheap watches or mobiles with Chinese names inscribed on 
them or for a customer to purchase them in truckloads.  It was likewise for the gobs 
of cheap blankets, slicers, plastic containers, toys,steam inhalers, chopping boards, 
cloth hangers etc., that had no revered brand names to their credit.  The retailer 
32 For excerpts of the interview see Appendix 2. 
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rented a shop with the help of a sponsor who nominally and for all legal purposes 
was his business associate, imported the afore-mentioned variety of goods either on 
his own or in conjunction with other retailers and sold them at his own free will 
within the premises of his shop or office if he had any.33  The terms of ownership for 
the retail business in question was some sort of a partnership of two or more of these 
foreigners in conjunction with an Emirati sponsor since sole proprietorship in trading 
was earmarked exclusively for UAE and GCC nationals.34  This legal framework for 
retailing in fact was more or less what determined economic progress and social 
mobility for the retailers from Malabar.  It is easy, now that there is some familiarity 
with a legal landscape the retailers in Dubai needed to navigate, to sympathize with 
Riyas for whom a retailer's ability to pool capital, enter into a partnership with 
another retailer of a similar background and run what could be called a business of 
his own translated into a successful career and a better social profile within the 
community.  The retailer(s) paid no commercial taxes on the returns,35 the 
government being hardly interested in his line of business or the nature and legal 
dimensions of his merchandise and the sponsor anything but accountable for the 
33 The procedure prescribed for setting up a business was far from complicated and roughly in the 
sequential order outlined here. The retailer, once he had selected the potential site, and the specific 
legal form of his establishment defined by the UAE Company Law No.8 of 1984, Article 5, was 
required to find a local partner (UAE national) in whom was vested 51 percent of the ownership of the 
business.  For details see, “Corporate Compliance (As per UAE Company Law No 8 of 1984)” 
published by Horwath Mak. http://www.horwathmak.com/pdfs/UAE%20COMPANY%20LAW
%20NO%208%20OF%201984(2).pdf., (accessed on May 15, 2012).  Also see How to set up a 
Business in Dubai, published by the Economic Research Department of the Dubai Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in 2009. http://www.dubaichamber.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/How_to_start_business.pdf., (accessed on May 15, 2012).  As for licensing 
and registration, the business owners had to list the type of business activities included within each 
license subject to a maximum of ten activities per license and come up with a name under which the 
establishment was to be registered.  The relevant documents had to be submitted to the municipality in 
the earliest times since it was the body authorized to issue trade licenses then. Later the onus of 
issuing trade licenses shifted to the Ministry of Economy and Commerce and then eventually to the 
Department of Economic Development  which was as recently as 2005. 
34 For details and exceptions to the rule, see “Starting a Business in Dubai: A Practical Guide”, Dubai 
Business Advisor, Vol 1, No.4 (2009). Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
http://www.dubaichamber.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Dubai_Business_Advisor-No.4.pdf., 
(accessed on May 15, 2012).
35 In Dubai as in the rest of the Emirates, only oil, gas and petrochemical companies and branch 
offices of foreign banks are practically required to pay tax.  This is despite the Dubai Income 
Ordinance of 1969 and the Income tax Decree (amended in 1970) stipulating that trading enterprises 
with returns of more than a million dirhams are to be subjected to taxation.  For details see Taxation in 
the United Arab Emirates published by Galadari and Associates. 
http://www.galadarilaw.com/uploads/brochures/172113_Tax.pdf., (accessed on May 15, 2012).  
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partners or the mode of working of the business itself.  With a trading license issued 
by any license issuing authority in the country he could import almost anything from 
anywhere (if the exporting country had no objections or if the importer could 
circumvent legal objections via political or extra-political methods) with minimal 
interference on the part of the customs.36
The irony of the game in which someone could call a business his own when there 
were always more than two people involved was quite a glaring one until some of my
informants explained, rather demonstrated the informal arrangements between the 
foreign partners and the token nature of the 51 percent of Emirati ownership.  Since 
there were no restrictions on the number of shops a retailer could have stakes in, a 
vast majority of them entered into partnerships with the same individuals over more 
than one venture.  Some of them were brothers, some cousins or brothers-in-law and 
yet others neighbors and friends who split the joint ventures between them in a 
manner that ensured each individual had the sole responsibility over the management 
and finances of a single shop as much as he shared ownership with the others in 
multiple firms.  Kareem and his older brother Altaf have five shops between them in 
Al Sabkha and Murshid Bazaar.  Three of these in Murshid Bazaar are 'owned' by 
Kareem and two in Al Sabka by Altaf as the brothers (whom I had separate 
conversations with) claimed.  The unequal division was justified by Kareem being 
able to pool in the greater share of capital having come to Dubai earlier than Altaf.
Importers, the more daring ones, have taken advantage of the state of affairs 
underlying the establishment of a business in Dubai and exploited loopholes in 
commercial law to spin off a highly lucrative business in counterfeit goods, or more 
precisely the knockoffs of premium brands like Gucci, Prada, Cartier, Rolex etc.  
These fakes, precisely because of the lax verification procedures at the port,37 
36 For details on customs clearance procedures, see Dubai Customs Customer Guide Edition 2, 
http://www.dubaicustoms.gov.ae/en/Publications/Publications/Customer_Guide_EnV2.pdf., (accessed 
on May 15, 2012).  
37 Note that there were no institutional mechanisms to deal with violation of intellectual property 
rights or instances of trademark infringement before 1992 in Dubai or the other emirates when Federal 
Law No. 37 on trademarks, otherwise known as trademark law came into being through the royal 
decree of the President of the UAE.  Go to the official portal of the Abu Dhabi government, 
http://www.abudhabi.ae/egovPoolPortal_WAR/appmanager/ADeGP/Citizen?
_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=p_citizen_homepage_hidenav&lang=en&did=14912., (accessed on May 15, 
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encountered hardly any difficulty in entering the city or leaving the port to its 
destination in Eastern Europe or even such ports as Amsterdam, the gateway to 
Western Europe.38  In the city, these were mostly sold by vendors bustling in street 
corners, young boys from remote parts of India, several of whom I encountered in 
the course of my fieldwork in and around the Gold souk and Meena Bazaar in Bur 
Dubai.39  Counterfeit products made their way to markets in Europe via Dubai's free 
trade zone in Jebel Ali where they were slapped with the name, logo and other visual 
markers of the original brand.40  In fact many of my informants told me about how 
some of their acquaintances and friends particularly those that hailed from Kasargod 
in Kerala41 were specialists in the art of faking brand logos and fabricating package 
labels of raw stuff and were doing very well in Dubai on these fronts.  They also told 
me how Kasargod in Kerala was Dubai's back-office providing all kinds of 
counterfeit services including fake passports, marriage certificates and other personal 
documents of national identity for those migrants that wanted to pursue quick, illicit 
pathways to wealth and success in the Gulf, thus earning for itself the epithet 
Kasargod embassy.42
2012).  Even with the law coming into effect there were hardly any reports of cases relating to 
trademark infringement in newspapers and other public media.  The Dubai government's first formal 
efforts insofar  as law enforcement on the trademark front was concerned were made in as late as 2005 
when an Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) unit was established at the Dubai Customs and programs to 
create awareness on the violation of intellectual property rights were launched.  For details see, Dubai 
Customs We are IPR Edition 3 (2010), 
http://www.dubaicustoms.gov.ae/en/Publications/Publications/We_Are_IPR_ENG.pdf., (accessed on 
May 15, 2012).
38 United Nations Office on drug and Crime, The Globalization of Crime. 
39 For more details, see chapter 3 of the thesis.  
40 United Nations, The Globalization of Crime,
41 Kasaragod is the northernmost district of Kerala and home to many of the state's coir and hand 
loom industries. It was an important centre of trade and specialized in the export of rice and coir 
during medieval times. In the 1980s however, it emerged as one of the subsidiary ports overseeing 
smuggling operations of gold and currency brought in from the Arabian Gulf.  
42 The term Kasargod Embassy interchangeably used with 'Kasargod Republic' and 'Ihe Indian 
Embassy of Kasargod,' drew much attention in the popular press in India and the Gulf following the 
crash of an Air India Express flight at Mangalore (which is the nearest airport to Kasargod) on May 
22nd, 2010 when 52 passengers from the district were killed.  At least ten of them were traveling on 
fake passports issued by the racket.  A particularly interesting case of identity theft that brought to 
light the modus operandi of the racket, its methods of issuing fake passports and the charges at which 
such passports were available, was that of Shanavas Mammed Koya whose passport number and 
address appeared on the passport of the dead Abdul Samad.  For more details, see M.G. 
Radhakrishnan, “Kerala: Republic of Kasargod,” India Today, June 11, 2010, 
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/kerala-republic-of-kasargod/1/101181.html (accessed May 5, 2012) 
and Suryatapa Bhattacharya, “Inside the trade in forged Passports,” in The National, September 4, 
2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/inside-the-trade-in-forged-passports  (accessed May 
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Shafeeq showed me on his cell phone the scanned versions of old Malayalam 
newspaper clippings of at least half a dozen young men arrested for their 
involvement in organized crimes of an economic nature.  There were two among the 
seven that he was convinced were part of a knockoff racket dominant in the late 
1990s and the early years of the 21st century in Dubai.  They were Gucci specialists, 
says Shafeeq, although there was no way to get them to admit it.  Shafeeq knew of 
their business, particularly in the line of jeans, through a Ukranian client of his who 
bought their supplies in Dubai and had them shipped to Ukraine every three months 
or so.  Manufactured in Malaysia and branded in Dubai as Levis, Gucci etc., they 
were in huge demand in Ukrainian markets, partly because of the remarkably high 
quality of the fabric and the stitch and the relatively lower price attached to the two.  
Interestingly, they were never arrested for their involvement in the knockoff racket 
which was spearheaded by some reputed business magnate in Dubai.  They were in 
the news for defaults on payments they owed to a chain of supermarkets in Dubai—
these supermarkets are owned by a Malayali group—and were arrested by the police 
in Kerala.
Raymond Barrett in Dubai Dreams alludes briefly to an episode with a Mumbaiker 
whose catchphrase of 'good copy, genuine fake,' so invited him towards the site of 
the sale in an apartment building far removed from the crowd in the street and hidden 
in an alley that he followed the lad to what Barrett describes as “an Aladdin's cave of 
fake designer bags, watches, belts, wallets and briefcases.”43  While for Barrett, 
Dubai's street culture of fakes in everything from designer bags to women may have 
seemed exotic, for the importer and the vendors, it was a venture that was risky 
beyond any other they could think of and needed a structural hierarchy not so much 
to distribute risk or have the secrets of the trade guarded as to protect the identity of 
the informer.  A well-meaning official at the Indian Consulate in Dubai44 warned me 
on the need to keep out of the sight of such outfits when I briefed him on an occasion 
5, 2012).
43 Barrett, Dubai Dreams, 26. 
44 The interview with the official was conducted in December 2011.  I do not wish to disclose the 
identity of the official for I fear as much as he does that his diplomatic future in the GCC region or 
elsewhere for that matter could be jeopardized if a publication were to evolve out of the work and his 
comments on the illegal side of business in Dubai figured in it.
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or two on my encounters with a couple of gangs and my interest in their modus 
operandi.  Although at a loss to explain the nature of the risk that these outfits could 
incur on account of my interest in them, he was quite clear about what would befall 
me in the event of my continuing to pursue them and the helplessness of the 
Consulate should something fatal happen to me.  My media friends were quick to 
indicate the transnational underpinnings of the business, the involvement of many 
reputed businessmen based in the city migrant and otherwise, and the global division 
of labour crucial to the management of its shadowy practices within the territorial 
confines of Dubai.  A point they repeatedly referred to was the involvement of 
Nigerian men in the outfit as henchmen and the possibility of my having been led to 
one of them with no prospects of return by the boys from Kasargod who were the 
only public faces of the trade in Dubai.  However, what risk entailed in such business 
for its higher echelons is a question that can be addressed only if one has a better 
understanding of the law as it underpins commercial behavior and streamlines illicit 
economic activity within the ambit of a financial economy in the emirate. 45 
The emirate of Dubai has its own judicial authority with the requisite institutional 
infrastructure and resources in the form of independent courts and judges besides a 
body of legal codes, federal, local and Sharia, formulated to address a range of issues 
that punctuate social, commercial, religious, civil and migrant life in the country as a 
whole and the emirate in particular.  Despite the presence of a modern institutional 
setting within which judicial proceedings take place, when it comes to regulatory 
frameworks to rein in commercial malpractices, be it smuggling, counterfeiting and 
other larger and more organized forms of economic crime, and law enforcement to 
combat them Dubai has been observed to be quite lax, even to the point seemingly of 
indifference.  An instance worth considering is the Primark case reported in the early 
half of 2012 in the national dailies in the Emirates.  An excerpt of the article 
“Primark copier could face legal bind” that appeared on April 26, 2012 in The 
45 For details on Dubai's legal system, see Andrew Tarbuck and Chris Lester, Dubai's Legal System: 
Creating a Legal and Regulatory Framework for a Modern Society, Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 
2009.  For Dubai's system of courts, court procedures, local laws and details of prosecution offices, go 
to the official website of the Dubai government, 
http://www.dubai.ae/en/Lists/Articles/DispForm.aspx?ID=85&category=Citizens., (accessed on May 
15, 2012). Note the nature of the sources listed.
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National is added here.
The owners of a Dubai firm allegedly faking Primark, a well-known European chain of 
clothing stores could face federal fines of  Dh 10,000 (US$ 2, 722) and up to a year in jail, 
if found guilty of trademark violations, lawyers said yesterday.  The local Primark, a 
company registered with Dubai Economic Development, opened a new clothing store in 
Bur Dubai this week purpoting to be the huge European retailer.  But the clothier based in 
Britain said on Monday that it did not have any stores in the UAE.  Lawyers say the local 
company is treading a dangerous legal tightrope even if Primark from the United Kingdom
does not have a registered trademark licence in the Middle East.
Note the irony in the stance of the Dubai Department of Economic Development 
which stated openly that it was not willing to take action against the company behind 
the store using the name Primark in the emirate.  It justified its stand on the ground 
that it was liable to initiate action only when the trademark is registered with the 
UAE Ministry of Economy.46
Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the dynamics of the Russian shuttle trade of the1990s and 
the ways in which Dubai's commercial geographies and urban spaces were redefined 
through its presence and practices of imports, retailing, counterfeiting and 
consumption.  It has engaged with the latter as spatially dispersed processes 
stemming from shifts in the geographies and cultures of production as well as those 
of consumption, all of which were influenced by a Dubai globalizing and being 
globalized via these.  The terms brand and counterfeit, as illustrated by the paper, 
encompass a whole range of meanings and practices and elude any kind of a 
definition.  Their multiple meanings as well as their cultural semantics are explored 
from within the canvas of Dubai's social histories of migration, trade and 
consumption and the logic of its retail markets.  The role of the state and its legal 
regimes in facilitating the city's specific culture of counterfeit has also been 
addressed.  It thus brings to the fore the contexts of power and politics informing 
what Chad Haines calls Dubai's “presencing project,”47 and its (Dubai's) visibility as 
46 For details go to http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-
insights/retail/primark-copier-could-face-legal-bind., (accessed on May 15, 2012).
47 Chad Haines, “Cracks in the Facade: Landscapes of Hope and Desire in Dubai,” Worlding Cities: 
Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global, ed. Ananya Roy and Aiwa Ong (Malden, 
Massachussets: Blackwell, 2011), 163. 
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a brand promoting particular forms of commodity cultures and aspirational lifestyles 
elsewhere in the world.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion
This work has evolved from a critique of the global city perspective on Dubai that 
highlights the city's rapid and superlative forms of spatial development in the 21st 
century, while ignoring the social and historical processes constitutive of such 
development.  In unpacking the politics underlying a view of the city as a new space 
created by the logic of 21st century capital, I have both attempted to revive notions of 
the past in Dubai and give it (the past) a global dimension.  The complementary 
aspect of the exercise has been writing Dubai back into the history of global capital, 
an attempt that has certainly not been and as we have seen in the introductory 
chapter, without precedent in the academia.  Clearly, what makes this work different 
is its attention to processes, alliances and struggles that defy the territorial logic of 
standard political geography or nation-states as it were, and yet find legitimacy and 
meaning in Dubai.  As against a catalogue of the city's half-a-century long 
infrastructural development projects and global growth strategies of the Maktoums 
drawn up by other scholars, I highlight these processes, alliances and struggles as 
having created distinctive trajectories and intricate patterns of globalization not just 
for Dubai but for other spaces as well.  It is in this and not in any comprehensive or 
teleological sense of the 'global city,' I contend, that Dubai becomes and continues to 
remain significant for Urban Studies and for studies in Global History. 
Entrenched in practices primarily of trade, the dissertation traces these processes, 
alliances and struggles to historical times and locates them in notions of space that 
correspond to diverse social imaginaries of the city of Dubai rather than to the 
manufactured realities of nation-states and their border regimes.  The historical and 
social space referred to here and that the dissertation takes for its geographical, 
political and epistemic frame of reference in the study of Dubai is the Indian Ocean.  
To be more precise, it is the Indian Ocean traversed, mapped and articulated in its 
political, social and financial contours by Indian mercantile capital for over half a 
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century that is central to my argument on the making of Dubai's specific forms and 
practices of an urbanity that has ever since the city's beginnings in the 19th century 
been global in scope and scale. 
The dissertation has traced the beginnings of Indian mercantile capital in Dubai to 
the pearl economy of the Persian Gulf in the 19th century.  It has also considered the 
ways in which it was instrumental to incorporating Dubai within the imperial port 
regime of the British and defining the local contours of its politics as a mercantile 
city-state.  It argues for Dubai's global relationality in history and in contemporary 
times as tied to the political project of a dual constituency in which power is shared 
between a tribal dynasty of rulers and a mercantile constituency, and the commercial 
consensus connecting the two.  This mercantile constituency comprises multiple 
ethnicities, groups and classes of merchants, traders and entrepreneurs that evolve 
and establish themselves in concert with the changing dynamics of  global capital as 
well as the historical developments that punctuate it.  Many of these ethnic and social 
groups have been written out of the discourses of the city in Dubai, or have been 
reduced to a structural constituency of capital as the labour force vis-a-vis other 
nationalities or ethnic groups like Filipinos, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis or Indonesians.  
In other words, they do not figure as anything more than temporary labour migrants 
constantly subjected to exploitation and abuse by local sponsors or their compatriot 
intermediaries in the business of labour recruitment.  By mapping the historical 
trajectory of mercantile capital in the Indian Ocean and the ethnic and social relations 
that have characterized it over the latter half of the 20th century, I not only narrate a 
different story of Dubai's migration, that is to say of merchant groups, but also 
expand the scope of labour migration to include practices and processes of trade as 
immanent to it.  In doing so, I recount personal stories essentially of physical and 
social mobility, thereby re-inscribing individuals and communities of Indians as 
agents of urban and transnational histories in Dubai with narrative voices in such 
capacity.   
The two mercantile communities of the Thattai Bhatias and the Malayalis that lend 
meaning to “geographies of commerce,” the conceptual category defining the work, I 
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have chosen for particular reasons.  While both of these derive their legitimacy as 
merchants, traders and entrepreneurs from within the structures and practices of 
Indian Ocean commerce, their histories as trading communities in Dubai are 
radically different and so are their locations within the city's social hierarchy.  The 
Bhatias' connections with Dubai go back to the 19th century when they came in as 
pearl financiers and merchants.  Following the Partition of India in 1947 and the loss 
of Thatta in the province of Sind to Pakistan, they relocated to Bombay and Dubai 
and established these as the two nodal points of a powerful geography of trade 
consolidated through the flow of gold, currency, consumer goods and people.  They 
were pioneers and trendsetters that created newer possibilities of commerce for 
communities that followed them into Dubai from Sind, say the Sonis who not much 
later specialized in the re-export trade in gold. The Malayalis, however, are an 
eclectic ethnic and linguistic group of Hindus, Christians and Muslims with diverse 
histories of migration and forming a composite segment of the migrant population in 
not just Dubai, but the rest of the Emirates and the larger Persian Gulf as well.  They 
have, ever since migration started on a large scale in the 1970s, been placed in 
multiple occupational and socio-economic categories as labourers, guest workers, 
tourists, entrepreneurs, businessmen and consumers and have played key roles in 
shaping the territorial and global commercial geographies of Dubai.  They have been, 
both as individuals who migrated before migration became an established practice in 
the Persian Gulf, and as a group constituting the dominant majority of migrants at the 
core of oil economies in the region, vital to bringing together and preserving multiple 
threads of histories in Dubai.  At the confluence of an earlier history of Indian Ocean 
mobilities and of more recent waves of an international regime of labour migration, 
they have woven together these multiple threads, each with its own temporal and 
spatial logic, in layers and entanglements carving out a transnational economy in 
Dubai on the one hand and a clearly segregated urban society of Emiratis and 
outsiders on the other.  Today, there are any number of billionaires among Malayalis 
in the world, particularly among those based in Dubai and to a certain extent, other 
parts of the Persian Gulf.  Not only have they been at the helm of a liberalizing 
economy in India, mostly visible in the jewellery, real estate and consumer retailing 
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sectors, but are also increasingly remodeling their businesses in concert with the 
changing contours of global capital and labour to become household names and 
brands on the global stage. 
The dissertation, in linking Dubai's trajectory of urbanity with the pathways and 
processes of mobility, both physical and social, of the Bhatias and the Malayalis has 
sought to work with and foreground analytic categories evolving from and 
commensurate with practices and imaginaries of movement, rather than rope in 
concepts informed by territoriality as a given.  To this effect, it has sought to analyze 
in particular the ways in which Dubai has constituted the lifeworlds of these 
communities and in turn to render the city meaningful through their interpretations of 
themselves and others as communities of migrants, traders, labourers, consumers and 
smugglers.  “Geographies of commerce” which is the key conceptual foundation in 
the study reflects the diverse and the constantly fluctuating contours of capital and 
commodities as they define the realms of their economic, social and political activity 
across the larger expanse of the Indian Ocean.  While Indian Ocean helps foreground 
the historicity of social spaces and mobilities that lie at the heart of economic 
activity, both legal and illegal in contemporary Dubai, “Geographies of commerce” 
points to the immediate spatial and political co-ordinates of the social interactions 
afforded by such mobilities.  It is thus deployed in the dissertation as a category that 
encompasses concepts, meanings, prejudices, politics and perceptions of the moral, 
the legal and the illegal produced in the act, process, and experience of specific 
practices of movement and the forms of social mobility afforded by it (movement).  
The term “geographies of commerce” was coined, to a large extent, to capture the 
alternate history of capital, trade and migration in an international system in which 
all three were monopolized and regulated by nation-states as the only legitimate 
economic players.  Thus many of the practices that are rendered legible in this study 
on Dubai and that actually constitute the city's global geographies of commerce are 
construed as illegal in the dominant vocabularies of nation-states the world over.  
Some such activities that have been dealt with at length in Chapters Three, Four and 
Five are smuggling and counterfeiting.  However, that these are activities that both 
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define and disrupt social, economic, political and legal spaces across the globe, 
fragmenting and incessantly re-organizing them at different historical junctures is a 
key point the dissertation makes.  The part played by commodities like gold, textiles 
and consumer electronics and the cultural, social and territorial politics implicit in 
their transactions are also made out as central to the institutions of smuggling and 
counterfeiting.  A significant feature of “geographies of commerce,” is its existence 
as a conduit for the exchange of and investment in cultural meanings and social 
politics around specific commodities transforming them as in the case of Dubai to 
global practices.  The ways in which these geographies become sources for and 
routes to the discursive and spatial production of Dubai as a global city, as well as the 
creation of global brands discussed in some detail have helped situate the concept as 
central to imagining Dubai as a global city.  
This dissertation on Dubai with its distinctive spatial approach to the city and its 
global past provides new theoretical insights and hints at new methodological 
possibilities for the study of other cities in contemporary times.  “Geographies of 
commerce” in particular opens up new ways of thinking about and through space in 
its incessantly fluctuating contours and as contingent on historical and political 
aspects in multiple yet mutually inclusive contexts.  We are talking of tools that help 
us map and render meaningful practices, processes and structures that lie on the 
margins of both academic and popular thinking and yet have remained vital to 
debates on global phenomena and structures, including nationalism, globalization 
etc.  I am here referring to illegal flows, the social, political and spatial strategies of 
mobility vis-a-vis territoriality and more importantly the ways in which the legal and 
the illegal, the licit and the illicit, and mobility and territoriality co-habit as 
interrelated congruent forces at multiple scales.  A study of contemporary global 
cities, I propose, cannot overlook these aspects of interconnectedness and inter-
referencing as essential co-ordinates of urbanity in the 21st century.  
Much of what is rendered in the work in terms of methodology speaks to important 
debates in Global History.  Scholars arguing for the need to globalize historiography 
while developing “new globally encompassing understandings of the past that remain 
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sensitive to local particularities,” basically underscore the potential of such moves to 
challenge western perspectives of history resting on the notion of convergence and 
the proven universalism of global forms and structures everywhere.1  Intellectual 
history has worked out many of these propositions in deconstructing Europe and in 
mapping and foregrounding epistemological and philosophical alliances and 
resemblances between spaces physically disconnected while unveiling the 
disjunctures and ruptures among different categories of actors in seemingly 
homogenous and unified spaces.2  This dissertation and what it offers in terms of 
methods takes these insights into the realm of social and urban history in ways that 
highlight the global city as a ground reality punctuated by tensions and 
contradictions as much as a discourse and a construct hinged on perceptions of 
homogeneity and singularity. 
1 Dominic Sachsenmaier, “Global history and critiques of western perspectives,” Comparative 
Education 42, no. 3 (2006): 452. 
2 For details see Kris Manjapra, “Transnational Approaches to Global History: A View from the Study 
of German-Indian Entanglement,” German History 32, no. 2 (2014): 274-293. 
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Appendix 1
Excerpts from Riyas Karoo's interview, January 2012
When I came here, the trend was such that these trading establishments that you are 
talking about would only sell National iron boxes, Sony television sets etc.  These 
were the only brands available in electronics then.  The problem with these brands 
was that an ordinary chap would have had to spend more than half of his income on 
just any one of these articles if at all he were to buy them.  If he bought a watch in 
addition to these, I mean TV and iron box, he would for sure incur a debt.  No 
wonder then that the ordinary folk unlike the earlier generation of mostly well-to-do 
migrants stopped thinking of the long term use of a particular electronic device.  The 
only sentiment governing them was 'I also need everything.' They would be on a 
budget but they would still need everything that others could afford to have.   They 
would have to gift everybody something or the other when they returned home, say a 
watch.  Gulf returnees were always in the habit of giving gifts, but in the earlier days 
they would only gift the elders in the family.  For instance, our relatives in the Gulf 
always gave my elder brother and sister something, but there was never anything for 
us.  Today you cannot not give everybody something.  Even the smallest fellow in 
the house would have his mind set on some gadget which you had to carry from the 
Gulf.  Some sort of a feeling of equality plus something for everybody had to 
translate into the figures of an ordinary guy's budget.  Could he afford to gift a brand 
like National then? Could he be concerned with quality the way others who belonged 
to a different class were?
The peculiarity of second grade brands like Geepas, Sanford etc., is that they offer a 
warranty.  If you bought a Panasonic set (tape recorder) in those days, a first grade 
brand, and there's some damage to it, you will not be able to find a service centre in 
Dubai despite the warranty offered by the brand.  Even if there is, an ordinary guy 
will never be able to take it there.  One service centre of Moulinex which I know and 
most people do not, is Nakeel centre.  I am not sure if it still exists. I once bought a 
branded mixer-grinder and when it needed repair, a jar had gone off, I couldn't find a 
place.  And when I did, the cost of the jar was equivalent to that of the entire unit.  
The jar actually costs more than the entire unit of a second or third grade brand.  The 
issue of service and repair was a big drawback of the first grade stuff in Dubai.
It is quality that first grade brands offer, not warranty really. To claim service on their 
limited warranties is a huge task in itself.  They would ask you if the damage was 
caused due to your negligence, for instance if the article fell off your hands, fell into 
water etc. For instance, if you buy a camera, there's always a possibility of it 
dropping it accidentally, now when you give it to the service centre, since they are 
experts at diagnosing the damage, they would instantly be able to sense your part in 
causing the damage.  They would then quote the price of repair as 200 or 300 
dirhams.  You would lose interest in the camera at that very moment. Consequently 
people started looking for things that will give you a warranty, the consolation is that 
one can use it at least for a year. Hence, the whole situation was beginning to be 
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oriented towards producing cameras and other such goods for a year, or as much as 
the components would last.  Remember it was at a time when customers were 
disillusioned with limited warranty products that fakes began to enter the market.  
When customers started bargaining for good prices, it became a different story 
altogether; the seller, if he were to make any profit out of it, he had to sell the 
premium brand iron box for 95 or 100 dirhams.  Customers would bargain and force 
the seller to sell it to them at 90.  After all that the seller does to prevent such a 
disaster, he would still be able to sell it only at 95, meaning he only gets a profit of 5 
dirhams.  That someone somewhere beginning to launch fakes of the National iron 
box was a blessing for the retailer who was fed up of customers that haggled who 
they realized couldn't be reformed.  The fake or the copy was almost the same as the 
original iron box.  The only option left was to reform themselves (for the sake of 
profits, for the sake of their sustenance), or adapt themselves to the situation.  They 
knew what there were doing was not right (selling fakes by passing them off as 
original stuff), but it was a buyer's market and they had to act accordingly.  Because 
someone launched the fake, people started buying it. So even when the selling price 
was 90, and the price after haggling was 85, the retailer would be fine, he could make 
a profit easily of 55 or 65 dirhams on the iron box. Thus the profit margin increased 
for the retailer.  Those who bought this fake stuff and were trapped began to believe 
that everything they bought in Dubai was fake. They didn't want National Panasonic 
any longer.  A huge majority of the people began to feel that they were not ever going 
to get the original brand; that they are never going to get it in the Dubai market at 
least.  This was detrimental for Dubai's image so the government began to enforce 
strict regulations, they began to monitor the flow of these goods at ports etc. It was in 
such a situation that second grade brands with a year's warranty, reasonable quality 
and a decent brand image began to carve a niche for themselves.  I can say for sure 
Nikai, I have sold quite a few iron boxes myself of Nikai.  Once customers started 
buying them, they became a bit more confident of the quality, it certainly was not the 
best, but at least you didn't have to duped into buying a fake National product.
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Appendix 2
Excerpts from Shafeeq's interview, December 2012
In the initial days, they would come to the shoe shop, look at the designs and styles, 
buy everything up, every piece that the shop stocked.  They only knew Russian.  
They brought money, every pie they had, converted into dollars, and spend it all in 
Dubai. Thanks to such behavior, all the retailers in the area, extending from Naif all 
the way up to Murshid Bazaar made it big. It was only later that Murshid Bazaar 
became devoted exclusively to wholesale trade.  The traders in the Iranian market 
retreated inside, moved inwards to settle down at Murshid Bazaar, at its farthest end, 
eh! it is not even Murshid Bazaar, it is much further inside, I mean the wholesale 
market, if you go from the gold souk, you will perhaps reach there, but no, an 
ordinary person, he could have lived in Dubai for years, but will never reach there.  It 
was there that the wholesalers catering to the Russians established themselves.  That 
is what we call the new Iranian market.  
The traders in Naif Road used to go up to the new Iranian market to procure goods 
for the Russians in the early days.  The Russians didn't know how to get there. One 
group would come and place an order saying we want these many shoes with us.  As 
retailers, we would ring up wholesalers in the Iranian market, they were mostly 
Sindhis and Iranians, and ask for the order to be delivered at our shops.  We would 
then deliver the cartons at the hotels where the Russians stayed. The hotels had their 
own storage facilities, warehouses, but because there were so many groups staying at 
the same time, the warehouses overflowed to parking lots and lobbies, even corridors 
leading up to the rooms, all of which were stacked to the roof with cartons of varying 
dimensions. These purchases they sent off as freight via air.
The Russians knew nothing, not even to say hello in English.  We were then all 
young men, dynamic and energetic, most of us unmarried.  These Russians were all 
fair and good-looking men and women.  The likes of me would go up to them in their 
hotels, sit with them in the lobby, ask them in English about their whereabouts, why 
they were doing this in Dubai, we even communicated through gestures.  With 
frequent interaction, I began to learn to speak Russian, many other Malayalis already 
did.  I now know Russian quite well, I can even read some Russian. I did learn the 
language, I should say, in less than two years.
It was the Russians who connected Dubai with China, although that was an 
inadvertent act.  They gave China an entry into Dubai's markets through innumerable 
products, half of them literally useless for the average individual.  I am not yet 
talking television sets or DVD players but cheap consumables.  Having been a trader 
myself, I can say with the greatest confidence that Chinese production received a 
boost and in such a minuscule span of time only because of Dubai. 
In Dubai, the Arabs and others used to buy quality stuff. When the Russians came, 
they wanted real low cost goods. We used to, for instance, sell containers of beach 
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umbrellas to the Russians.  Where did these come from? Obviously China. Could 
you have imagined that in the Dubai you lived? A container of some 2,300 pieces of 
beach umbrella? We used to give them a bill for 2300 pieces on order and had the 
order delivered to them by evening or in the morning the next day at the latest. When 
they started buying container loads, and this they did from different traders 
simultaneously, they started hiring warehouses on short-term leases.  It was to these 
warehouses, not in hotels, remember, that we delivered the consignment.  Soon, even 
retailers began to have their own warehouses, we had one for instance at Al Aweer.  
From these warehouses, we (retailers) would load the consignments on to containers 
in their presence. When their business in their home countries began to stabilize and 
expand, they would just come to us and tell us, see we need a thousand pieces of this 
particular item, or ten thousand pieces of another item, we want it in December.  We 
would then take the order, issue them bills for the purchase, take an advance 
payment, mostly ten or twenty percent of the total amount and book directly with the 
production units and factories in China. When the goods arrived in containers from 
China, we would break the seal of the Chinese company, put our own dealer names 
or brand names and then direct the shipment to Russia or wherever they wanted it.  
This was nine times out of ten done in the presence of the Russian customer himself 
or herself, you know there were quite a few women customers as well.  And all this 
was done at the Jebel Ali port.
I started a shop two years later in Murshid Bazaar, fully convinced of the trend and 
the bright side  it had for my career.  I had a large customer base. There were many 
traders like me in those days.  I know of somebody called Moosa, he started offices 
in Poland and Russia, hmm, hear he is doing well even now. What Moosa did was 
only a response to a particular development, in fact.  The Russians started getting 
wiser. They began to learn English, their children began to learn German.  They now 
have high standards of cultural excellence.  Moscow, no wonder is the most 
expensive city.
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